Bailey Hutchinson in 2000; the precincts comprising District 23 also gave a majority of their votes in 1998 to Republican candidates for Governor and Attorney General and to Democratic candidates for Comptroller and Lt. Governor.[4]

Congressman Henry Bonilla represented District 23 during the 1990's as the number of Spanish-surnamed registered voters in the district rose from 46 percent to 53 percent and, as found by the District Court, Latino voters gave less and less of their support to Congressman Bonilla. J.S. App. at 145. In 2002, although he was the incumbent, Henry Bonilla received the lowest level of support from Latino voters that he had ever received. *Id.* at 128. As a result, he almost lost his seat, garnering a slim 51.5 percent of the overall vote.

The crisis that had developed for Mr. Bonilla by 2002 was the shift of Latino voters away from him, not a shift in the partisan composition of his district. In fact, the Republican performance of District 23 was enhanced by the *Balderas* district court when compared to District 23 in the previous (1990's) plan.[5] In spite of the fact that District 23 had become more Republican after the three-judge court redrew it in 2001, Mr. Bonilla's margin of victory had diminished to less than 2 percentage points in 2002.

Throughout the 1990's, Mr. Bonilla had been successfully re-elected with strong Anglo support and a portion of Latino support. However, it was the willingness of Latino voters to vote for Mr. Bonilla during the 1990's that allowed him to remain in office as his district grew into one with a majority of Spanish-surnamed registered voters.

By 2002, Mr. Bonilla was losing more support among Latino voters in District 23 than other Republican

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[4] GI Forum Pls. Ex. 3 (Texas Legislative Council RED-M205 reports for Plan 1151C: 2002, 2000 and 1998 General Elections).

[5] GI Forum Pls. Ex. 3, 4 (Texas Legislative Council RED-M200 reports for Plans 1151 and 1000).

candidates for office. For example, one of the State's mapmakers acknowledged that the Republican statewide candidate for Comptroller in 2002, Carol Keaton Rylander, received twice as much support from Latino voters in District 23 as Mr. Bonilla.[6]

State mapmakers and legislators openly stated that their reason to reconfigure District 23 was to ensure the election of Mr. Bonilla. Representative Phil King, chief map drawer in the Texas House, testified that the Legislature altered District 23 to make sure Mr. Bonilla was re-elected. J.S. App. at 229. The Texas Senate's chief redistricter, Bob Davis, similarly testified that the goal in changing District 23 was to ensure the re-election of Mr. Bonilla.[7]

The State's expert testified at trial that the bolstering of Mr. Bonilla's re-election chances and the reduction of Latino population in District 23 "happen together, [and] one is a consequent of the other." J.S. App. at 222.

The District Court concluded that the State's drastic reconfiguration of District 23 was intended to ensure the re-election of Mr. Bonilla, as well as the other Republican incumbents in Texas, with the ultimate goal of building the State's Republican delegation to 22. *Id.* at 90-91.

As explained by Judge Ward, a member of the *Session* panel:

> The State's solution to this political problem was brutal, yet simple: destroy the opportunity district. The state did so by cracking a cohesive Hispanic community out of Webb County and taking in Anglos from the Texas Hill Country to build a district in which the Hispanic community will not be able to influence the outcome of the election.

J.S. App. at 191 (Ward, J., dissenting in part).

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[6] Tr., Dec. 18, 2003, 1:00 p.m., at 55 (Bob Davis).

[7] Tr., Dec. 18, 2003, 8:30 a.m., at 114 (Bob Davis).

Texas legislators dismantled District 23 with a second race-based goal – to ensure that Mr. Bonilla was re-elected in a nominally Latino-majority district. The District Court found that District 23 was intentionally constructed with enough Latinos for a bare voting age majority but not enough to elect the candidate of choice. J.S. App. at 145-46.

State map drawers also admitted that one of their goals was to ensure that District 23 contained a nominal majority of Latinos. *Id.* at 229. The State's expert witness testified that, despite his warnings to the Legislature that they were creating a District 23 that would not perform for Latino voters, every version of District 23 he saw maintained a voting age majority of Latinos. *Id.* at 220.

Thus, the State's map drawers articulated a carefully balanced and profoundly racial motive: reduce the Latino population of Congressional District 23 so that it could not elect the Latino-preferred candidate, but ensure that the district was nominally Latino so that Mr. Bonilla could still claim to be elected from a Latino-majority district. Representative Phil King, chief map drawer in the Texas House, put it this way: "Well, we tried the keep it above 50 percent Hispanic VAP, and we tried to make it a District that [had] some more Republicans in it so that Henry Bonilla could have an easier time with re-election because we didn't want to lose him." *Id.* at 229. *See also id.* at 230.

B. The State Crafted Seven Latino-Majority Districts in South Texas but Only Provided Political Opportunity in Six

The State's decision to create seven congressional districts in an area featuring a 58 percent Latino citizen voting age majority brought with it the ease of creating seven congressional districts that would offer the opportunity to elect the Latino candidate of choice. Instead, the State gave with one hand and took away with the other. It diminished District 23 to the point of ineffectiveness and then rearranged the remaining counties to insert District 25. The net result was six minority opportunity districts

located in a larger, expanded area of the state that could support seven such districts.

II. Procedural History

GI Forum Appellants filed their challenge to the 2003 congressional redistricting in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas on October 14, 2003. That case, *GI Forum v. Texas*, No. CV-03-124 (S.D. Tex. 2001) was consolidated with other redistricting challenges in the Eastern District of Texas on October 23, 2003. Trial went forward on December 11, 2003.

The District Court upheld the State's congressional redistricting plan in an opinion dated January 6, 2004 and issued its final judgment on January 15, 2004. J.S. App. at 217. On appeal, this Court vacated that ruling and remanded the case for reconsideration in light of *Vieth*, 541 U.S. at 267. *See Jackson v. Perry*, 125 S.Ct. 351 (2004).

A. District Court's Opinion

On remand, the District Court declined to consider whether, in its pursuit of a partisan goal, the State violated the rights of Latino voters. Instead, the District Court dismissed such claims as "beyond the scope of the mandate."[6]

Following trial, the District Court had found that Latino population was removed from District 23 in order to ensure the re-election of incumbent Henry Bonilla, who was not the preferred candidate of Latino voters: "The

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[6] "The GI Forum ... return to their claims that the Texas plan impermissibly burdens minority voters in violation of the Voting Rights Acts [sic] and the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Each would tie these claims to partisan gerrymandering. The contention is that these violations occurred in the effort to gain partisan advantage, however else the effort may be flawed. We examined and rejected all of the claims in detail in our previous opinion. As these claims are beyond the scope of the mandate we are not persuaded that we should revisit them." J.S. App. at 42.

evidence showed that Bonilla had lost a larger amount of Hispanic support in each successive election. In 2002, Bonilla attracted only 8 percent of the Latino vote." J.S. App. at 145, 128. In order to "shore up" District 23 for the incumbent, the District Court found that the State removed 99,766 people, who were more than 90% Hispanic, from the district and added 101,260 largely Anglo residents of the Texas Hill Country. *Id.* at 128. The State accomplished this removal of Latino population by slicing through the middle of the City of Laredo and Webb County, a U.S.-Mexico border community that was previously included whole in District 23. *Id.* at 128.

The District Court found that: "Congressional District 23 is, unquestionably, not a Latino opportunity district under Plan 1374C. The map drawers divided Webb County, which is 94 percent Latino." *Id.* at 144.

Despite these findings and conclusions, the District Court accepted the partisan justification offered by the State for eliminating District 23 as a Latino opportunity district but maintaining it as nominally Latino-majority.

The District Court further concluded: "The change to Congressional District 23 served the dual goal of increasing Republican seats in general and protecting Bonilla's incumbency in particular, with the additional political nuance that Bonilla would be reelected in a district that had a majority of Latino voting age population – although clearly not a majority of citizen voting age population and certainly not an effective voting majority." *Id.* at 145-46. Thus, even the court acknowledged that the State's partisan goal was infused with race.

The District Court, struggling to reconcile its identified dual goals, and to provide appropriate weight to the racialized element of even the partisan goal standing alone, ended up effectively deferring to the Legislature, concluding that "this plan was a political product from start to finish." *Id.* at 96. The District Court concluded that, in its view, holding otherwise would "inject the federal courts into a political game for which they are ill-suited." *Id.* at 96. Still, the District Court expressed at

length its discomfort with this solution, explicitly noting the lack of adequate guidance on reconciling dual racial and non-racial motivations. J.S. App. at 96-97. Nevertheless, on remand the District Court declined to consider whether the standards discussed in *Vieth* required a different conclusion.

With respect to GI Forum Appellants' challenge to the configuration of districts in South and West Texas, although conceding that it was bound by this Court's rulings in *Shaw v. Hunt*, 517 U.S. 899 (1996) (*Shaw II*) and *Johnson v. DeGrandy*, 512 U.S. 997 (1994), J.S. App. at 44-46, the District Court after trial concluded that the State could permissibly offset the vote dilution caused by the loss of District 23 by creating District 25 located to the east of District 28. Limiting the holding of *Shaw II* to the creation of non-compact districts, the District Court held that the State's creation of District 25 in South Texas, which was intended to cure the retrogression caused by eliminating District 23, also offsets any vote dilution, otherwise actionable under section 2.

B. Judge Ward Issued a Strong Dissent on GI Forum Appellants' Claims

Judge Ward, who was a member of the *Balderas* panel in 2001 that drew the previous map, wrote separately in dissent from the majority's January 2004 opinion. Explaining that District 23 was created by the *Balderas* three-judge panel in 2001 as a "protected Latino opportunity district," Judge Ward concluded that, in reconfiguring District 23, the State had made

> . . . the conscious choice to dismantle a minority opportunity district to thwart the growing Latino dissatisfaction with an incumbent Congressman. Just when it became apparent that District 23 was becoming more effective for the class it was intended to protect, the State intentionally altered it.

J.S. App. at 207 (Ward, J., dissenting in part).

Judge Ward also rejected the State's attempt to offset the loss of District 23 as an effective Latino district through the crafting of a new District 25:

> Although I recognize that 'States retain broad discretion in drawing districts to comply with the mandate of § 2,' I do not read the Court's cases to mean that the 'effects' test of § 2, if satisfied, may be defended against by pointing to a political agenda in the affected portion of the jurisdiction and compensation, over the long haul, to other members of the injured group residing elsewhere in the jurisdiction.

J.S. App. at 194 (Ward, J., dissenting in part) (internal citations omitted).

Positing that increasing Latino population in another Texas congressional district could threaten an incumbent, Judge Ward concluded, "To use *DeGrandy* to permit the State at that stage to dismantle [such a district] and create a new district somewhere else has a tendency to perpetuate the legacy of discrimination, not to thwart it." *Id.* at 208.

Finally, Judge Ward wrote that the GI Forum Appellants had proved their vote dilution claims under section 2. *Id.* at 197-208. Noting that the State had included 14 new counties into its configuration of South Texas congressional districts, and reviewing the GI Forum Appellants' suggested rearrangement of district boundaries in this same territory, Judge Ward wrote that the "evidence is undisputed that, under Plan 1385C, sponsored by the GI Forum Plaintiffs, Latino voters constitute the majority of citizen voting age population in seven congressional districts in South and Central Texas." *Id.* at 208. Having met the standard set out in the first *Gingles* precondition, Judge Ward further found that the GI Forum Appellants' districts were effective, concluding that, "[v]iewed in light of these election returns, as opposed to simply looking at the CVAP content or any other single statistic, all of these districts perform, in terms of winning elections, at least as well as their counterparts in Plan 1374C." *Id.* at 199. *See Thornburg v. Gingles*, 478 U.S. 30 (1986).

Judge Ward further concluded that the proposed seven Latino opportunity districts were compact and met the *DeGrandy* proportionality test and that the 2001 decision in *Balderas* did not compel the outcome of the GI Forum Appellants' vote dilution claim because *Balderas* dealt neither with Plan 1374C nor the newly available census data on citizen voting age population. *Id.* at 202-10.

THE QUESTIONS PRESENTED ARE SUBSTANTIAL

Following remand of this case for reconsideration in light of *Vieth v. Jubelirer*, the GI Forum Appellants offered, and the District Court rejected, the suggestion that at least one workable standard for unconstitutional partisan gerrymandering is the purposeful manipulation of minority voter population in order to limit the number of districts in which minority voters could elect their preferred candidates. The District Court rejected the argument that it is unconstitutional to remove minority voters from an opportunity district in order to ensure the re-election of a candidate who had come to be strongly disfavored by minority voters.

In spite of evidence to the contrary, the District Court forced itself to assume that Latino voters are Democrats and Democrats are Latino voters in order to conclude that partisanship justified the removal of Latino voters from District 23 for the purpose of ensuring the re-election of Henry Bonilla. Similarly, the District Court improperly accepted partisanship as sufficient justification for minimizing Latino voting strength across the southern portion of the state.

The District Court ruling has serious implications for states across the country where voting is still racially polarized and where many of today's minority voters experienced first hand the exclusion of the poll tax, literacy tests and other measures intended to frustrate their vote. To give states free license to eliminate minority voting opportunities with only vague and generalized references to incumbency protection or partisanship

creates an unworkable legal standard for mapmakers who are currently attempting to juggle the prohibitions of the Voting Rights Act and the Fourteenth Amendment with the flexibility granted to them under *Georgia v. Ashcroft*, 539 U.S. 956 (2003) to shape minority political opportunities and elected officials' desires to maximize partisan political advantage.

The Court should grant plenary review in this case in order to clarify the proper application of the prohibition against partisan gerrymandering and its interaction with section 2, the rapid doctrinal development in race conscious redistricting, as well as the Court's recent decision in *Georgia v. Ashcroft*. Without clarification before the next round of redistricting in 2010, map drawers will remain at a loss as to how to understand the limits of partisan gerrymandering, both with respect to intentional vote dilution, as well as the effects standard of *Thornburg v. Gingles*, 478 U.S. at 30.

I. TEXAS MAY NOT DISMANTLE A LATINO OPPORTUNITY DISTRICT FOR THE SOLE PURPOSE OF ELECTING THE CANDIDATE DISFAVORED BY LATINO VOTERS

The District Court recognized that District 23 was dismantled precisely to ensure that Latinos, who had increasingly withdrawn their support from Mr. Bonilla, would lose their ability to influence the outcome of the election. Latino pressure on Mr. Bonilla to adopt different stances in Congress, itself a form of influence over the political process, was met by the Texas Legislature with a revision of District 23's boundaries that denied Latinos any chance at all of electing their candidate of choice.

When the record in the case showed, and the District Court acknowledged, that Latino voters had been fluid in their support of the Republican incumbent in the preceding decade, the District Court erred when it considered Latino voters and Democratic voters as interchangeable in its analysis of the alterations to District 23. State

legislatures have never been permitted to treat race and partisan affiliation as interchangeable in redistricting. Nevertheless, the District Court approved, and even described, the dismantling of District 23 as the removal of Latino voters in order to ensure the re-election of a candidate from a particular political party.

It has long been established that using political boundaries to "fence out" racial minorities from political opportunities violates the Constitution. *See Gomillion v. Lightfoot*, 364 U.S. 339 (1960). Redistricting that treats people of one race differently is prohibited because "classifications of citizens solely on the basis of race . . . threaten to stigmatize individuals by reason of their membership in a racial group and to incite racial hostility." *Shaw v. Reno*, 509 U.S. at 643.

Similarly, drawing district lines on the assumption that people of the same race vote together "reinforces the perception that members of the same racial group – regardless of their age, education, economic status, or the community in which they live – think alike, share the same political interests, and will prefer the same candidates at the polls." *Id.* at 648.

> It is true that redistricting in most cases will implicate a political calculus in which various interests compete for recognition, but it does not follow from this that individuals of the same race share a single political interest. The view that they do is "based on the demeaning notion that members of the defined racial groups ascribe to certain 'minority views' that must be different from those of other citizens," the precise use of race as a proxy the Constitution prohibits.

Miller, 515 U.S. at 914 (quoting *Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC*, 497 U.S. 547, 636 (1990) (Kennedy, J., dissenting)).

Justice Kennedy wrote in *Vieth* that race in redistricting cannot be tolerated in the same way that courts tolerate partisanship:

> That courts can grant relief in districting cases where race is involved does not answer our need

> for fairness principles here. Those controversies implicate a different inquiry. They involve sorting permissible classifications in the redistricting context from impermissible ones. Race is an impermissible classification. See *Shaw v. Reno*, 509 U.S. 630 (1993). Politics is quite a different matter.

Vieth, 541 U.S. at 307 (2004) (citation omitted).

See also Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. at 650 (1993) ("[N]othing in our case law compels the conclusion that racial and political gerrymanders are subject to precisely the same constitutional scrutiny. In fact, our country's long and persistent history of racial discrimination in voting – as well as our Fourteenth Amendment jurisprudence, which always has reserved the strictest scrutiny for discrimination on the basis of race . . . would seem to compel the opposite conclusion.").

The *Vieth* decision tells us that the question of "how much is too much" is one applied to partisanship, not race. Race is never a permissible redistricting criteria, even when there are permissible co-existing motives. *Vieth*, 541 U.S. at 344.

Nevertheless, declaring in its 2004 opinion that, "a high percentage of Blacks and Latinos are Democrats," the District Court proceeded to analyze the changes to District 23 without reference to the partisan composition of the district or the likelihood that Latino voters would support candidates of one party or another. J.S. App. at 90-91.

Throughout its discussion of the dismantling of District 23, the District Court systematically confounded the notions of race and partisan affiliation:

> The record presents undisputed evidence that the Legislature desired to increase the number of Republican votes cast in Congressional District 23 to shore up Bonilla's base and assist in his re-election. The evidence showed that Bonilla had lost a larger amount of Hispanic support in each successive election. In 2002, Bonilla attracted only 8 percent of the Latino vote.

J.S. App. at 128. In spite of its finding that Latino voters supported Mr. Bonilla at higher levels in the past, thus demonstrating their willingness to vote for the Republican candidate, the District Court accepted the State's proffered solution of removing Latino voters from District 23 in order to "shore up" the base of Mr. Bonilla.

In order to "shore up" District 23 for the incumbent, the District Court found that the State removed 99,766 people, who were more than 90 percent Hispanic, from the district and added 101,260 largely Anglo residents of the Texas Hill Country. *Id.*

Noting that it was the drop in support among Latino voters that had caused the re-election crisis for Mr. Bonilla, the court proceeded seamlessly to the idea that removing Latino voters from the district was permissible partisan redistricting. Judge Higginbotham, commenting from the bench during trial, summarized his view that the State had responded to the decline in Latino voter support for Mr. Bonilla by removing them from the district and replacing them with voters who would more reliably support Mr. Bonilla. "The blunt purpose was to assist Congressman Bonilla because he was down to about 8 percent [Latino voter support]. Put in some Alamo Heights, that area of the Republican vote. But then having done that, and to avoid the obvious problems of diluting that District, you draw another District. What's the problem with that?"*

The District Court never discussed the substantial rates of ticket-splitting by Latino voters in Webb County, or tested the State's assertion that it had to locate the district's boundary in the middle of the City of Laredo and Webb County. Instead, after examining racial voting trends, the District Court concluded that the threat to Mr. Bonilla's re-election was decreasing support among Latino voters. Despite its conclusion that "the Texas Legislature sought to apply to South and West Texas its primary

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* Tr., Dec. 15, 2003, 8:30 a.m., at 63 (Hon. Patrick Higginbotham).

partisan goal of increasing the likelihood that Republican candidates would be elected to Congress," the District Court never found that Webb County or District 23 was trending more Democratic; on the contrary, District 23 performed better for Republican statewide candidates in 2002 than its predecessor district.[10] No party at trial testified to a surge of Democratic voting in District 23 prior to the Texas Legislature's decision to radically redraw its boundaries. The District Court also did not address testimony by State witnesses that other Republican candidates garnered more than twice the Latino support as Mr. Bonilla in the 2002 election.[11]

The District Court consistently discussed District 23 in terms of its Latino composition and analyzed the changes made by the Texas Legislature in terms of its effect on Latino voters. The District Court focused on the facts that the Legislature's changes to District 23 reduced the Hispanic citizen voting age population of the district from 57.5 percent to 46 percent and reduced the Spanish-surnamed registered voters from 55.3 percent to 44 percent. J.S. App. at 128-29. The District Court concluded: "The map drawers divided Webb County, which is 94 percent Latino." *Id.* at 144.

The "problem" being addressed by Texas redistricters in 2003 was not the behavior of people who voted Democrat (who by definition did not support Mr. Bonilla) but the behavior of people who voted Republican – those ticket-splitting Latinos who formerly voted for Mr. Bonilla but who had become disenchanted and started voting for his opponents.

The District Court improperly rejected the argument that Mr. Bonilla's incumbency could have been preserved

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[10] GI Forum Pls. Ex. 3, 4 (Texas Legislative Council RED-M200 reports for Plans 1151 and 1000).

[11] Tr., Dec. 18, 2003, 1:00 p.m., at 54-55 (Bob Davis).

by placing him into a district other than District 23, thus allowing District 23 to continue to function as a Latino opportunity district and obviating the need to create the new District 25 to the east. Such a measure would have resulted in the same number of Republican and Democratic districts in the plan. For example, Texas mapmakers created District 11 as a heavily Republican seat with no incumbent directly to the north of District 23. The District Court relied instead on testimony by witnesses for the State who claimed that their goal was to keep Mr. Bonilla in a district that was heavily Latino, even if it failed to elect the Latino candidate of choice.[12] Texas mapmakers from the House and Senate both articulated the desire to recruit more Latinos into the Republican party by placing them into a district that would elect Mr. Bonilla.[13]

Based on its findings that Latino voters in District 23 had supported Mr. Bonilla at greater levels in the past but in 2002 had withdrawn their support and were more likely to vote for Republican candidates who were not Mr. Bonilla, the District Court should have required a non-racial explanation when Texas mapmakers excised more than 75,000 Latinos from the district.

Texas mapmakers understood well that District 23 was a minority opportunity district in 2003 and the District Court accepted their explanation that the district had to be dismantled to ensure the re-election of the candidate not preferred by Latino voters, *i.e.*, to prevent Latinos from electing their preferred candidate. Thus, the decision to dismantle District 23 was driven by race – not just an awareness of race, but the intent to thwart the will of a cohesive bloc of minority voters. Furthermore, by denying District 23's Latino voters the opportunity to encourage their representative in Congress to shift his positions on public policy, Texas mapmakers stole from

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[12] Tr., Dec. 18, 2003, 8:30 a.m., at 113-14 (Bob Davis); Tr., Dec. 18, 2003, 1:00 p.m., at 164 (Rep. Phil King).

[13] Tr., Dec. 18, 2003, 8:30 a.m., at 113-14 (Bob Davis); Tr., Dec. 18, 2003, 1:00 p.m., at 165-66 (Rep. Phil King).

them the ability to affect the political process through their vote. "This is altogether antithetical to our system of representational democracy." *Shaw v. Reno*, 509 U.S. at 648. Ultimately, the configuration of District 23 violates the statutory and constitutional "obligation not to create ... districts for predominantly racial, as opposed to political or traditional, districting motivations." *Easley v. Cromartie*, 532 U.S. 234, 249 (2001).

Having concluded, as the District Court did in this case, that the State purposefully created District 23 so that "Bonilla would be reelected in a district that had a majority of Latino voting age population – although clearly not a majority of citizen voting age population and certainly not an effective voting majority," the District Court should have also concluded that the State alteration of District 23 violated section 2 and the Constitution. J.S. App. at 145-46.

Incumbency protection is not a permissible motive when diluting minority votes is chosen as the means to protect the incumbent. *Garza v. County of Los Angeles*, 918 F.2d 763, 771 (9th Cir. 1990), *cert. denied*, 498 U.S. 1028 (1991) (although line drawers acted primarily to protect incumbents, their knowledge that they were preventing the emergence of a Latino-majority district together with other aspects of the process leading to the decision were sufficient to require a finding of racial intent). Judge Kozinski aptly illustrated how intentional discrimination can intersect with legitimate motives:

> Assume you are an anglo homeowner who lives in an all-white neighborhood. Suppose, also, that you harbor no ill feelings toward minorities. Suppose further, however, that some of your neighbors persuade you that having an integrated neighborhood would lower property values and that you stand to lose a lot of money on your home. On the basis of that belief, you join a pact not to sell your house to minorities. Your personal feelings toward minorities don't matter; what matters is that you intentionally took

> actions calculated to keep them out of your neighborhood.

Garza, 918 F.2d at 778 n.1 (Kozinski, J., concurring in relevant part).

Judge Kozinski explained that where "the record shows that ethnic or racial communities were split to assure a safe seat for an incumbent, there is a strong inference – indeed a presumption – that this was the result of intentional discrimination, even absent ... smoking gun evidence." *Id.* at 779.

Lower courts have consistently followed the prohibition on mixed motive race discrimination in redistricting even when the state articulates a non-racial motivation for its actions. *Rybicki v. State Board of Elections*, 574 F. Supp. 1082, 1109 (N.D. Ill. 1982) (three-judge panel) ("under the peculiar circumstances of this case, the requirements of incumbency are so closely intertwined with the need for racial dilution that an intent to maintain a safe, primarily white, district for Senator Joyce is virtually coterminous with a purpose to practice racial discrimination"). *See also Ketchum v. Byrne*, Nos. 83-2044; 83-2065; 83-2126, 1984 U.S. App. LEXIS 19572, at *28 (7th Cir. 1984) ("We think there is little point for present purposes in distinguishing discrimination based on an ultimate objective of keeping certain incumbent whites in office from discrimination borne of pure racial animus.").

Similarly, in *Bush v. Vera*, 517 U.S. 952 (1996), this Court held that racial motivations are not overcome with a blanket justification of partisanship, particularly when there is no specific proof that partisanship, as opposed to race, was the predominant motive. "[T]o the extent that race is used as a proxy for political characteristics, a racial stereotype requiring strict scrutiny is in operation." *Id.* at 968. This Court in *Vera* specifically forbade, in the context of redistricting, "political gerrymandering [that is] accomplished in large part by the use of race as a proxy." *Id.* at 969. *See also Diaz v. Silver*, 978 F. Supp. 96, 123 (E.D.N.Y. 1997), *aff'd without opinion*, 522 U.S. 801 (1997) ("while incumbency explains, in major part, the final boundaries

of various districts, without the factor of race, the 12th District, as a majority Latino district, would never have been created").

GI Forum Appellants suggest that this case requires a ruling, consistent with *Vieth*, that race played an impermissible role in the Texas redistricting plan. The dismantling of a minority opportunity district, with the goal that it no longer provide the opportunity to elect the minority-preferred candidate is not only "rare," as the term is used by Justice Scalia in *Vieth*, but may very well be unique in redistricting history to date. *See Vieth*, 541 U.S. at 286. The startling facts surrounding the use of race in dismantling District 23 more than meet the standard for unconstitutional gerrymandering sought by Justice Kennedy in *Vieth* and further satisfy the need for an objective, neutral approach to evaluate the existence of a constitutional violation.

II. THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED WHEN IT RULED THAT SECTION 2 DID NOT REQUIRE THE CREATION OF A SEVENTH LATINO OPPORTUNITY DISTRICT IN THE SOUTHERN PORTION OF THE STATE

When this Court vacated and remanded the District Court's 2003 decision, it did not reach the question of vote dilution raised by the GI Forum Appellants. Appellants therefore ask the Court to address this serious claim raised by GI Forum Appellants.

In Texas, the Legislature chose to expand the territory in which it drew Latino-majority districts by adding 14 whole or partial counties. The population of this newly-expanded territory required the creation of seven congressional districts and overall contained a Latino citizen voting age majority of 58%. After sweeping in greater numbers of Latino voters, however, State mapmakers artfully crafted only six districts in which Latinos enjoyed the opportunity to elect their candidate of choice. This dilutive construction of districts may have been motivated by the State's intent to benefit one political party but it

also limited the voting strength of Latinos by packing and fracturing them across South Texas.

The State's redistricting plan shifts and squeezes Latino population into only six opportunity districts among the seven districts located in the southern portion of the state. A simple rearrangement of the boundaries of these seven districts yields the more rational and compact seven Latino opportunity districts proposed by the GI Forum Appellants. As noted by Judge Ward of this panel, the "evidence is undisputed that, under Plan 1385C, sponsored by the GI Forum Plaintiffs, Latino voters constitute the majority of citizen voting age population in seven congressional districts in South and Central Texas." J.S. App. at 198 (Ward, J., dissenting in part). Election analysis performed by Dr. Richard Engstrom, and relied upon by the District Court in its order of January 2004, demonstrates that all seven opportunity districts proposed by the GI Forum Appellants offer the opportunity to elect the Latino-preferred candidate.

A. *Shaw II* And *Johnson v. DeGrandy* Do Not Permit Vote Dilution In One Area Of The State To Be "Offset" By The Creation Of Another Majority-Minority District In A Different Part Of The State

This Court's rulings in *Shaw II* and *DeGrandy* make clear that states may not trade-off the voting rights of people in one region for those in another region:

> If a § 2 violation is proved for a particular area, it flows from the fact that individuals in this area 'have less opportunity than other members of the electorate to participate in the political process and to elect representatives of their choice.' 42 U.S.C. § 1973(b). The vote-dilution injuries suffered by these persons are not remedied by creating a safe majority-black district somewhere else in the State. . . . To accept that the district may be placed anywhere implies that the claim, and hence the coordinate right to an undiluted vote

> (to cast a ballot equal among voters), belongs to the minority as a group and not to its individual members. It does not.

Shaw II, 517 U.S. at 917. *See also DeGrandy*, 512 U.S. at 1019 (it is "highly suspect" to hide behind proportionality if "in any given voting jurisdiction, the rights of some minority voters under Section 2 [are] traded off against the rights of other members of the same minority class . . . ") (parenthetical omitted); *Rural W. Tennessee African-American Affairs Council v. Sundquist*, 209 F.3d 835, 844 (6th Cir. 2000) (relying on *DeGrandy* and *Shaw II* to refrain from analyzing minority opportunity to elect in other parts of the state "because to do so would require us to trade the § 2 rights of individual African-Americans in rural west Tennessee against those of African American groups elsewhere in the State"); *Moon v. Meadows*, 952 F. Supp. 1141 (E.D. Va. 1997) (three-judge panel) (rejecting claim that racially-motivated district was compelled by section 2 where district was not located in geographic area of vote dilution).

In the case at hand, the State asserted, and the District Court erroneously accepted, that the State could remedy, under section 2 as well as section 5, the loss of District 23 as a majority-minority district by creating District 25.

B. The District Court Erroneously Required GI Forum's Demonstrative *Gingles* Districts To Be More Compact And Provide Greater Electoral Opportunity Than Their Counterparts In The State's Plan

1. Compactness

Fifth Circuit precedent required the District Court to apply the compactness test of the first *Gingles* precondition only to evaluate whether an additional Latino-majority district was achievable. *See Houston v. Lafayette County*, 56 F.3d 606, 611 (5th Cir. 1995) (en banc) ("[T]he question is not whether the plaintiff residents' proposed

district was oddly shaped, but whether the proposal demonstrated that a geographically compact district could be drawn."); *Clark v. Calhoun County, Miss.*, 21 F.3d 92, 95 (5th Cir. 1994) ("[P]laintiffs' proposed district is not cast in stone. It was simply presented to demonstrate that a majority-black district is feasible").

Relying upon well-accepted quantitative measures of compactness generated by the Texas Legislative Council, the District Court found that all of the seven districts proposed by GI Forum Appellants were more compact than the State's District 15 in South Texas, which stretches from Hidalgo County on the U.S.-Mexico border to Bastrop County.[14] In addition, the District Court found that four of the seven districts proposed by GI Forum Appellants were as compact or more compact than their counterparts in the State's plan. However, the District Court then concluded, without reference to any objective measures of compactness, that the GI Forum Appellants' demonstration plan would not satisfy the first *Gingles* precondition because "Plan 1385C proposes districts that are more unusually shaped" than the challenged Plan 1374C. J.S. App. at 74.[15] None of the Court's factual findings addressed whether the Latino community of South and West Texas, which fits neatly into the 58 county area identified by the District Court, is sufficiently numerous and compact to comprise

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[14] Plaintiffs here refer to the mathematical measures of compactness known as "perimeter to area" and "smallest circle." *See* Richard H. Pildes & Richard G. Niemi, *Expressive Harms, "Bizarre Districts," and Voting Rights: Evaluating Election-District Appearances After Shaw v. Reno*, 92 Mich. L. Rev. 483, 554-55, n.203 (1993).

[15] For example, the District Court criticized GI Forum Appellants' demonstrative Congressional Districts 15 and 25 as "unusually shaped" despite the fact that they are *more* compact than the State's challenged Districts 15 and 25. J.S. App. at 134-35 n.125. The District Court also compared GI Forum Appellants' demonstrative Congressional District 28, which spans the relatively short distance between San Antonio and Austin, unfavorably with the State's Congressional District 28, which stretches more than three times the distance to connect Zapata County with Hays County. *Id.*

the majority of seven districts. *See Vera*, 517 U.S. at 997 (1996) (Kennedy, J., concurring) ("The first *Gingles* condition refers to the compactness of the minority population, not to the compactness of the contested district.").

Instead, the District Court erroneously required GI Forum Appellants' demonstrative districts not just to meet but exceed in every instance the compactness of the State's districts in the region and then further satisfy an ill-defined "eyeball" test applied subjectively by the District Court. As this Court stated in *Vera*, "a Section 2 district that is reasonably compact and regular, taking into account traditional districting principles such as maintaining communities of interest and traditional boundaries, may pass strict scrutiny without having to defeat rival compact districts designed by plaintiffs' experts in endless beauty contests." *Id.* at 977.

2. Effectiveness

The District Court found that GI Forum Appellants' demonstration of seven congressional districts satisfied the Fifth Circuit's own bright-line numerosity test for the first *Gingles* precondition.[16] J.S. App. at 133 ("The GI Forum Plaintiffs present a demonstration district [sic], Plan 1385C, that shows an additional Latino citizen voting age majority district in South and West Texas"); and *id.* at 140 n.133 (citing *Valdespino v. Alamo Heights Indep. Sch. Dist*, 168 F.3d 848, 852-53 (5th Cir. 1999), *cert. denied*, 528 U.S. 1114 (2000) (applying "a bright line test" of greater

[16] The District Court opinion suggests that the decision in *Balderas v. Texas* regarding whether plaintiffs could demonstrate seven Latino-majority congressional districts in South Texas dictates an identical finding in the case at hand. J.S. App. at 133-34. This suggestion is clearly erroneous. The task before the *Session* District Court was to evaluate whether the State's unprecedented use of 58 counties in its redistricting of South Texas diluted minority voting strength in that region. GI Forum Appellants' demonstration in *Session* of how this expanded region can yield seven minority opportunity districts was completely different from the districts proposed by plaintiffs in *Balderas* to remedy malapportionment.

than 50% citizen voting age population to determine whether plaintiffs constitute a majority in their demonstration district)). The District Court further found that GI Forum Appellants had satisfied the second and third *Gingles* preconditions and demonstrated the existence of critical Senate Factors. "This court recognizes that Plaintiffs have established racially polarized voting and a political, social and economic legacy of past discrimination." J.S. App. at 136.

Nevertheless, the District Court held that GI Forum Appellants could not prove, under the totality of circumstances, that Latinos will suffer vote dilution in the absence of seven Latino-majority districts in South Texas. The District Court based its "totality of circumstances" conclusion on a finding that not all seven of the districts proposed by GI Forum Appellants in its demonstrative plan offered Latinos the opportunity to elect their candidate of choice.

Once again, use by the District Court of different standards for evaluating the State's challenged districts and GI Forum Appellants' proposed districts demonstrates the District Court's incorrect application of *Thornburg v. Gingles* to this redistricting challenge.

In deciding whether or not the State's configuration of Latino-majority districts in Plan 1374C would offer Latinos the opportunity to elect their candidate of choice, the District Court properly examined the election performance of the challenged districts and rejected testimony by those critics of Plan 1374C who argued that a district's effectiveness turns on super-majority demographics.[17] Nevertheless, the District Court summarily

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[17] For example, in evaluating the effectiveness of the State's Latino-majority districts, the District Court rejected the non-statistical testimony of expert witness Dr. Polinard who stated that there is no "magic number" that tells you when a district's Spanish-surnamed voter registration becomes effective, but "you become more comfortable with opportunity districts once you break into those 60%-plus ranges." J.S. App. at 141 n.136. Instead, the District Court used functional

(Continued on following page)

concluded that GI Forum Appellants' District 28 was not effective "because ... a low majority of the Hispanic citizen voting age population does not produce an *effective* Latino opportunity district." J.S. App. at 140-41 (emphasis in original). However, the District Court's own test of functional effectiveness (based on election analyses by experts for both the State and GI Forum Appellants) showed that the seven GI Forum Appellants' proposed districts were similarly or more effective to elect the Latino-preferred candidate than those enacted by the State.[15]

Once again, use by the District Court of different standards for evaluating the State's challenged districts and GI Forum Appellants' proposed districts demonstrates the District Court's incorrect application of *Thornburg v. Gingles* to this redistricting challenge.

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election performance to conclude that districts in the State's plan were effective with far less than the 60% Spanish-surnamed voter registration suggested by Dr. Polinard. *Id.* at 151, 152 n.151. The District Court nevertheless quoted this very same discredited testimony to suggest that the GI Forum Appellants' proposed District 28 would not offer an opportunity to elect the Latino-preferred candidate, despite the fact that it elected the Latino-preferred candidate at the same rate as State's District 28 (eight out of eight racially contested elections). *Compare* J.S. App. at 140-41 *with* J.S. App. at 92 n.151.

[15] The District Court relied upon and reprinted in its opinion the GI Forum Appellants' statistical table showing six effective Latino districts in Plan 1374C but excised the portion of that same table showing seven effective Latino districts in the GI Forum Appellants Plan 1385C. J.S. App. at 152 n.151. Similarly, the District Court relied upon the testimony of GI Forum Appellants' expert witness, the nationally recognized political scientist Dr. Richard Engstrom, to conclude that the State's Plan 1374C contained six effective Latino districts while ignoring those portions of his analysis showing that the GI Forum Appellants' plan contained seven effective Latino districts. *See, e.g.*, J.S. App. at 151 n.150, 154, 158 n.171, 159 n.175.

C. The District Court Misapplied *DeGrandy* In Concluding That The First *Gingles* Precondition Operates As A Cap On The Proportionality That Can Be Achieved By Minority Voters In A Redistricting Plan

The District Court applied the traditional proportionality test articulated in *Johnson v. DeGrandy*, 512 U.S. at 997, to the State's redistricting plan and concluded that "Plaintiffs are correct in their calculation that six districts in which Latinos hold a majority of citizen voting age population, out of thirty-two districts that comprise Texas, do not equate to arithmetic proportionality between the number of Latino majority-minority districts and the Latinos' percentage of the citizen voting age population in the State." J.S. App. at 139-40. Nevertheless, after applying the correct proportionality standard under *DeGrandy* and finding that Latinos do not enjoy proportional political strength, the District Court applied a new and different standard to conclude that Latinos in Texas enjoy proportional political strength.

The District Court held that, in the proportionality analysis, the overall number of districts in the redistricting plan should be limited to the number of minority opportunity districts that can be created in the redistricting plan, improperly tying the question of proportionality back into the first *Gingles* precondition: "*DeGrandy* requires an examination of whether the totality of circumstances includes rough proportionality between the number of *effective* majority minority districts that can be drawn meeting the Gingles factors and the minority-members' share of the relevant population." J.S. App. at 140 (emphasis in original). *But see DeGrandy*, 512 U.S. at 1013 n.11 ("'Proportionality' as the term is used here links the number of majority minority voting districts [in the geographic area at issue] to minority-members' share of the relevant population.").

The District Court concluded that because, under the first *Gingles* precondition, no more than six Latino citizen voting age majority districts could be created in Texas, the number six functions as the upper limit of permissible

political opportunity. Thus, the District Court concluded that Latinos enjoyed proportionality when they comprised the majority of six districts, regardless of the number of districts in the statewide redistricting plan, or the Latino population proportion of the state.

This Court has never imposed the cap on political opportunity espoused by the District Court and has never suggested that the first *Gingles* precondition plays a role in evaluating whether minority voters possess, under the totality of circumstances, an equal opportunity to participate in the political process. *See also DeGrandy*, 512 U.S. at 1011 ("[T]he ultimate conclusions about equality or inequality of opportunity were intended by Congress to be judgments resting on comprehensive, not limited, canvassing of relevant facts"). The first *Gingles* precondition addresses whether minority voters are geographically concentrated in such a way that the proposed remedy will address their vote dilution; proportionality addresses a very different issue – whether minorities enjoy political opportunity regardless of geographic dispersion. To make the latter dependent on the former is circular logic, collapses the broader inquiry of totality into the specific test of the first *Gingles* precondition and defeats the purpose of looking beyond the *Gingles* preconditions to make an overall assessment of opportunity to participate in the political system.

CONCLUSION

The Court should note probable jurisdiction.

Respectfully submitted,

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
MARSHALL DIVISION

FRENCHIE HENDERSON, ET AL.	§	CIVIL ACTION
	§	NO. 2:03-CV-354
v.	§	
	§	Consolidated
RICK PERRY, ET AL.	§	

(Filed Jun. 9, 2005)

Before HIGGINBOTHAM, Circuit Judge, and WARD and ROSENTHAL, District Judges.

PATRICK E. HIGGINBOTHAM, Circuit Judge:

We are asked to examine again, in light of the Supreme Court's decision in *Vieth v. Jubelirer*,[1] the claims that the redistricting plan for the election of the thirty-two members of Congress from Texas, adopted by the Texas legislature in 2003, is unconstitutionally tainted by excessive partisan purpose. Ultimately, we will adhere to our earlier judgment that there is no basis for us to declare the plan invalid.

We conclude that claims of excessive partisanship before us suffer from a lack of any measure of substantive fairness. The claims accept that some partisan motivation is inevitably present in the political enterprise of redistricting, but urge that at some point it can become unconstitutional, presumably a denial of equal protection. No party before us states with clarity the precise constitutional

[1] 541 U.S. 267 (2004).

deficit. Although the lead plaintiffs invoke the structure of equal protection analysis, they identify no suspect criterion or impinged fundamental interest in insisting that if the state acts with the "sole" purpose of partisan advantage in drawing legislative districts, regardless of its effects, the state must offer a "compelling explanation" for its effort. The conduct that plaintiffs condemn is offered only in unstructured form; their condemnation of practices such as targeting incumbent members and ignoring "communities of interest" and other "traditional" principles of redistricting comes untethered to constitutional texts.

The most frequently invoked image of the evil resulting from excessive partisanship in drawing congressional districts is the non-competitive district, a product of a member choosing his constituents. We are asked to recognize this as anti-democratic and implored to find a means to curb it. The vision of the House of Representatives controlled by members who do not face serious opposition to reelection is urged as a stain upon its historical image as an institution embracing the teaching of Cincinnatus. The argument ignores a historical fact; the Texas delegation has enjoyed non-competitive districts for at least the past four and one-half decades, long before there were two political parties with any strength in the state. The emergence of Texas as a two-party state has not altered this reality, although it has given rise to forces that have caused the Texas delegation now to approximate the relative statewide voting strength of the two parties. As we will explain, there is little to suggest that taking up the tools plaintiffs offer in attacking the 2003 Texas plan will in fact remedy this awkward reality.

After addressing the claims of excessive partisanship, we will turn to a narrower and seemingly more plausible contention that does not attempt to measure how much partisanship in redistricting is constitutionally excessive, but instead uses the requirement of one-person, one-vote as a tool to limit how often redistricting can occur. This contention aims only at "voluntary" mid-decade redistricting that occurs when a legislature replaces a valid existing plan put into place after the last census; it does not attempt to set a standard for direct judicial supervision over partisan influence in redistricting, but instead proposes a rule that is intended to prevent the specific type of redistricting that occurred in Texas in 2003. The argument is that a legislature seeking to displace a valid extant plan may not rely on decennial census figures to meet the stringent demands of one-person, one-vote, but must instead prove that its proposed plan distributes population in an equipopulous manner by use of actual current figures. While its relative simplicity is seductive and avoids the need to measure how much partisanship is constitutionally excessive, we are not persuaded that it is appropriate for this court to endorse this application of the one-person, one-vote requirement as a means to the end of limiting political influences on redistricting.

I

The history of this case and of the efforts of the Texas legislature to draw lines for its thirty-two congressional districts is set out in our previous opinion, and we will not repeat it here.[3] While the appeal from our judgment

[3] *See Session v. Perry*, 298 F. Supp. 2d 451 (E.D. Tex. 2004).

upholding the plan adopted by the Texas legislature was pending before it, the Supreme Court decided *Vieth v. Jubelirer*. In *Vieth*, the Court affirmed the decision of a three-judge court rejecting claims by three registered Democrats who vote in Pennsylvania that a redistricting plan for congressional districts adopted by the Pennsylvania legislature should be set aside because it constituted an impermissible political gerrymander, in violation of Article I and the Equal Protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Their complaint, in addition to other claims, alleged that the districts were "meandering and irregular" and "ignored all traditional redistricting criteria . . . solely for the sake of partisan advantage."[3] The three-judge court granted defendants' Rule 12 motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, and the Supreme Court affirmed.

Shortly thereafter, in *Cox v. Larios*,[4] the Court summarily affirmed the judgment of a three-judge court that had rejected a redistricting plan of the Georgia legislature as failing to conform to the principle of one-person, one-vote. The district court held that because the legislature sought to give advantage to certain regions of the state and to certain incumbents in an effort to help Democrats and hurt Republicans, Georgia was not entitled to the 10% deviation toleration normally permitted when a state is drawing lines for its legislature.[5]

Then, after the summer recess, the Court remanded the present case "for further consideration in light of

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[3] *Id.*, at 272-73 (internal quotation marks and brackets omitted).

[4] 124 S. Ct. 2806 (2004).

[5] *Larios v. Cox*, 300 F. Supp. 2d 1320 (N.D. Ga.) (three-judge panel), *summarily aff'd*, 124 S. Ct. 2806 (2004).

Vieth,"[4] making no reference to its decision in *Larios*. Responsive to the remand order, we received briefs and heard oral argument from all parties and amici.

Although in our prior opinion we turned back many attacks upon the legislative plan for electing members of the Texas congressional delegation, we read the remand order to be a directive to reexamine only our rejection of the claim that the Texas plan is an illegal political gerrymander. This mandate does not include consideration of other attacks, with the possible exception of the claim that the Texas plan failed to abide the command of one-person, one-vote. Variations of this one-person, one-vote claim have been in the case from its inception, but came to the fore only in the arguments following the remand to this court. The Court made no mention of one-person, one-vote in its remand order, nor was it at issue in *Vieth*. However, this issue was present in the Court's examination of Georgia's plan in *Larios* in a way arguably related to the present case. Any examination of compliance with one-person, one-vote thus faces the threshold hurdle of whether the claim is within the mandate of the remand. We will treat this question in due course.

II

The light offered by *Vieth* is dim, and the search for a core holding is elusive. This observation is not a criticism, but a recognition that *Vieth* reflects the long and twisting historical narrative of political gerrymanders in the United States.

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[4] *Jackson v. Perry*, 125 S. Ct. 351 (mem.) (Oct. 18, 2004).

The most recent chapter in this history of partisan influence upon the drawing of legislative districts involves the federal judiciary's effort to play the role it claimed for itself in *Davis v. Bandemer*.[7] Judicial reluctance to surrender this role is understandable. The move to the one-person, one-vote principle in *Reynolds v. Sims*[8] both answered some of the critics of *Baker v. Carr*[9] and fulfilled the predictions of others who warned against entering the political thicket.[10] While hardly analogous to the quest for standards for reining in partisan gerrymanders, the relatively quick two-year process culminating in *Reynolds* encourages those reluctant to concede the futility of finding an effective standard for *Bandemer*. And as we will suggest, we have yet to calculate the full costs of achieving the clear and easily administered standard of *Reynolds*.

In addition, there is hesitation to concede that any solutions must come from legislatures and other political players whose critics say lack the ability to restrain themselves. This fear is fueled by the advent of computer-driven redistricting, which has taken this hoary practice to a new level.[11] There is wariness of lines that fall precisely

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[7] 478 U.S. 109 (1986) (finding political gerrymandering claims justiciable).

[8] 377 U.S. 533 (1964) (applying one-person, one-vote principle to malapportionment claims).

[9] 369 U.S. 186 (1962) (finding malapportionment claims justiciable).

[10] *See, e.g., Colegrove v. Green*, 328 U.S. 549, 556 (1946) (opinion of Frankfurter, J).

[11] *See Vieth*, 541 U.S. at 345-46 (Souter, J, dissenting), citing Samuel Issacharoff, *Gerrymandering and Political Cartels*, 116 HARV. L. REV. 593, 624 (2002) ("[I]ncumbent entrenchment has gotten worse as the computer technology for more exquisite gerrymandering has improved and political parties have ever more brazenly pursued

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where the draftsmen intend – an absence of randomness or sufficient extraneous forces that the draftsmen must accept. At bottom it is a concern that the power to draw lines is inadequately checked, an implicit accusation that the political process is inadequate to the task. There is also the reality that many members of the House of Representatives enjoy a more secure tenure than members of the Senate for the simple reason that Senators run statewide, while their colleagues in the House may run in districts crafted to their advantage.[13] Answers to such questions do not come easily.

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incumbent protection"); Pamela S. Karlan, *The Fire Next Time: Reapportionment After the 2000 Census*, 50 STAN. L. REV. 731, 736 (1998) ("Finer-grained census data, better predictive methods, and more powerful computers allow for increasingly sophisticated equipopulous gerrymanders."); Richard H. Pildes, *Principled Limitations on Racial and Partisan Restricting*, 106 YALE L.J. 2505, 2553-54 (1997) ("Recent cases now document in microscopic detail the astonishing precision with which redistricters can carve up individual precincts and distribute them between districts with confidence concerning the racial and partisan consequences.")

Even before the computer enhanced the ability to draw precise lines, the politicians were hardly without their own devices. At the same time, these perceived legislative line-drawing failures are distant from the state legislature's six-decade gridlock that the Court faced in *Baker v. Carr*. *See* 369 U.S. at 187-95 (Tennessee General Assembly had not been reapportioned since 1901, despite the Tennessee Constitution's decennial requirement); *see also Reynolds*, 377 U.S. at 583 (same, in Alabama).

[13] One commentator has noted:

> For the most part, redistricting appears to be done by barons dividing up fiefdoms, not by democratically accountable representatives. . . . The gerrymandered House contrasts with elections the same day for nongerrymandered Senate seats and governorships. About half of all gubernatorial and U.S. Senate elections were competitive in 2002, compared with fewer than 10% of House elections.

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The Founders were no strangers to the self-interest afflicting legislators charged with drawing the lines for their own seats. Nor were they blind to the need to locate the power to curb potential abuses, With Article I, Section 4, they gave to the legislatures of each state authority to prescribe the times, places and manner of holding elections for Senators and Representatives.[13] The Founders also insisted upon a superintending of the exercise of this power granted to the states. They gave that assignment to Congress by granting it the power to "make or alter" such regulations.[14] Congress has exercised this power from time to time, as Justice Scalia recounted in his opinion in *Vieth*.[15] While not directly speaking to the difficulties of gerrymandered state legislatures, this explicit placement in the Congress of the power to supervise the authority granted to states, coupled with the difficulty faced by judges of divining rules or standards adequate to distinguish a judicial decision resolving issues of partisanship in redistricting from a legislative act, has to date left the courts in the indefensible position of undertaking a task they cannot perform.

In upholding the Texas plan for congressional districts, we followed an unbroken line of cases declining to

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Richard H. Pildes, *The Supreme Court 2003 Term – Foreward: The Constitutionalization of Democratic Politics*, 118 HARV. L. REV. 28, 63-64 (2004) (footnotes omitted).

[13] U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4 ("The Times, Places and Manner of holding Elections for Senators and Representatives, shall be prescribed in each State by the Legislature thereof; but the Congress may at any time by Law make or alter such Regulations, except as to the Places of chusing Senators.").

[14] *Id.*

[15] 541 U.S. at 275-77 (plurality opinion).

strike down a redistricting plan as an illegal partisan gerrymander.[16] We left any change in direction to the Supreme Court, making only brief observations about our own years of work in this case and in drafting plans with the feared computers.[17] We observed that the Court could make an honest case of *Bandemer* by either setting a standard or concluding that the issue was not justiciable. We expressed deep reservations over any approach that would dilute the critical Voting Rights Act by deploying it in name only or by borrowed concepts. We were and remain wary of employing metrics to determine how much is too much partisan motive or effect in redistricting, convinced that such an approach could not move the Court from its stasis under *Bandemer*. We need not further recount these observations.

In *Vieth*, the four Justices in the plurality voted to end the search for a workable standard, concluding that the legality of partisan gerrymanders is not justiciable and

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[16] *See, e.g., O'Lear v. Miller*, 222 F. Supp. 2d 850, 859 (E.D. Mich.) (three-judge panel), *summarily aff'd*, 537 U.S. 997 (2002); *Marylanders for Fair Representation, Inc. v. Schaefer*, 849 F. Supp. 1022, 1043 (D. Md. 1994) (three-judge panel); *Terrazas v. Slagle*, 821 F. Supp. 1162, 1172-75 (W.D. Tex. 1993) (three-judge panel); *Pope v. Blue*, 809 F. Supp. 392, 397 (W.D.N.C.) (three-judge panel), *summarily aff'd*, 506 U.S. 801 (1992); *Ill. Legislative Redistricting Comm'n v. La Paille*, 782 F. Supp. 1272, 1275-76 (N.D. Ill. 1992); *Badham v. March Fong Eu*, 694 F. Supp. 664, 671 (N.D. Cal. 1988) (three-judge panel), *summarily aff'd*, 488 U.S. 1024 (1989); *see also Vieth*, 541 U.S. at 280 n.6 (collecting cases); Samuel Issacharoff & Pamela S. Karlan, *Where to Draw the Line?: Judicial Review of Political Gerrymanders*, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 541, 543 (2004) ("In the ensuing eighteen years [since *Bandemer*], not a single challenge to a congressional or state legislative reapportionment managed to satisfy this standard.").

[17] *Session*, 298 F. Supp. 2d at 457, 474-75.

should be left to the political arena.[18] Four dissenting Justices offered various possibilities for a standard that might serve a judicial role.[19] Justice Kennedy cast the pivotal fifth vote to affirm the dismissal of the partisan gerrymandering claim.[20] Although Justice Kennedy found each of the standards offered in the dissents deficient, he declined to abandon the search for a standard and, presumably, provided the fifth vote necessary to remand the present case.

Upon our reading of *Vieth*, then, our mandate requires us to look at this record again, with the message that the Court is unpersuaded by contentions that it can never properly locate a standard adequate to a judicial role in policing partisan gerrymanders, but that the standards the plurality rejected in *Vieth* were inadequate to that task. In their arguments on remand, the plaintiffs have offered various approaches for adjudicating claims of partisan gerrymandering. While the State's contention that most, if not all, of these arguments have been rejected by a majority of the Court is strong, we decline to stop there, given the unusual fracture of the Court in *Vieth*. We can only fairly read the remand to suggest that the Justice providing the fifth vote sees the possibility of a workable standard emerging from this case, the rejected allegations of the complaint in *Vieth* aside. We turn then to the various solutions offered on remand.

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[18] 541 U.S. at 305-06 (plurality opinion).

[19] *Id.* at 317-41 (Stevens, J., dissenting); *id.* at 343-55 (Souter. J., joined by Ginsburg, J., dissenting); *id.* at 355-68 (Breyer, J., dissenting).

[20] *Id.* at 305-17 (Kennedy, J., concurring).

III

We first address the argument of the Jackson Plaintiffs[21] that the current redistricting map is unconstitutional because it was driven solely by a partisan agenda. Before reaching the merits of this claim, however, we find it illuminating briefly to recount some of the events leading up to the passage of the redistricting plan now under attack.

A

The history of electoral politics in Texas during the latter half of the twentieth century can be described as the story of the dominance, decline, and eventual eclipse of the Democratic Party as the state's majority party. From Reconstruction until approximately the beginning of the 1960's, the Democratic Party dominated the political landscape in Texas.[22] In 1961, John Tower became the first Republican Senator elected from Texas since 1875.[23]

Throughout the 1960's, and for much of the 1970's, Republican voting strength on a statewide basis hovered

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[21] Our reference to "Jackson Plaintiffs" includes the following: all plaintiffs included in the Amended Complaint filed on November 7, 2003, on behalf of the existing Jackson, Mayfield, and Manley plaintiffs; additional plaintiffs included there for the first time; and the Democratic Congressional Intervenors.

[22] *See* Mike Kingston, *John Tower: The GOP's Godfather*, *in* TEXAS ALMANAC 1992-1993 (1991), at 438 ("For most of the 20th century, Republicans were more a party of patronage than a legitimate political force in Texas. The action was within the ranks of [the] Democratic party where conservatives battled liberals, and the Democratic nomination was tantamount to election.").

[23] *Id.*

near 35%.[24] During this time, Republicans never held more than four congressional seats at one time.[25]

In 1978, William Clements, Jr., was elected Governor of Texas, becoming the first Republican to hold that office since 1874.[26] In the 1978 election, Democrats won twenty out of twenty-four congressional seats and captured 56% of the vote in statewide races, while Republicans' statewide strength stood at 43%.[27] Republican strength grew throughout the 1980's such that by 1990, the Republican Party had nearly achieved parity with the Democratic Party, garnering 47% of the statewide vote compared to the 51% for the Democrats.[28] Nonetheless, Democrats still held the lion's share of congressional seats, with nineteen compared to the Republican's eight.

No doubt aware of the growing strength of the Republican Party, the Texas legislature, controlled by Democrats, enacted a redistricting plan in 1991.[29] Under this plan, Democrats won twenty-one congressional seats in the 1992 election compared to nine won by the Republicans, even though the "tipping-point" had been reached with the Democratic and Republican parties capturing an equal share of the vote in statewide races.[30]

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[24] *See* Appendix.

[25] *See* Mike Kingston, *Republican Party in Texas, in* TEXAS ALMANAC 1982-1983 (1981), at 490.

[26] *See* Mike Kingston, *Politics and Elections, in* TEXAS ALMANAC 1982-1983 (1981), at 491.

[27] *See* Appendix.

[28] *Id.*

[29] *See infra* note 48.

[30] *See* Appendix.

Throughout the 1990's, Republican strength continued to grow, while the Texas congressional delegation remained firmly in the hands of Democrats. By the end of the decade, Republicans were consistently winning every statewide race on the ballot, including the offices of governor, lieutenant governor, attorney general, and seats on both the Supreme Court and Court of Criminal Appeals.[31] Yet with the 1991 Democratic Party gerrymander still in place, Democrats captured seventeen congressional seats to the Republicans' thirteen in the 2000 election, despite Republicans garnering 59% of the vote in statewide elections to the Democrats' 40%.[32]

Following the 2000 census, the Texas legislature was unable to pass new lines for the Texas congressional delegation, and the task eventually fell to this court.[33] For reasons that we will discuss, the plan produced by this court perpetuated much of the 1991 Democratic Party gerrymander. In the 2002 elections, the number of congressional seats held by Democrats remained unchanged, with Republicans gaining the two seats added by the census. In 2003, the Texas legislature, now controlled by Republicans, passed the redistricting plan that we upheld in *Session* and now review again in light of *Vieth*. Under this plan, Republicans captured twenty-one congressional seats in the 2004 election compared to eleven for the Democrats.[34] In this election, Republicans carried 58% of

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[31] *See* Office of the Secretary of State, 1992-2005 Election History, at http://elections.sos.state.tx.us/elchist.exe (last visited Apr. 1, 2005).

[32] *Id.*

[33] *See Balderas v. Texas*, No. 6:01-CV-158, slip op. (E.D. Tex. Nov. 14, 2001), *summarily aff'd*, 536 U.S. 919 (2002).

[34] *See* Appendix.

the vote in statewide races compared to 41% for Democrats.[1] It is against this backdrop that we now consider the Jackson Plaintiffs' arguments on remand.

B

The Jackson Plaintiffs urge that we "distill from the *Vieth* opinions the principle that a decision to revise a districting map, along with particular features of the map, become unconstitutional when the evidence makes clear that the legislature was driven solely by a partisan agenda." Invoking equal protection analysis, the Jackson Plaintiffs contend that sorting voters for the sole purpose of gaining partisan advantage can serve no rational or legitimate purpose. This approach focuses on voluntary legislative redistricting – "voluntary" in the sense that it sets out to replace a valid extant plan. By definition, this approach would tolerate efforts to gain partisan advantage when the legislature is compelled to redistrict because the extant plan is invalid, such as when new decennial census figures require redistricting to comply with one-person, one-vote or to accommodate changes in the numbers of legislative members. This is so because efforts to gain partisan advantage in involuntary redistricting do not constitute the sole reason for the undertaking. Rather, the Jackson Plaintiffs' approach takes aim at mid-decade (or "mid-cycle") efforts to replace a valid extant plan, drawing on the observation in *Session* that structural or process-based constraints may have more purchase because they

[1] *Id.* By way of comparison, when the statewide voting strength was roughly reversed in 1982, Democrats took twenty-two congressional seats to the Republicans' five. *Id.*

avoid the difficulties attending efforts to gauge how much is too much partisan motive or gain.

In support of their argument, the Jackson Plaintiffs point to Justice Kennedy's opinion in *Vieth*, in which he observes that a "determination that a gerrymander violates the law rests on something more than the conclusion that political classifications were applied. It must rest instead on a conclusion that the classifications, though generally permissible, were applied in an invidious manner or in a way unrelated to any legitimate legislative objective."[36] Justice Kennedy, the argument continues, pointed to the Court's denial in *Baker v. Carr* that it needed to "enter upon policy determinations for which judicially manageable standards are lacking . . . if on the particular facts . . . a discrimination reflects *no* policy, but simply arbitrary and capricious action."[37] It is suggested that redistricting for purely partisan purposes is an example of such arbitrary and capricious action. It is further suggested that this "sole reason" approach by its own terms would not apply in *Vieth* because the Pennsylvania legislature had to redistrict for multiple reasons, including the legal requirement of redrawing the lines after the 2000 decennial census in ways that created equipopulous districts based on that census, as well as satisfying the Voting Rights Act and accounting for "traditional" districting criteria, such as incumbent protection and minimizing split precincts.

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[36] 541 U.S. at 307 (Kennedy, J., concurring).

[37] *Id.* at 310 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (quoting *Baker*, 369 U.S. at 226) (internal quotation marks omitted).

Finally, the Jackson Plaintiffs parse the opinions of the four dissenting Justices, noting that all sought to locate a principle that would identify plans lacking a rational basis. The Jackson Plaintiffs urge that condemning efforts undertaken solely to gain partisan advantage is such a principle. They add as a final implementing principle the proposition that when a legislature controlled by a single party replaces a legal redistricting plan in the middle of the decade, the effort should be presumptively unconstitutional. They conclude that this presumption could be overcome only by a "compelling explanation."[38]

In response, the State urges that *Vieth* "squarely rejected the notion that 'sole,' 'predominant,' or 'only' partisan intent suffices to state a claim." In *Vieth*, the Court found insufficient allegations that the Pennsylvania districts "ignore[ed] all traditional redistricting criteria, including the preservation of local government boundaries, solely for the sake of partisan advantage."[39] The Court noted that the plaintiffs had alleged that when the Pennsylvania legislature turned to redistricting after the 2000 census, "the Republican Party controlled a majority of both state Houses and held the Governor's office. Prominent national figures in the Republican Party pressured the General Assembly to adopt a partisan redistricting plan as a punitive measure against Democrats for having enacted

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[38] This ignores, as it must, the reality that even with an overarching objective of feathering the party nest, the various cuts and turns of a redistricting plan with its reverberating impacts are infused with myriad mixtures of local politics and accommodation, inevitably producing lines drawn for a variety of reasons and objectives, often inconsistent with the overall objectives of partisan gains.

[39] 541 U.S. at 272-73 (plurality opinion).

pro-Democrat redistricting plans elsewhere."[40] The Court in *Vieth* had before it allegations that the Pennsylvania map was drawn "solely" and "exclusively" for political ends by a single-party-controlled legislature. These allegations were insufficient to overcome the motion to dismiss the political gerrymandering claim. Justice Stevens argued for a test based on such factors.[41] The State points out that the contention by the Jackson Plaintiffs mirrors the dissent of Justice Stevens, or is at least functionally identical to it, and that Justice Kennedy expressly rejected the "standards proposed . . . by our dissenting colleagues."[42]

We are persuaded that the Jackson Plaintiffs offer a standard for measuring an excessively partisan redistricting plan that is functionally equivalent to the standard offered in Justice Stevens's dissent, a view rejected by five Justices. This similarity aside, the Jackson Plaintiffs' equal protection analysis, assertedly a structural approach, fails on its merits. Specifically, they are unable to locate a substantive sight or suspect criterion to trigger strict scrutiny. Rather, they claim to rely upon the most deferential standard of review under the Equal Protection Clause, the absence of rationality.[43] Even more, they would alter rationality review to insist that justification for the plan require proof that a legislature that voluntarily engages in redistricting have purposes other than partisan

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[40] *Id.* at 272 (plurality opinion).

[41] *Id.* at 317-19 (Stevens, J., dissenting).

[42] *Id.* at 308 (Kennedy, J., concurring).

[43] *See, e.g., Williamson v. Lee Optical of Okla.*, 348 U.S. 483 (1955); *cf. Lawrence v. Texas*, 539 U.S. 558, 580 (2003) (O'Connor, J., concurring) ("When a law exhibits such a desire to harm a politically unpopular group, we have applied a more searching form of rational basis review to strike down such laws under the Equal Protection Clause.").

advantage by offering a "compelling explanation." That is, of course, not rationality review.

The fact that the Texas legislature's redistricting plan replaced the court-drawn plan put into place after the 2000 census does not make the legislative plan invalid in light of *Vieth* because it was "solely" motivated by political motivation. As noted, the *Vieth* plurality rejected a "sole" motivation test as a basis for measuring when partisan influences on redistricting are impermissibly excessive. Although Vieth did not involve mid-cycle redistricting to replace an existing plan, there is no constitutional or statutory prohibition on mid-decade redistricting, as we explained in our earlier opinion rejecting plaintiffs' contention that Texas lacked the authority to draw new district lines to replace the court-drawn map put into place after the last census. In that opinion, we noted that "innumerable decisions have either assumed that a state legislature may draw new lines mid-decade or have invited a state to do so after the court has drawn a map in a remedial role."[44] For example, in *Wise v. Lipscomb* the Supreme Court observed:

> Legislative bodies should not leave their reapportionment tasks to the federal courts; but when those with legislative responsibilities do not respond, or the imminence of a state election makes it impractical for them to do so, it becomes the "unwelcome obligation" of the federal court to devise and impose a reapportionment plan *pending later legislative action.*"[45]

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[44] *Session*, 298 F. Supp. 2d at 460; *see id.* at 460 n.14, 461.

[45] 437 U.S. 535, 540 (1978) (emphasis added) (citation omitted); *see also Branch v. Smith*, 538 U.S. 254, 265-66 (2003); *Upham v. Seamon*,

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We also pointed to the practical solutions that Congress has available to prevent or limit such mid-cycle redistricting.[46]

As those on whose shoulders we stand, we suffer no illusion of commission or ability to cleanse the air of partisan politics and self-interest, or to otherwise make angels of men. Rather, we accept the common-sense understanding that any voluntary redistricting would not have been undertaken unless a majority of the legislature thought it would advance their interests. That is, the self-interest of members of the legislative body will inevitably be a "but-for" cause of voluntary redistricting, the only activity the Jackson Plaintiffs would now condemn. This condemnation is driven by the assumption that the self-interest of members is a proxy of partisan interest. Putting aside limited amendments to cure some inadvertent error made in adopting an extant legal plan, if the initiating force of partisan ambition is sufficient to strike down all that follows, the principle contended for forbids mid-cycle redistricting by judicial fiat, when neither Congress nor the State of Texas has done so. This would contradict the long-standing assumption by courts that a state may replace existing court-imposed redistricting plans with plans enacted by the state's legislature.

Further, considering self-interest as a proxy of partisan purpose is forced. It does not accommodate the reality that a representative may act out of self-interest to secure a less competitive district – conduct that may or may not

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456 U.S. 37, 44 (1982); *Connor v. Finch*, 431 U.S. 407, 411-12 (1977); *White v. Regester*, 422 U.S. 935, 935-36 (1975) (per curiam).

[46] *Session*, 298 F. Supp. 2d at 474-75.

be beneficial to her party. Indeed it may be executed by a trade with a member of the opposite party equally actuated by the instinct of political survival.

In addition to making tendentious use of the equal protection standard and conflating the personal ambition of party members with partisan intent, the Jackson Plaintiffs' approach is question-begging in a more fundamental way. It does not escape, because it cannot, the absence of a substantive measure of fairness. It ends the inquiry into legality with a finding that the State acted with the sole purpose of obtaining partisan advantage for the controlling party, presuming that such action is irrational and impermissible regardless of its actual effects. This approach discounts the possibility that there may be rational justifications for attempting to redistrict to improve a party's position. For example, it is not clear that acting to undo a perceived *dis*advantage imposed previously by an opposing party is irrational in the sense that it admits of no salutary or constitutionally acceptable result.

In concept, the Supreme Court could announce a constitutional principle that acting solely with partisan purpose has no place in the drawing of districts. In implementing this principle, the Court could then adopt a prophylactic rule forbidding voluntary mid-cycle redistricting by state districting bodies controlled by one party – a bold but candid pronouncement, the *Miranda* of redistricting jurisprudence. The Jackson Plaintiffs shy from this step. Rather, they urge a "process," albeit one that admits of a single conclusion: that mid-cycle redistricting is unconstitutional. The inability to formulate an enforceable principle except one that gathers its normative content from an implementing rule both raises the question of justiciability and draws into question the legitimacy of the

announced principle. After all, it is a much smaller step from the two underlying building blocks of *Miranda* – the due process and Sixth Amendment-based right to not be convicted upon an involuntary confession and an experience-based factual judgment of the inherently coercive environment of the station house – to the implementing prophylactic of *Miranda*'s warning requirement. The baseline in *Miranda* was a settled constitutional principle, not an elusive condemnation of conduct that some would say is antithetical to American ideals and others would say is politics as old as the Republic itself.

The articulation of a constitutional principle here – such as condemning as irrational the drawing of district lines with the purpose (colored "sole," "dominant," "voluntary," or otherwise) of partisan gain – must face the facts of this case. While the present plan, drawn by a Republican Party majority in 2003, has been decried as egregious, the story must begin with the earlier map drawn by a Democratic Party majority in 1991. That plan, put in place following the 1990 census, was cited in the political science literature as an extreme example of what one party can do in drawing a redistricting map to the detriment of the other.[47] In 2000, the Democratic Party gerrymander was

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[47] *See, e.g.*, MICHAEL BARONE, THE ALMANAC OF AMERICAN POLITICS 2004, at 1510 (2003) [hereinafter BARONE 2004] ("The plan carefully constructs democratic districts with incredibly convoluted lines and packs heavily Republican suburban areas into just a few districts."); MICHAEL BARONE, THE ALMANAC OF AMERICAN POLITICS 2002, at 1448 (2001) (describing it as the "shrewdest gerrymander of the 1990s").

Another commentator describes it as follows:

> The impact of political gerrymandering on the competitiveness of elections has not been given the attention it deserves. For example, following the 1990 census, Texas experienced what is sometimes referred to as "the great partisan gerrymander of

(Continued on following page)

still in place and, although Republicans now enjoyed substantial statewide majority strength, the results of the congressional elections favored Democrats by a seventeen to thirteen margin.[48]

The map drawn by this court in 2001 perpetuated much of this gerrymander.[49] It did so because this court was persuaded that it could not achieve "fairness" to political parties without some substantive measure of what is "fair." Simply undoing the work of one political party for the benefit of another would have forced this court to make decisions that could not be defended against charges of partisan decision-making – again, for the lack of a substantive standard. As the panel explained, it would follow only "neutral" redistricting standards.[50] Once the panel had left majority-minority districts in place and followed neutral principles traditionally used in Texas – such as placing the two gained seats in the areas of growth that produced them, following county lines, avoiding the pairing of incumbents and the splitting of voting precincts, and undoing transparent offsetting movements of the same number of residents between districts – the drawing ceased, leaving the map free of further change except to conform it to one-person, one-vote. Make no mistake, this

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'91." The Democrat-controlled legislature carefully created conservative districts around the Republican incumbents. This "packing" strategy helped the Democrats in the 1992 election to win 21 of the other 22 districts.

Brian P. Marron, *Doubting America's Sacred Duopoly: Disestablishment Theory and the Two-Party System*, 6 TEX. F. ON C.L. & C.R. 303, 337 (2002) (footnotes omitted).

[48] *See* Appendix.

[49] *See Balderas*, No. 6:01-CV-158, slip op.

[50] *Id.* at *5.

undertaking, while shorn of partisan motive, had political impact in the placement of every line.[51] The results of this court's plan did ameliorate the gerrymander and placed the two districts gained by Texas in the census count; however, doing more necessarily would have taken the court into each judge's own notion of fairness. The practical effect of this effort was to leave the 1991 Democratic Party gerrymander largely in place as a "legal" plan.[52]

Plaintiffs seize upon the targeting of certain incumbents in the present plan, Democrats who had been reelected even as their constituents voted for Republicans with increasing frequency. This was one of its most controversial features – egregiously wrong in the eyes of Democrats. In the eyes of Republicans, however, this feature was justified because the effect of the court plan was to perpetuate incumbency that was *itself* the product of a partisan gerrymander. Under the legislative plan, twenty-one Republicans and eleven Democrats were elected in November 2004.[53] While this was a substantial swing, the State urges that it actually better reflected the statewide voting strength of the parties than did the court plan; that the size of the swing only reflected the distortion caused

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[51] The difficulties of partisan decision-making do not go away as dominance by one party over the other is diminished. Non-competitive districts allocated among incumbents perfectly reflecting party strength as measured by their numbers of representatives are the likely outcome. This reality alone raises questions of the aptness of rules indexed by controlling parties acting in mid-cycle. Even if this foray were to enjoy some modicum of success, it leaves untouched the most common occurring occasion for partisan redistricting – the effort following the decennial census.

[52] Indeed, the 2002 congressional election totals were identical to the 2000 results, with the exception of the two new seats. *See* Appendix.

[53] *Id.*

by the gerrymandered plan it replaced.[54] That is, the displaced judicially-crafted plan of 2001, while easing the partisan outcome of the 1991 gerrymander, nonetheless left the minority party (Democrats) in control of the majority of the congressional seats.[55]

The State urges that the legislative purpose of the current plan was to remedy this unfair drawing – that its line-drawing was hardly "invidious." The State does not suggest that there is a constitutional right to proportionality,[56] or that one constitutional wrong justifies another. Rather, the State argues that this outcome is relevant to the Jackson Plaintiffs' contention that the present legislative plan is irrational as a matter of law. As Justice White explained in *Gaffney v. Cummings*,

> judicial interest should be at its lowest ebb when a State purports fairly to allocate political power to the parties in accordance with their voting strength. . . . [We do not] have a constitutional warrant to invalidate a state plan, otherwise within tolerable limits, because it undertakes, not to minimize or eliminate the political strength of any group or party, but to recognize it and, through districting, provide a rough sort of proportional representation in the legislative halls of the State.[57]

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[54] *See id.*

[55] *See id.*; *see also* BARONE 2004, *supra* note 48, at 1508 ("In U.S. House races, as they have since 1994, Republicans won more votes than Democrats, but fewer seats, thanks to a 1991 Democratic redistricting plan which was closely followed by a court in 2001.").

[56] *See Vieth*, 541 U.S. at 288 (plurality opinion) (noting that "the Constitution contains no such principle: of proportional representation).

[57] 412 U.S. 735, 754 (1973).

In other words, the suggestion is not that escaping from one impermissible partisan gerrymander is a license to replace it with another, and we do not understand the State to argue as much here. Rather, it is that even by the "irrationality" measure proposed by the Jackson Plaintiffs, the current Texas plan is not an impermissible gerrymander at all.

It is instructive to compare the results of the Texas legislature's redistricting effort with the results of the redistricting plan enacted by the Pennsylvania legislature that the Court upheld in *Vieth*. In the 2000 general election, Pennsylvania voters elected eleven Republicans and ten Democrats to represent them in Congress.[25] In that same election, Republican Party statewide candidates

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[25] The following is a summary of the results of the last three election cycles in Pennsylvania:

Year	Statewide Strength		Pennsylvania Congressional Seats		
	R	D	R	D	Total
2004	46%	51%	12 (63%)	7 (37%)	19
2002	47%	50%	12 (63%)	7 (37%)	19
2000	49%	48%	11 (52%)	10 (48%)	21

See Bureau of commissions, Elections and Legislation, Pennsylvania Department of State, 2004 General Election Returns, *at* http://www.electionreturns.state.pa.us/ (last visited Apr. 1, 2005); bureau of commissions, Elections and Legislation, Pennsylvania Department of State, Archived election Results Selections, *at* http://web.dos.state.pa.us/cgi-bin/ElectionResults/elec_archive.cgi?which=Archive (last visited Apr. 1, 2005).

"Statewide Strength" was calculated by averaging the percentage of vote received by each party in all of the following races that occurred in Pennsylvania in a given year: Governor, Attorney General, Auditor General, and U.S. Senator. This provides a rough approximation of a party's general appeal statewide. *Cf.* Appendix.

captured an average of 48% of the statewide vote against 47% by Democratic Party candidates.[80]

Following the 2000 census, Pennsylvania's allotment of congressional seats was reduced from twenty-one to nineteen.[80] Pennsylvania's General Assembly then took up the task of drawing a new districting map. Under the plan that the Assembly produced, and which the Court ultimately upheld in *Vieth*, Pennsylvania voters elected twelve Republicans and only seven Democrats to Congress in the 2002 general election.[81] These results were repeated in the 2004 general election, giving Republicans control of 63% of Pennsylvania's congressional seats despite the fact that Republican statewide candidates captured an average of only 46% of the statewide vote against 51% for the Democrats.[82] In short, under the plan passed by the Pennsylvania General Assembly and upheld by the Court in *Vieth*, the party that garnered, on average, less than half the vote in statewide races was able to capture nearly two-thirds of Pennsylvania's congressional seats. In contrast, the plan passed by the Texas legislature resulted in the election of twenty-one Republicans and eleven Democrats to the House of Representatives in 2004, when the Republican Party carried 58% of the vote in statewide races and the Democratic Party carried 41% of the vote.[83]

The State's description of the 2003 Texas legislative plan as dismantling a prior partisan gerrymander that

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[80] *See* table, *supra* note 60.

[81] *See id.*

[82] *See id.*

[83] *See* Appendix.

had entrenched a minority party, in order to allow a party with overwhelming statewide voting strength to capture two-thirds of Texas's congressional delegation, is a characterization that the record supports. Under the Jackson Plaintiffs' analysis, with its keystone declaration that partisan line drawing is *per se* irrational, if the Democrats in Pennsylvania were to obtain control of the state legislature, they could not then voluntarily undertake to undo the present map – even to bring Pennsylvania's congressional delegation more in line with the parties' apparent statewide strength – because they would be acting solely for partisan advantage. However, as we have explained, saying it is irrational, even saying it many times, does not make it so. And if the effects of the Pennsylvania plan did not provide a basis to find excessive partisanship in redistricting, it is hard to see how the effects of the Texas plan make it constitutionally offensive.

In short, the plaintiffs' contentions on remand are conspicuous for want of any measure of substantive fairness, one that can sort plans as "fair or unfair" by something other than a judge's vision of how the judiciary ought to work – more precisely, how the judiciary ought to run this show. We are persuaded that the inability of any plaintiff to conquer these difficulties, even when supported by able lawyers with an army of advisors, is explainable by the reality that this effort has been to give a legislative task to a court.[84]

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[84] Of course, to paraphrase Justice Harlan, the fact that a standard for justiciabiliy is not precisely definable does not mean that it is ineffable. *See Poe v. Ullman*, 367 U.S. 497, 524 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting). However, if such a standard simply is ineffable, we should

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C

Beyond the plaintiffs' inability to articulate a measure of substantive fairness, we are unable to locate in any of the proposals offered a clear articulation of the failures in governance to which courts are asked to direct their supervisory efforts. The plaintiffs persist in advancing claims that rest upon the perceived loss of individual rights by voters who, they allege, are victimized by impermissible classifications. The plaintiffs are unable to locate and address structural defects and conspicuously fail to connect their claims with the most visible awkwardness in today's electoral structure: the absence of competitive districts.[48]

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not be surprised by the inability of numerous talented individuals to define it.

[48] *See* Issacharoff & Karlan, *supra* note 16, at 544 n.17 ("[O]ne person, one vote's individualistic rhetoric may have come to obscure its original purposes of combating entrenchment and safeguarding majority rule."). This absence of competitive districts reflects the inversion of which Judge Ward wrote when he decried the phenomenon of representatives selecting their constituents. *See Session*, 298 F. Supp. 2d at 516 (Ward, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) ("As in other contexts, extreme partisan gerrymandering leads to a system in which the representatives choose their constituents, rather than vice-versa."); *see also* Issacharoff & Karlan, *supra* note 16, at 574 ("One way of thinking about this in terms of the constitutional structure of representation is that in the original Constitution, the Senate was picked by the state legislatures and the House was chosen by 'the people,' but that after a process of amendment and political adaptation, the houses have been inverted: now, the people pick the Senate and the state legislatures, through gerrymandering, pick the House." (footnotes omitted)); *supra* note 12 and accompanying text. For a delineation of the number of "safe seats" in each Congressional election between 1962 and 2004, *see* Appendix.

"Safe seats" protecting incumbent legislators flourish regardless of whether political parties are fighting for advantage, and appear even when "neutrals," not the legislators, are drawing the lines.[86] Indeed, as Justice O'Connor has observed, the rough and tumble of partisan politics may work against the proliferation of safe seats. Her prescient observation bears emphasis:

> Indeed, there is good reason to think that political gerrymandering is a self-limiting enterprise. In order to gerrymander, the legislative majority must weaken some of its safe seats, thus exposing its own incumbents to greater risks of defeat – risks they may refuse to accept past a certain point. Similarly, an overambitious gerrymander can lead to disaster for the legislative majority: because it has created more seats in which it hopes to win relatively narrow victories, the same swing in overall voting strength will tend to cost the legislative majority more and more seats as the gerrymander becomes more ambitious.[87]

Further, the creation and perpetuation of non-competitive districts can be facilitated by cooperation across the political aisle, as incumbents from each party negotiate to protect as much of their political turf as

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[86] That a judicially-approved plan could result in a majority of non-competitive districts is not surprising given that turning over the line-drawing process to independent commissions, as some states have done, does not necessarily avoid this result. *See* Steven Hill, Editorial, *Schwarzenegger vs. Gerrymander*, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 19, 2005, at A29.

[87] *Bandemer*, 478 U.S. at 152 (O'Connor, J., joined by Burger, C.J., and Rehnquist, J., concurring).

possible.[84] It is much like the oft-cited observation about the marketplace that when two or more competitors come together, the conversation will inevitably turn to price.

There are other forces that disconnect Texas voters from their "representatives," including one-person, one-vote. Texas is an increasingly urbanized state, with over 60% of its population concentrated in the large metropolitan areas of Houston, Dallas-Fort Worth, San Antonio, and Austin.[85] In drawing a map, the districts covering West Texas must reach eastward across hundreds of miles to gather sufficient population to meet the equipopulous requirement. These "reaches" must extend far beyond genuine communities of interest and come with a real risk here that West Texas farmers and ranchers will be represented in Congress by a person residing in one of the large metropolitan areas, creating a substantial disconnect between voters and their representatives. Again, this disconnect is facilitated in part by one-person, one-vote and the Voting Rights Act, both of which require map drawers to reach out for voters, departing from local

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[84] *See Gaffney*, 412 U.S. at 738-39 (addressing cooperative efforts by the two parties in Connecticut to carve up the landscape).

[85] *See* U.S. Census Bureau, U.S. Dep't of Commerce, Ranking Tables for Metropolitan Areas: 1990 and 2000, at http://www.census.gov/population/cen2000/phc-t3/tab03.pdf (Apr. 2, 2001), at tbl.3. The concentration of the Texas population can also be illustrated by comparing the census figures for the most populous and least populous counties in the state. According to the 2000 census, 45% of Texans live in five of the state's 254 counties. *See* U.S. Census Bureau, U.S. Dep't of Commerce, Census 2000 Summary File 1 (SF 1) 100-Percent Data, Geographic Area: Texas – County (8,458,627 out of total population of 20,851,820 live in Harris, Dallas, Tarrant, Bexar, and Travis counties), available at http://www.census.gov/census2000/states/tx.html. By comparison, only 2.6% of Texans live in the state's 100 least populous counties. *Id.*

communities tied by common economic pursuits and local tradition and creating opportunities for self-interested line drawing.[70] Specifically, in reaching out, the drawers are invited to select voters favorable to their own electoral chances – a temptation driven primarily by the self-interested desire to gain safe seats, not the secondary and more remote goal of achieving "partisan purposes." In effectuating this goal of safe seats, map drawers may choose to pull certain populations into their districts for a host of reasons: some areas may produce low voter-turnout; others may be dominated by agrarian interests; and yet others may be populated by several generations of the drawer's extended family.

Although plaintiffs argue that the districts under the 2003 Texas plan are non-competitive as a result of partisan gerrymandering, their argument and evidence assumes, but does not show, a necessary or actual correlation between partisan line drawing and an increase in the number of non-competitive Texas congressional districts. Again, the historical record is instructive. Texas has not held a congressional election for at least the past four and one-half decades in which more than a handful of districts were "competitive."[71] For most of this time, Texas was

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[70] *See* Michael W. McConnell, The Redistricting Cases: *Original Mistakes and Current Consequences*, 24 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 103, 112 (2000) ("Both as a matter of state constitutional law and as a matter of custom, legislators used to be extremely reluctant to violate city, county, and township lines. Now, under 'one person, one vote,' they are required to do so. And once that constraint is lifted, they are liberated to snake lines all over the map to achieve their own purposes. The result, as Justice Harlan warned back in *Reynolds*, is an invitation to gerrymandering." (citing *Reynolds*, 377 U.S. at 622 (Harlan, J, dissenting))).

[71] *See* Appendix.

dominated by the Democratic Party at both the statewide and local levels. In many congressional races held during this time, the incumbent had no opponent.[73] Self-interest of incumbents controlled. As the Republican Party came to strength during the late 1980's and 1990's, the Democratic Party continued to hold a large majority of the congressional seats.[73] Even with the growing competitiveness between the parties, the number of non-competitive districts remained relatively constant.[74] The Democrats resisted the statewide growth in the number of Republican voters with its redistricting plan following the 1990 census.[75] It is important to understand that this partisan effort was greatly aided by the Voting Rights Act, in combination with the introduction in 1964 of the one-person, one-vote principle. The redistricting plan drawn following the 1990 census was the fruition of these requirements. By the time the plan now under attack was first proposed, the Voting Rights Act had effectively taken six Democratic Party seats off the table, rendering them untouchable and largely non-competitive. That is, only twenty-six of the thirty-two congressional seats allocated to Texas could be pursued by the Republican line drawers, who began their task with fifteen existing seats. To adhere to the goal of taking a share of the Texas delegation [illegible] at a minimum, approximated its then-current state voting strength, the Republican Party had to hold its fifteen seats and pick up at least three or four of the remaining eleven seats. In sum, the 2003 Texas map drawn by the Republicans effectively

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[73] *Id.*

[73] *Id.*

[74] *Id.*

[75] *See* supra note 48 and accompanying text.

achieved their goals during the 2004 election, but effected little change in the number of competitive districts. Texas has not had a significant number of competitive House races for at least the past four and one-half decades. The cases that guide our way do not provide a basis for us to hold that a redistricting plan's failure to change this long course of events is a basis to invalidate that plan.

D

The point is simple. It is difficult to set upon a course of treatment until the illness is diagnosed, and broad-spectrum responses have no place here – or should not. The Texas plan is not more partisan in motivation or result, including the impact on the number of competitive districts, than the Pennsylvania plan upheld in *Vieth*. The Jackson Plaintiffs have not identified a way to invalidate the Texas plan under the standards they urge as surviving *Vieth*. Yet, as the dissents and Justice Kennedy's concurrence in *Vieth* make clear, the disquiet with the role of partisan politics in redistricting persists, despite the difficulties in expanding the judicial role. The search for some judicial means to limit political gerrymandering takes us to the University Professors' suggestion that the principle of one-person, one-vote can serve this end. We now turn to that contention.

IV

The Amicus Curiae Brief of University Professors, which was supported in the main by all plaintiffs, seeks to apply the one-person, one-vote principle as a brake against excessive partisan redistricting by reducing the frequency of redistricting efforts. This argument, while present in

various forms throughout this litigation, was brought to the fore by the Professors' brief, taking its place alongside the contentions of the Jackson Plaintiffs.

The argument is easily stated. Each new decennial census immediately places many legislative bodies in clear violation of one-person, one-vote, requiring the drawing of new districts.[76] The process leading to a new plan may be extended for several years by court challenges and multiple legislative efforts, sometimes resulting in a court-promulgated plan. Although decennial census data is by that time no longer accurate, it is still used to draw the map. The use of this otherwise inaccurate data is sometimes described as a "legal fiction."[77] The Professors urge that this fiction is supported by the necessity of allowing

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[76] *See Georgia v. Ashcroft*, 539 U.S. 461, 489 n.2 (2003) ("When the decennial census numbers are released, States must redistrict to account for any changes or shifts in population. . . . After the new enumeration, no districting plan is likely to be legally enforceable if challenged, given the shifts and changes in a population over 10 years. And if the State has not redistricted in response to the new census figures, a federal court will ensure that the districts comply with the one-person, one-vote mandate before the next election."); *see also Reynolds*, 377 U.S. at 584 ("[I]f reapportionment were accomplished with less [than decennial] frequency, it would assuredly be constitutionally suspect.").

[77] *See, e.g., Georgia v. Ashcroft*, 539 U.S. at 489 n.2 ("[B]efore the new census, States operate under the legal fiction that even 10 years later, the plans are constitutionally apportioned."); *Johnson v. Miller*, 922 F. Supp. 1556, 1563 (S.D. Ga. 1995) (three-judge court) ("In the calculus of district population deviation, our only measure of the state's demographics is the decennial census. Since the population is not static, we adhered to the fiction that the census block figures are accurate to the exclusion of all others.") *aff'd, Abrams v. Johnson*, 521 U.S. 74 (1997); *see also People ex rel Salazar v. Davidson*, 79 P.3d 1221, 1233 (Colo. 2003) ("The United States Supreme Court has recognized the legal fiction that these figures remain accurate for the entire ten years between censuses.").

courts and legislative bodies to rely on the census figures without any demonstration of their present accuracy. This fiction, the argument continues, should not be enjoyed by a legislative body that voluntarily redistricts – that is, acts to replace a legal existing plan. In other words, dilution of the powerful command of one-person, one-vote should not be allowed when redistricting is not required by law. Pointing to the observation in our *Session* opinion of the practical values of a congressional prohibition of such voluntary redistricting efforts, the Professors urge that while that decision belongs to the Congress, not the courts, the enforcement of this constitutional principle is the obligation of the courts. They argue that it may be an alternative structural brake on partisan gerrymandering, conceding the present absence of a meaningful metric of substantive fairness – of how much partisan gain is too much – and declining to offer one.

The argument as presented comes unadorned with supporting case citations, relying upon the exacting principle of one-person, one-vote and the observation that the limit on partisan gerrymanders the Supreme Court is seeking is lying at its feet.[78] The simple logic of denying the benefit of the fiction that decennial census figures remain accurate throughout the decade to those who indulge in mid-cycle redistricting, together with the belief that here lies the most inviting ground for regulation, has given life to this argument.

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[78] The Court has only recently demanded exactitude in the population of districts drawn by the Georgia legislature for partisan gain. *See Larios*, 124 S. Ct. at 2808 (Stevens, J., concurring). It did so in *Larios* by denying it the 10% toleration of deviation in the drawing of lines for state legislative seats.

The State replies that injecting one-person, one-vote at this juncture is beyond the scope of the mandate; that it has a tangential tie at best to the directive to reconsider in the light of *Vieth*; and in any event would be attended by its own coterie of practical problems of application.

In oral argument, Professor Scot Powe was modest in the claims he made concerning the effects of applying one-person, one-vote here, observing that even if requiring the State to demonstrate compliance with current numbers would offer only a small brake, it should be required. Viewed from this perspective, the strength of the argument does not rest upon its utility in curbing partisan excesses, although it might do so. Rather, the strength lies with the power of the proposed rule itself. It asks why a state legislative body under no legal requirement to redistrict should face anything less than the full reach of the constitutional strictures of one-person, one vote – that is, why it should benefit from a fiction born of necessity.

The University Professors deny that their rule would constitute a bar on a legislature that wants to replace a court-ordered plan before the next census is conducted. At the same time, they concede that their proposed rule would, by design, make it very difficult because only the decennial census figures provide sufficiently detailed and reliable data for redistricting.[79] They also acknowledge that "there is effectively no alternative" to decennial census data.[80] The State agrees, noting that "*Wesberry v.*

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[79] Tr. at 164.

[80] Univ. Prof. Br. at 4; *see id.* at 3 ("[U]se of population enumerations from the most recent federal decennial census is essential ... because such recent census data is the most comprehensive, precise, and objectively attainable enumeration data available."). They point out

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Sanders requires essentially perfect equality between congressional districts. In practice, that high degree of mathematical precision would be all but impossible using any data other than decennial block-level data."[41] Judge Ward suggests in his concurrence that if a state wanted to pursue a mid-decade re-redistricting effort, it could perform a special state-wide census to provide the necessary numbers. Such a suggestion goes beyond what the parties recognized as within the realm of the practical or feasible. In their briefs and at oral argument, the litigants conceded that such data do not exist and could not practically be obtained. The proposed rule is intended to, and would, serve as a means to the end of preventing what Texas did here, to redistrict mid-decade to replace a court-imposed plan with one crafted by the legislature.

The practical effect of the rule would be to bar what courts have stated was within the prerogative of the state legislatures: to draw their own map to replace one imposed by a court. In none of these cases has a court suggested that the state legislature could not use the data from the last census, but instead had to conduct a special, statewide census, in order to replace a court-drawn map with a

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that some "[m]ore current, but incomplete information, such as population estimates . . . , or minority voter registration or turn-out" exists. *Id.* at 5. These data, however, would be "unacceptable as a basis for actually drawing district boundaries on a systematic, statewide basis." *Id.* Although other parties attempted to argue that they could rely on data showing county and city population trends since the census to show that the 2003 Texas plan was not equipopulous as of 2005, the University Professors as well as the State recognized that such data would not meet the legal requirements for drawing district boundaries. *See id.*; State Reply Br. at 41; Tr. at 69, 133, 137; *see also Valdespino v. Alamo Heights Indep. Sch. Dist.*, 168 F.3d 848, 853-854 (5th Cir. 1999).

[41] State Reply Br. at 41 (citation omitted).

legislatively-drawn map.[22] The departure from what courts have assumed is the proper relationship between court-imposed plans and legislatively-enacted plans signals caution in endorsing the University Professors' proposed rule.

The University Professors assert that their proposed rule merely protects the fundamental right of people to elections conducted under maps that provide equal representation to equal numbers of persons. Yet it is difficult to discern how their proposed rule actually protects or furthers the one-person, one-vote principle, as opposed to the one-person, one-vote fiction. The Supreme Court has frequently observed that the decennial census is only briefly accurate, noting on one occasion that "the well-known restlessness of the American people means that population counts for particular localities are outdated

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[22] The courts have assumed that legislative plans replacing court-imposed plans are expected to rely on the data from the last census, despite the passage of time. *See Johnson*, 929 F. Supp. at 1563 (upholding the Georgia State Senate redistricting plan that the legislature drew in 1995 using 1990 census data and acknowledging that "[a]t this point in the decade," the data for one-person, one-vote purposes "is largely theoretical. The real data, known only to providence, would doubtlessly lead us to another result."), *aff'd*, *Abrams v. Johnson*, 521 U.S. 74 (1997); *Terrazas v. Clements*, 537 F. Supp. 514, 516 (N.D. Tex. 1982) (implementing a temporary reapportionment plan based on 1980 census figures that would remain "in effect for all elections through December 31, 1983, unless valid apportionment plans are enacted sooner"); *Bush v. Martin*, 251 F. Supp. 484, 488 n.3 & 517 (S D. Tex. 1966) (tentatively approving a 1965 legislative redistricting plan based on 1960 census data, but noting that the Texas Legislature could adopt a plan before the next decennial census).

long before they are completed."[83] One of the University Professors has described

> [o]ne of the odder features of the one-person, one-vote doctrine, when applied to the population of electoral districts, . . . that it seemingly applies only in the first election cycle out of the (usual) five in any ten-year period. That is, the practical dynamics of population growth and mobility in the United States operate to assure that mathematically identical districts (by whatever measure) in the first election are almost certainly going to be different, often dramatically so, by the third or fourth election. Indeed, as a practical matter, this differentiation might be present even by the actual occurrence of the first election, which takes place two years after the enumeration on which the reapportionment will have been based.[84]

The University Professors do not explain how, in an election held in 2004, 2006, or 2008, the districts drawn in 2001 using 2000 census numbers are more equipopulous if measured against current actual population data than districts drawn in 2003 using 2000 census numbers. If the University Professors' application of one-person, one-vote is adopted, the virtually certain result would be to have the next elections conducted under the court-ordered plan drawn in 2001, using 2000 census numbers. Yet all recognize that the 2001 plan is no more a reflection of today's actual population distribution than the 2003 legislative

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[83] *Karcher v. Daggett*, 462 U.S. 725, 732 (1983); *see also Gaffney*, 412 U.S. at 745.

[84] Sanford Levinson, *One Person, One Vote: A Mantra in Need of Meaning*, 80 N.C. L. REV. 1269, 1278 (2002).

plan; both are based on the 2000 census numbers. Neither plan would produce equipopulous districts for elections held in 2006, if those districts could be measured against current data. The difficulty in discerning how the University Professors' proposed rule in fact promotes one-person, one-vote underscores its actual purpose, of limiting mid-decade "voluntary" redistricting in order to limit political gerrymandering.

The University Professors' argument would insist on current population data only for voluntary mid-cycle efforts to redistrict. It is not clear, however, whether insistence on current population figures for voluntary redistricting could be so cabined. The combined effect of such a rule and the incentives of politics are difficult to predict. Indexing liability to voluntary redistricting could create large incentives to seek a judicial invalidation of an existing plan as violative of equipopulous requirements. If, as Judge Ward posits, a state can feasibly and practically obtain mid-decade census data that is sufficiently detailed and reliable to use in drawing district lines, the proposed rule may have the perverse effect of breeding more efforts to redistrict. Such data could provide not only a means to defend a "voluntary" re-redistricting plan, but also a basis to attack valid extant plans drawn using the decennial population data.[55] If one-person, one-vote is applied as the

[55] *Reynolds v. Sims* speaks generally about the frequency of legislative efforts to reapportion and the use of decennial census data toward the end of the decade. 377 U.S. at 583-84. Chief Justice Warren observed that "[r]eallocation of legislative seats every 10 years coincides with the prescribed practice in 41 of the States, often honored more in the breach than the observance, however." *Id.* at 583 (footnote omitted). He noted that, while acting only at the end of a decennial period leads to some imbalance in the population of districts, limitations on the frequency of these efforts are justified by the need for stability and

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University Professors advocate, and the ability to obtain reliable and detailed mid-decade census information does or will exist, then would mid-decade re-redistricting be required to meet the demand of one-person, one-vote applied in this fashion? Despite the assertions of its proponents, the actual bite of a rule denying reliance on decennial data to redistricting efforts voluntarily undertaken is both important and uncertain.

We recognize, with Judge Ward, the potential benefits of precluding mid-decade re-redistricting efforts. Judge Ward's citation to the legislative history of the 1976 Census Act amendments, noting that "constantly changing representative districts" is "bad politics, resulting in bad government," is instructive. Providing states with an incentive to obtain their own mid-decade census data to use in redistricting does not appear consistent with Congress's decree that federally-funded mid-decade data could not be used in redistricting because mid-decade redistricting was "bad politics." This history underscores Congress's authority to prohibit or limit discretionary redistricting efforts by the states.

The rule the University Professors and other plaintiffs propose would require us to apply an established doctrine in a novel way, with uncertain basis and effect. We add to these concerns the question of whether the entire contention is

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continuity in the legislative system. *Id.* The court's eye was, of course, on failures to reapportion, finding no difficulty with reapportioning *more frequently* than every ten years, while finding less frequent efforts to be suspect. *Id.* at 583-84; *id.* at 583 n.65 ("[T]he constitutions of seven . . . states either require or permit reapportionment of legislative representation more frequently than every 10 years."). Of course, the allocation of seats among the states rests on the decennial count. *See* 2 U.S.C. § 2a.

outside the mandate of the remand order. While it is true that *Larios* is relevant to this contention, the Court's order makes no reference to it. We do not wish to overstate any of these concerns viewed singly. Cumulatively, however, they counsel caution. We choose to abide that counsel and decline to adopt the University Professors' proposed rule.

V

The G.I. Forum, Congresswomen, and Texas-NAACP on remand return to their claims that the Texas plan impermissibly burdens minority voters in violation of the Voting Rights Acts and the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Each would tie these claims to partisan gerrymandering. The contention is that these violations occurred in the effort to gain partisan advantage, however else the effort may be flawed. We examined and rejected all of the claims in detail in our previous opinion.[36] As these claims are beyond the scope of the mandate we are not persuaded that we should revisit them.

VI

Having reconsidered, we respectfully adhere to our judgment. We deny all relief requested by Plaintiffs and judgment is entered for Defendants.

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[36] *Session*, 298 F. Supp. 2d at 469-516. Judge Ward dissented from the panel's rejection of the claims that focused on changes made in Congressional District 23. *See id.* at 516-17 (Ward, J., dissenting). The panel was otherwise in full agreement.

APPENDIX

The following table was compiled from data provided by the Texas Secretary of State's Office as well as from the Texas Almanac, volumes 1962-1963 through 1992-1993.[87]

[87] *See* Office of the Secretary of State, 1992-2005 Election History, at http://elections.sos.state.tx.us/elchist.exe (last visited Apr. 1, 2005) and, *e.g.*, Texas Almanac 1992-1993 (1991).

Year	Statewide Strength		Congressional Seats				
	R	D	R	D	Total	Competitive	Unopposed
2004	58%	41%	21 (66%)	11 (34%)	32	3	7
2002	57%	41%	15 (47%)	17 (53%)	32	6	9
2000	59%	40%	13 (43%)	17 (57%)	30	2	9
1998	56%	43%	13 (43%)	17 (57%)	30	1	11
1996	55%	44%	14 (47%)	16 (53%)	30	9	1
1994	52%	47%	11 (37%)	19 (63%)	30	5	5
1992	49%	49%	9 (30%)	21 (70%)	30	3	5
1990	47%	51%	8 (30%)	19 (70%)	27	2	13
1988	47%	52%	8 (30%)	19 (70%)	27	2	13
1986	43%	56%	10 (37%)	17 (63%)	27	2	10
1984	51%	49%	10 (37%)	17 (63%)	27	5	9
1982	40%	59%	5 (19%)	22 (81%)	27	4	9
1980	45%	54%	5 (21%)	19 (79%)	24	6	4
1978	43%	56%	4 (17%)	20 (83%)	24	6	4
1976	38%	60%	2 (8%)	22 (92%)	24	4	6
1974	28%	70%	3 (13%)	21 (88%)	24	3	8
1972	45%	51%	4 (17%)	20 (83%)	24	2	11
1970	34%	66%	3 (13%)	20 (87%)	23	2	13
1968	31%	69%	3 (13%)	20 (87%)	23	0	12
1966	32%	67%	3 (13%)	20 (87%)	23	4	17
1964	29%	71%	0 (0%)	22 (100%)	22	2	0
1962	37%	63%	2 (9%)	20 (91%)	22	3	5

We calculated "Statewide Strength" by averaging the percentage of votes garnered in all statewide elections occurring in a given year, including Governor, Lieutenant Governor, Attorney General, Comptroller of Public Accounts, Commissioner of the General Land Office, Commissioner of Agriculture, Railroad Commissioners, Texas Supreme Court, Texas Court of Criminal Appeals, U.S. Senator, and U.S. Congressman-at-Large.[88] For our purposes, this provides a rough approximation of a party's general appeal statewide.[89] We excluded the results for President from these figures.

The "Competitive" column tallies those seats that were competitive either in the general election or in the primary. We considered a seat to be "competitive" if it was won with less than 55% of the vote.[90] We first looked to the results of the general election, separating competitive from non-competitive races. For those races deemed non-competitive, we looked to the primary of the party whose candidate prevailed in the general election, and separated competitive and non-competitive races at the primary level.[91] We then tallied all competitive races identified at

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[88] After 1964, Texas no longer elected a Congressman-at-Large.

[89] *Cf. Vieth*, 541 U.S. at 288-89.

[90] *See* Richard H. Pildes, *supra* note 12, at 63 (defining competitive districts as those won with less than 55%) (citing David R. Mayhew, *Congressional Elections: The Case of the Vanishing Marginals*, 6 Polity 293, 304 (1974); Gary C. Jacobson, The Electoral Origins Of Divided Government: Competition In U.S. House Elections, 1946-1988, at 26).

[91] If a primary race – or a general race in 1996 – went to a runoff, we used the figures from the runoff to determine competitiveness. However, were we to consider the presence of a runoff to be per se "competitive" the number of competitive seats would increase by 2 in

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both the general and primary levels to arrive at an overall measure for a given electoral cycle.[22]

The "Unopposed" column tallies those races in the general election with only a single party candidate – regardless of any third-party candidates.

The table below sets forth in further detail the data on competitiveness, broken down by party in the primary and general elections.

Year	General Election			Primary	
	Total Seats	Competitive		Competitive	
		R	D	R	D
2004	32	1	1	0	1
2002	32	1	3	2	0
2000	30	1	1	0	0
1998	30	0	1	0	0
1996	30	2	5	0	2
1994	30	1	4	0	0
1992	30	0	2	0	1
1990	27	0	2	0	0
1988	27	0	2	0	0
1986	27	1	0	1	0
1984	27	3	0	2	0
1982	27	0	2	0	2
1980	24	2	2	0	2

2004, 1 in 2002, 1 in 2000, 1 in 1998, 2 in 1996, 2 in 1984, 2 in 1982, 2 in 1978, and 1 in 1964.

[22] In 1996, thirteen of the districts were redrawn by a court, following a previous decision that some of those districts were the product of racial gerrymandering. *See Vera v. Bush*, 933 F. Supp. 1341 (S. D. Tex. 1996). Special elections open to all candidates were held and a number of runoffs resulted.

1970	24	1	4	0	1
1970	24	0	3	0	1
1974	24	1	1	0	1
1972	24	1	0	0	1
1970	23	0	0	1	1
1968	23	0	0	0	0
1966	23	0	1	0	3
1964	22	0	1	0	1
1962	22	1	1	0	1

Ward, J., specially concurring:

I concur in the result reached by the majority on the question whether any of the plaintiffs have set forth a standard for judging partisan gerrymandering claims which survived the holding of *Vieth v. Jubelirer*, 124 S.Ct. 1769 (2004). I write separately to explain in somewhat more detail why, if unconstrained by the scope of the Supreme Court's mandate, I would adopt the "one-person, one-vote" arguments initially presented by the Travis County parties and now urged on remand by the University Professors.

I

Justice Harlan warned that the Supreme Court's "one-person, one-vote" rulings might lead to more partisan gerrymandering efforts. He predicted that the Court's holdings requiring mathematical exactitude might encourage more drawing of district lines to maximize the political advantage of the party temporarily in control of the state legislatures. He also observed that "[a] computer may grind out district lines which can totally frustrate the popular will on an overwhelming number of critical issues" *Wells v. Rockefeller*, 394 U.S. 542, 551 (1969) (Harlan, J.,

dissenting). Those concerns have been realized. *See Vieth*, 124 S.Ct. at 1816 (Souter, J., dissenting) (citing, *inter alia*, Pamela S. Karlan, *The Fire Next Time. Reapportionment After the 2000 Census*, 50 Stan. L. Rev. 731, 736 (1998) (noting that "[f]iner-grained census data, better predictive methods, and more powerful computers allow for increasingly sophisticated equipopulous gerrymanders.")).

In Justice Breyer's dissenting opinion in *Vieth*, he noted that "[b]y redrawing districts every 2 years, rather than every 10 years, a party might preserve its political advantages notwithstanding population shifts in the State." *Vieth*, 124 S.Ct. at 1827 (Breyer, J., dissenting). By incorporating data from election cycles which post-date the most recent census data, a State under the control of a single political party may repeatedly fine-tune gerrymanders at the expense of the constitutional promise of one-person, one-vote. In *Session*, the court expressed a similar concern, stating: "[o]ur point is that if the judiciary must rein in partisan gerrymanders, limitations that focus upon the time and circumstance of partisan line – drawing and less upon the 'some but not too much' genre of strictures offer the best of an ugly array of choices." *Session v. Perry*, 298 F. Supp.2d 451, 475 (E.D. Tex. 2004). The rule advocated would require the State to demonstrate that a new redistricting plan does not worsen any population deviations existing among the current districts, denying the benefit of the fiction that the population reflected by the census remains accurate throughout the decade.

The rule is not a blanket prohibition on mid-cycle redistricting, as urged by the State. *See* State Defendants' Response Brief on Remand at 36 ("Plaintiffs' claims fail because they are an undisguised attempt at a backdoor judicial prohibition on 'mid-decade' redistricting, and this

Court has already correctly concluded that 'mid-decade' redistricting is legal and permissible"). The rule proposed involves a balancing of the State's authority to redistrict mid-decade with the voters' rights to equal representation in the Congress. The court is therefore correct to recognize implicitly that the "one-person, one-vote" and "mid-decade" arguments are distinct creatures. To be sure, the rule proposed in this case would make it more difficult for a State to exercise its authority to alter congressional districts repeatedly over the course of a decade, but it would not preclude it.

II.

A.

The majority questions whether the proposed rule (designed to curb the frequency of mid-cycle efforts) might breed even more efforts to gerrymander. The court is surely correct to raise that issue. But the majority does not explain why the *rule* as distinct from *politics* might encourage more redistricting. For my part, I am reminded of the practical observations of one court that politicians are not interested in redistricting "because of their innate attachment to mathematical exactitude." *Daggett v. Kimmelman*, 811 F.2d 793, 801 (11th Cir. 1987). Thus, it is unlikely that a State would engage in mid-cycle redistricting unless the party in power thought it could gain partisan advantage by doing so. Moreover, as a legal matter, the Supreme Court has held that initial plans adopted with the most recent census data comply with one-person, one-vote throughout the decade:

> When the decennial Census numbers are released, States must redistrict to account for any

> changes or shifts in population. But before the new census, States operate under the legal fiction that even 10 years later, the plans are constitutionally apportioned.

Georgia v. Ashcroft, 123 S.Ct. 2498, 2515 n.2 (2003). This legal principle would doom lawsuits directed toward invalidating initial plans drawn with the decennial data. The rule urged by the University Professors does not *require* states to take any action above what is already mandated by existing Supreme Court precedent.

B.

The majority also suggests that the rule might not serve as a sufficient brake and that this counsels against adoption of the rule: "Despite the assertions of its proponents, the actual bite of a rule denying reliance on decennial data to redistricting efforts voluntarily undertaken is both important and uncertain". The majority is being bashful. No rule designed to police partisan gerrymandering could have less bite than *Bandemer*. As Justice Scalia noted in *Vieth*, the one case that upheld preliminary relief under *Bandemer* did not involve the drawing of district lines. In all cases involving the drawing of district lines, relief under *Bandemer* was refused. *Vieth*, 124 S.Ct. at 1778-1778 & nn. 5-6 (collecting cases). Contrary to the majority's suggestion, I am convinced that a requirement that a State demonstrate current population figures to comply with one-person, one-vote when replacing a valid plan would serve as a structural brake on partisan redistricting efforts.

The gerrymanderer's paraphernalia is the decennial census data, election results, and a powerful computer.

Although the parties do not explicate on the difficulty of deriving more accurate population data, the University Professors suggest (and the State recognizes) that such data do not currently exist. *See* University Professors' Brief at 4 ("After all, there is effectively no alternative."); State Defendants' Response Brief on Remand at 37 (" . . . it requires the State to show an up-to-date data set that the Professors say does not exist. . . ."). Neither the State nor the Professors explain that such data *could not* exist, only that it does not. The burden is, of course, on the State to make a good faith effort to achieve population equality among the districts, and it is unlikely that proof of such equality could be met solely with estimates or statistical sampling. *See Karcher v. Daggett*, 462 U.S. 725, 736 (1983) ("[T]he census data provides the only reliable – albeit less than perfect – indication of the districts' 'real' relative population level."); *Department of Commerce v. United States House of Representatives*, 525 U.S. 316 (1999) (holding that Census Act prohibits use of statistical sampling methods to compensate for undercounting).

A State seeking to replace a valid plan in the middle of the decade might choose to conduct a special statewide census. Properly conducted, this effort would accommodate both the State's constitutional prerogative to redistrict mid-cycle and the voters' rights to districts that comply with one-person, one-vote principles. The State offers no principled reason for subordinating the latter to the former, and I can perceive none. What the State wants in this case is the right to rely on the federal census data to *facilitate* its efforts at partisan gerrymandering while failing to update the enumeration. This seems to me a perverse use of the data sanctioned by the Supreme Court

for use in efforts to *avoid* the dilution of individual votes cast in congressional elections.

C.

There are practical reasons to require the State to update the census data before embarking on mid-cycle redistricting efforts. Legislators know their districts, and cartographers are aware of what is happening on the ground in terms of demographics. Although the State asserts that "[t]he record does not show that the legislators took into account any post-Census population changes that had already occurred," State Defendant's Brief at p. 44 n. 30, the evidence cited by the Travis County parties from one of the architects of the map demonstrates that new CD4 was designed with an eye toward what was happening on the ground so that it could "grow into" a Republican district during the decade. Brief of Travis County and the City of Austin at p. 10; Tr. December 18, 2004, Afternoon Session, at pp. 177-178, Testimony of Phil King ("So this District 4, I think will grow Republican. That's one reason we drew it that way. Grayson and Collin counties are fast-growing Republican areas, so we felt like if we didn't win 4 now we'd grow into it"). This is one of the primary dangers of mid-cycle redistricting predicted by Justice Breyer in his dissent in *Vieth*. The rule proposed by the University Professors would require that districts designed with an eye toward what is happening on the ground be accompanied by proof that those districts were created in a good faith effort to achieve equal population.

In addition, cartographers in Texas who are either unable or unwilling to develop more current data risk diluting the strength of the fastest-growing segment of the

population, the Latino population. LULAC's brief, for instance, illustrates a comparison of the estimated populations of District 19, a predominately Anglo district, to District 28, a predominately Latino district. District 19 is growing at a much slower pace than District 28. To indulge the fiction of the accuracy of the census data under these circumstances encourages cartographers to use their knowledge of current demographics as well as voting trends exhibited through election cycles when drawing new maps. That legislators in some states might be disposed to use their knowledge of population shifts occurring after the release of the decennial numbers while gerrymandering during the initial round of redistricting is not a sufficient reason to shy away from the rule in this case. As Justice Souter explained in defending his effort to limit extreme gerrymanders: "[t]he most the plurality can show is that my approach would not catch them all." *Vieth*, 124 S.Ct. 1769 (Souter, J, dissenting).

III.

Although a rule denying the use of the decennial data is rooted in the Constitution, that rule enjoys the benefit of being consistent with what little statutory authority touches on the subject. The 1976 amendments to the Census Act authorized a mid-decade census for use in administering public benefit programs. *See* 13 U.S.C. § 141(d)-(g). One of the statutory provisions provides that:

> Information obtained in any mid-decade census shall not be used for apportionment of Representatives in Congress among the several States, nor shall such information be used in prescribing congressional districts.

13 U.S.C. § 141(e)(2).

The purpose of the second clause of this provision was explained by its sponsors, who noted that the overall goal of the legislation was:

> to provide timely statistical information to assist the Federal Government in administering the allocation of finds under its various programs, assist States and local government in planning, and to assist the business community and the general public.

H.R. Report No. 94-944, at 17-18 (Supplemental Views of Representatives Edward J. Derwinski and Trent Lott). Representatives Derwinski and Lott explained that any issues that were extraneous to the legislation should be removed. *Id.* One of these extraneous issues was the possibility that some might use the federally-funded mid-decade data in redistricting efforts. Citing a 1971 paper prepared by the American Law Section of the Library of Congress, Representatives Derwinski and Lott recognized that Congress had the constitutional power to prohibit discretionary redistricting efforts attempted by the States. *Id.* In reliance on the 1971 paper, the Representatives concluded:

> Therefore, there appears to be a sound basis for the legislative action proposed in our amendment, but it also has the practical effect of avoiding the confusion to the public of having constantly changing representative districts. It is bad politics, resulting in bad government, to promote the continual shifting and drifting of congressional district lines.

Id. Representatives Derwinski and Lott therefore sponsored the amendment enacted as part of section 141(e)(2), which prohibited any reliance on mid-decade census data

for redistricting purposes. The obvious assumption underlying this amendment was that congressional redistricting would have already occurred once in the decade by the time the mid-decade census was conducted.

Carried to its extreme, the State's logic in this case is that it has the Article I power to alter its congressional districts throughout the decade and it may rely exclusively on the decennial census data to discharge its one-person, one-vote obligations at any time during that period. But it makes little sense for the courts to permit a State to rely on federal decennial data throughout a decade when Congress has explicitly banned reliance on more current data that might be assembled in the middle of that decade. A rule denying reliance on the decennial data for voluntary redistricting efforts is therefore consistent with the Congressional policies embodied in section 141(e)(2) of the Census Act.

IV.

The State questions as "bizarre" any holding that would reinstate Plan 1151C over 1374C on the grounds that the former might be more equipopulous than the latter if used in the remaining elections. The State observes that the two plans rely on the exact same census data, and the State's population has shifted equally since the 2000 Census, regardless of whether Plan 1151C or Plan 1374C is in place. The State misses the point, however, of the argument. The former plan was born of necessity to bring the State into compliance with one-person, one-vote principles. The latter statute was born of a "single-minded purpose" of the Legislature to achieve partisan political gain. *Session*, 298 F. Supp. 2d at 470.

The Supreme Court requires States to utilize the census data to facilitate the constitutional voting rights guaranteed by *Wesberry*. That the data can be manipulated to other ends when used *in conjunction* with an effort to create equipopulous districts at the beginning of a decade is no justification for extending the protection afforded by the data to state legislatures which voluntarily embark on the task of redistricting for partisan political purposes.

V.

Although I concur in the result reached by the court with respect to the question whether the plaintiffs' proposed tests survived the holding in *Vieth*, I respectfully disagree with the court's suggestion that partisan gerrymandering is not to blame for the decreased competition in congressional races. To be sure, *bi*-partisan gerrymandering is also a culprit. *See* Samuel Issacharoff and Pamela S. Karlan, *Where to Draw the Line? Judicial Review of Political Gerrymanders*, 153 U. Pa. L. Rev. 541, 570-71 (2004). But surely one of the primary goals of Plan 1374C is to elect and entrench Republican congressmen, whatever the voting trends of the state's population might be.

Dr. Alford's declaration explains how gerrymanders of the sort presented in this case contribute to the lack of competitive elections. That declaration, tendered in support of the Jackson Plaintiffs' brief on remand, recounts the utter non-competitiveness of most of the districts under Plan 1374C. As readily admitted by the State, the design of Plan 1374C was to produce a 22-10 Congressional delegation in favor of the Republican Party. As Dr. Alford explains, the one surprise from the 2004 election cycle was how close the map came to producing those

numbers in the very first election conducted under the plan. Dr. Alford predicts that in the upcoming 2006 elections, one of the districts won by a Democrat, District 17, will be one of only a dozen or so truly competitive congressional districts in the country. As Dr. Alford has observed, Plan 1374C is not only a partisan gerrymander, but it is a very effective one, no doubt enabled in part by the architects' knowledge of the most recent election returns. Nevertheless, despite my disagreement with some of the language in the court's opinion, I am persuaded that the plaintiffs have not articulated a test which survived the holding of *Vieth*. I therefore concur in the result reached by the court that *Vieth* does not compel us to reach a different conclusion in this case.

VI.

In conclusion, I note that the majority and I agree on some very important points. First, the court's opinion observes that the University Professors' argument is a "narrower and seemingly more plausible contention" when compared to other efforts which attempt to measure the elusive concept of the fairness of redistricting plans. I agree. Second, the language of the majority opinion ("[w]e do not wish to overstate any of these concerns viewed singly") can hardly be construed as an endorsement of the State's arguments on the merits of this issue. With that view, I also agree. What tips the scale is the scope of the mandate.

The courts have marked time since *Bandemer*, while the partisan rancor exhibited in the redistricting process has grown to new levels. Justices Stevens and Breyer recently observed that:

> After our recent decision in *Vieth v. Jubelirer*, 541 U.S. ___, 124 S.Ct. 1769, 158 L.Ed.2d 546 (2004), the equal-population principle remains the only clear limitation on improper districting practices, and we must be careful not to dilute its strength.

Cox v. Larios, 124 S.Ct. 2806, 2808 (2004) (Stevens, J. concurring). As the Travis County parties suggest in their brief on remand, this court's prior opinion did not give due consideration to their argument. Nevertheless, an inferior court's desire to end (or at least limit) this "bloodfeud," *Balderas v. State of Texas*, 6:01-CV-158, slip op., at 10 (E.D. Tex. Nov. 14, 2002), does not justify the exercise of judicial power arguably outside the scope of a higher court's directive.

It has not escaped my notice that the remand order in this case was issued after *Larios* but instructs this court to reconsider in light of only *Vieth*. The rule proposed by both the Travis County parties and the University Professors is grounded on principles of one-person, one-vote and is therefore more closely aligned with the holding in *Larios*. Given free reign to reconsider in light of the court's affirmance in *Larios*, I would not indulge the legal fiction that the census data remain accurate under these circumstances. I am persuaded that any shortcomings of the rule suggested by the majority are more perceived than real. Respect, however, for the scope of the mandate causes me to concur in the judgment denying relief at this time.[1]

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[1] I continue to adhere to the remaining views expressed in my original opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part.

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
MARSHALL DIVISION

FRENCHIE HENDERSON, ET AL.	§	CIVIL ACTION
Vs.	§	NO. 2:03-CV-354
RICK PERRY, ET AL.	§	Consolidated

FINAL JUDGMENT

(Filed Jun. 9, 2005)

For the reasons expressed in the court's opinion filed contemporaneously herewith, the court renders judgment in favor of the defendants on all claims. All claims asserted are dismissed with prejudice.

So **ORDERED** and **SIGNED** this 9th day of June, 2005.

/s/ Patrick E. Higginbotham
PATRICK E. HIGGINBOTHAM
TJW
UNITED STATES CIRCUIT
JUDGE

/s/ John H. Rosenthal
JOHN H. ROSENTHAL
UNITED STATES DISTRICT
JUDGE

/s/ T. John Ward
T. JOHN WARD
UNITED STATES DISTRICT
JUDGE

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
MARSHALL DIVISION

FRENCHIE HENDERSON, ET AL.	§	
	§	
Plaintiffs,	§	CIVIL ACTION NO.
	§	
vs	§	2:03-CV-354
	§	
RICK PERRY, ET AL.,	§	Consolidated
	§	
Defendants.	§	

NOTICE OF APPEAL

(Filed Aug. 2, 2005)

Notice is hereby given that Plaintiffs American GI Forum of Texas, LULAC District 7, Eli Romero, Simon R. Balderas and Gilberto Torres (GI Forum Plaintiffs) hereby APPEAL the June 9, 2005 decision and final judgment of the three-judge court in this case to the Supreme Court of the United States. This appeal is taken pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1253.

DATED: August 1, 2005 Respectfully submitted,

By: /s/ Nina Perales

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
MARSHALL DIVISION

WALTER SESSION, ET AL	§	CIVIL ACTION
	§	NO. 2:03-CV-354
V.	§	(Filed Jan. 6, 2004)
	§	
RICK PERRY, ET AL	§	Consolidated

Before HIGGINBOTHAM, Circuit Judge, and WARD and ROSENTHAL, District Judges.

HIGGINBOTHAM, Circuit Judge, and ROSENTHAL, District Judge:

Various voters, members of Congress, the City of Austin, Texas, the GI Forum, the League of United Latin American Citizens ("LULAC"), and voters of Cherokee County challenge congressional redistricting set forth in Plan 1374C, enacted into law by the Texas Legislature on October 12, 2003,[1] and precleared by the Department of Justice on December 19, 2003. Plaintiffs[2] allege that Plan 1374C is invalid because (1) Texas may not redistrict mid-decade; (2) the Plan unconstitutionally discriminates on the basis of race; (3) the Plan is an unconstitutional partisan gerrymander; and (4) various districts in Plan 1374C dilute the voting strength of minorities in violation of § 2 of the Voting Rights Act.

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[1] 2003 Texas House Bill 3, 78th Leg., 3d C.S. (Oct. 12, 2003).

[2] To avoid unnecessary confusion, we will attribute the arguments raised against Plan 1374C to the Plaintiffs as a group. We recognize, of course, that each Plaintiff has brought distinct arguments to the table.

We hold that Plaintiffs have failed to prove that the State statute prescribing the lines for the thirty-two congressional seats in Texas violates the United States Constitution or fails to comply with § 2 of the Voting Rights Act. We also reject Plaintiffs' argument that the Texas Legislature lacked authority to draw new districts after a federal court drew them following the 2000 census.

We decide only the legality of Plan 1374C, not its wisdom. Whether the Texas Legislature has acted in the best interest of Texas is a judgment that belongs to the people who elected the officials whose act is challenged in this case. Nor does the reality that this is a reprise of the act of the 1991 State Legislature weigh with the court's decision beyond its marker of the impact of the computer-drawn map. This extraordinary change in the ability to slice thin the lines brings welcome assistance, but comes with a high cost of creating much greater potential for abuse. Congress can assist by banning mid-decade redistricting, which it has the clear constitutional authority to do, as many states have done. In Texas, the phenomenon is new but already old. The larger lesson of 1991 and 2003 is that the only check upon these grasps of power lie with the voter. But, perversely, these seizures entail political moves that too often dance close to avoiding the recall of the disagreeing voter. We know it is rough and tumble politics, and we are ever mindful that the judiciary must call the fouls without participating in the game. We must nonetheless express concern that in the age of technology this is a very different game.

Part I presents the factual background of the case. Part II addresses whether Texas had the legislative authority to draw new district lines mid-decade. Part III

addresses generic claims that challenge the map as a whole, namely, claims of racial discrimination and partisan gerrymandering asserted to be unconstitutionally extreme. Part IV lays out the legal principles governing our analysis of Plaintiffs' more specific claims. Part V addresses the § 2 vote dilution claims as directed toward the Dallas-Fort Worth area, as well as the other potential influence districts in East and Central Texas. Finally, Part VI addresses the § 2 vote dilution and *Shaw* claims directed at districts drawn in South and West Texas.

I

The U.S. Census Bureau released the 2000 decennial census in March 2001. As a result of its population growth, Texas was due two additional seats in the House of Representatives, bringing its total to thirty-two. Texas in turn had to draw thirty-two equipopulous districts to account for its additional representation and to meet the constitutional requirement of one man, one vote. Under Texas law, the Texas Legislature had the task of drawing the districts.[3]

Despite the imminency of state primary elections, the 77th State Legislature failed to adopt a redistricting plan. Lawsuits in state and federal court followed. Voters and others requested that the court draw a new map. The *Balderas* court deferred to state court efforts to adopt a state redistricting plan. When these state court efforts failed, we recognized that the State's existing congressional districts were unconstitutionally malapportioned

[3] *See Perry v. Del Rio*, 67 S.W.3d 85, 91 (Tex. 2001).

and reluctantly accepted the duty to prepare a new, constitutional plan.

Without a baseline state plan in place, the court invited the parties to submit redistricting recommendations. Following a bench trial, the panel applied neutral districting factors and adopted Plan 1151C to govern the State's 2002 elections. The panel refused suggestions not required by law and rejected policy choices better left to legislative consideration.

Balderas ultimately ordered that Plan 1151C would govern the 2002 congressional elections.[4] Certain plaintiffs representing Hispanic voters appealed the decision, arguing that the panel erred by not drawing an additional Hispanic district in the Southwest region of the state. The Supreme Court summarily affirmed.[5] As a result of the 2002 elections, the Texas congressional delegation included seventeen Democrats and fifteen Republicans. However, with their newly drawn state districts, legislative Republicans gained control over both houses of the Texas State Legislature, as well as control over all prominent Executive Branch positions.

The Texas Legislature revisited redistricting in 2003. The Legislature was unable to adopt a new plan during the 2003 regular session, in part because Democratic House members, by absenting themselves, denied a quorum. Governor Perry called the Legislature into special session.

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[4] *Balderas v. Texas*, No. 6:01-CV-158, slip op. (E.D. Tex. Nov. 14, 2002), *aff'd mem.*, 536 U.S. 919 (2002).

[5] *Balderas v. Texas*, 536 U.S. 919 (2002).

During the first special session, the House approved a new congressional map, but the Senate failed to do so because its "two-thirds" supermajority rule permitted the Democrats to block a vote. To break the impasse, Lieutenant Governor Dewhurst announced that he would suspend operation of the two-thirds rule in any future special session considering congressional redistricting legislation. Although Democratic legislators again attempted to prevent formation of a quorum, the 78th Legislature ultimately was able to accomplish during its third special session what the 77th Legislature could not: pass a congressional redistricting plan, Plan 1374C.

II

Plaintiffs argue that Texas lacks the power, under either the Constitution or the election statutes, to redraw congressional districts in the middle of the decade. Some Plaintiffs find this limitation implicit in the text of the Elections Clause, while others urge that Congress has affirmatively limited state authority to redistrict by § 2c of Title II.[6] A third strain of arguments focuses on the *Balderas* judgment and asserts either that the judgment collaterally estops the State from enacting a new plan or that the judgment exhausted the State's authority to redistrict.

Although there are compelling arguments why it would be good policy for states to abstain from drawing district lines mid-decade, Plaintiffs ultimately fail to provide any authority – constitutional, statutory, or

[6] 2 U.S.C. § 2c (2003).

judicial – demonstrating that mid-decade redistricting is forbidden in Texas. In fact, what meager authority we have found seems to allow the states to redraw lines mid-decade, at least where a court drew the existing lines within the decade. As we will explain, the Elections Clause of the Constitution grants states broad power to regulate the "time, place, and manner of holding elections for Senators and Representatives."[7] Congress has the power to override state regulations or to impose rules of its own, but it has not chosen to limit redistricting to the period immediately following the release of the decennial census. Judicial decisions, both by the Supreme Court and by district courts throughout the country, have allowed and even invited states to redraw district lines following a court's action.

Against this backdrop of authority, we cannot agree that either the Constitution or the voting statutes restricts the states to once-a-decade redistricting. We therefore reject the argument that the Texas Legislature had no authority to draw the lines of congressional districts and deny Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment.

A

The Constitution of the United States delegates to states the power to develop procedures governing congressional elections by the Elections Clause. It provides:

> The times, places and manner of holding elections for Senators and Representatives, shall be

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[7] U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4.

> prescribed in each state by the legislature thereof; but the Congress may at any time by law make or alter such regulations, except as to the places of choosing Senators.[4]

This provision delegates to state legislatures both the power and responsibility to redraw congressional voting districts.[5] States do not possess this authority as an incident of their sovereignty. Rather, the Elections Clause delegates power to the states in broad terms. While states may only enact "time, places and manner" regulations, the text does not define or otherwise limit the states' discretion. Nonetheless, Congress may, if it chooses, make regulations governing the "times, places and manner" of holding elections or alter regulations enacted by state legislatures. This reservation to Congress, however, is not a direct limitation on the scope of the states' authority; rather, it allows Congress to override state election decisions or to enact regulations of its own. Unless and until Congress chooses to act, the states' power to redistrict remains unlimited by constitutional text.

Plaintiffs would read an implicit, temporal limitation into the text of the Elections Clause, but the argument is empty. The argument is that the Elections Clause allows Congress to pass laws regulating elections "at any time," but does not explicitly allow states to act at any time. Plaintiffs reason that, by failing to include the phrase "at any time" within the grant of power to states, the Elections Clause implicitly denies that power. Hence, they

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[4] U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4.

[5] *See, e.g., Smiley v. Holm*, 285 U.S. 355, 366-67 (1932).

conclude, the Elections Clause allows states to draw districts only once, immediately after the release of each decennial census.

We are unpersuaded. The argument tortures the text of the Clause, which by its clear terms has no such limitation. That Congress may exercise its power at any time says nothing of the states' power to enact election regulations, especially when the states are given this authority in terms that suggest no restriction beyond those that Congress may impose. To paraphrase the argument, if the Framers had intended to limit the states' power in such a specific way, surely they would have done so explicitly. This is just too convenient and tailored. For the first fifty years of our Nation's history, it was not uncommon for representatives to be chosen in statewide, at-large elections;[10] states often did not divide into congressional districts. The notion that the Elections Clause somehow embodies an implicit limitation on mid-decade redistricting is therefore anachronistic at best; presumably, it never entered the Framers' minds. Even today, there is no constitutional requirement that states must necessarily subdivide their territory into districts;[11] the requirement that states draw districts is largely a creature of statute.[12]

Even if the Elections Clause did not give states the power to prescribe election regulations at "any" time, Plaintiffs do not explain why we should read the Clause to allow states to exercise election power only one time after

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[10] *Wesberry v. Sanders*, 376 U.S. 1, 7-9 (1964).

[11] *Id.* at 8.

[12] *See* 2 U.S.C. § 2a, 2c (2003).

the census or how any such interpretation could find mooring in the text of the Constitution. What Plaintiffs ask us to do, then, is not simply to add a single limitation to the Elections Clause's grant of power; they ask that we create, out of whole cloth, a detailed scheme for states to exercise their constitutional authority. This we cannot do.

Judicial decisions have implicitly rejected the notion that a state may impose only one redistricting map each decade. While no court has, to our knowledge, explicitly addressed whether states have the power to do so under the Constitution,[13] innumerable decisions have either assumed that a state legislature may draw new lines mid-decade or have invited a state to do so after the court has drawn a map in a remedial role.[14]

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[13] The recent decision by the Colorado Supreme Court, *People ex rel. Salazar v. Davidson*, 79 P.3d 1221 (Colo. 2003), rests squarely on state law. That court did not hold that the U.S. Constitution limits states to once-a-decade redistricting.

[14] *See, e.g.*, *Branch v. Smith*, 123 S.Ct. 1429, 1437 (2003) (affirming the district court's imposition of a redistricting plan, but noting that the district court's "alternative holding is not to be regarded . . . as binding upon state and federal officials should Mississippi seek in the future to administer a redistricting plan adopted by the Chancery Court"); *Upham v. Seamon*, 456 U.S. 37, 44 (1982) (observing the parties' argument "that because the District Court's plan is only an interim plan and is subject to replacement by the legislature in 1983, the injury to appellants, if any, will not be irreparable"); *Wise v. Lipscomb*, 437 U.S. 535, 540 (1978) ("Legislative bodies should not leave their reapportionment tasks to the federal courts; but when those with legislative responsibilities do not respond, or the imminence of a state election makes it impractical for them to do so, it becomes the 'unwelcome obligation' of the federal court to devise and impose a reapportionment plan pending later legislative action." (internal citations omitted)); *Connor v. Finch*, 431 U.S. 407 (1977) (implicitly assuming that the state legislature could replace a "permanent" plan imposed by a district

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The Supreme Court has intimated on several occasions that states may redistrict mid-decade following court action. In *Upham v. Seamon*,[15] the Court noted that the parties "urged that because the District Court's plan is only an interim plan and is subject to replacement by the legislature in 1983, the injury to appellants, if any, will not be irreparable."[16] Similarly, in *Branch v. Smith*, the Court noted that the district court's holding that state courts could not constitutionally create redistricting plans, a holding the Court vacated, was not "binding upon state

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court); *White v. Regester*, 422 U.S. 935 (1975) (noting that Texas's legislative plan "does not become effective until the 1976 elections"); *Vera v. Bush*, 980 F.Supp. 251, 253 (S.D. Tex. 1997) ("Because the legislature has failed to act, this Court is left with the 'unwelcome obligation' of providing a congressional redistricting plan for the 1998 and millennial election cycles *pending later legislative action*." (emphasis added)); *Vera v. Bush*, 933 F.Supp. 1341, 1346, 1353 (S.D. Tex. 1994) ("Bullock and Laney contend that the Texas Legislature is ready and willing to redistrict during its 1997 regular session. Of course, in any event, they will have that opportunity, as this Court's remedy is an interim plan and the Court will require the legislature to prepare its own constitutional redistricting plan next year."); *Terrazas v. Clements*, 537 F.Supp. 514 (N.D. Tex. 1982) (implementing a temporary reapportionment plan that would remain "in effect for all elections through December 31, 1983, unless valid apportionment plans are enacted sooner"); *Bush v. Martin*, 251 F.Supp. 484, 517 (S.D. Tex. 1966) (tentatively approving a legislative redistricting plan, but noting that the Texas Legislature could improve the plan before the next decennial census: "We retain jurisdiction to enable the 60th Legislature, convening in January of 1967 and any special sessions convened through July 1967, to take further action. . . . Indeed, this very litigation in its advocative hammering out of the issues, possible standards, strengths and deficiencies of H.B. 67, has made a substantial contribution to the continuing legislative process and function as the Texas Legislature takes the second and sharper look.").

[15] 456 U.S. 37 (1982).

[16] *Id.* at 44.

and federal officials should Mississippi seek in the future to administer a redistricting plan adopted by the Chancery Court."[17] The Court's most vivid statement on the topic came in *Wise v. Lipscomb*:

> Legislative bodies should not leave their reapportionment tasks to the federal courts; but when those with legislative responsibilities do not respond, or the imminence of a state election makes it impractical for them to do so, it becomes the "unwelcome obligation" of the federal court to devise and impose a reapportionment plan *pending later legislative action*.[18]

The Court's language contemplates that any federal court plan must give way to later legislative redistricting efforts. And, of course, the displaced plan here was judicially crafted. No legislative plan is being displaced.

Given this authority and the broad language of the Elections Clause, we conclude that the Elections Clause itself – the provision in the Constitution that grants states the authority to redistrict – does not limit states to redistricting once per decade, particularly where, as here, the State's action follows a court-imposed map. If any such limitation is to be found, then it must be found elsewhere.

B

Some Plaintiffs would locate limitations in other clauses in the Constitution, most notably the Census

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[17] 123 S. Ct. 1429, 1437 (2003).

[18] 437 U.S. 535, 540 (1978) (citing *Connor v. Finch*, 431 U.S. 407, 415 (1977) (emphasis added)).

Clause.[19] Those Plaintiffs point to two phrases which, we are told, prevent a state from redistricting any time it chooses. The Census Clause provides, in pertinent part:

> Representatives . . . shall be apportioned among the several States . . . according to their respective numbers. The actual Enumeration shall be made within three years after the first meeting of the Congress of the United States, and within every subsequent term of ten years, in such manner as they shall by law direct.[20]

Plaintiffs argue that the phrase "according to their respective numbers" and the sentence requiring enumeration every ten years together impose affirmative limitations on the states' power to redistrict.

We disagree. The Census Clause by its terms applies to the apportionment of seats in the House of Representatives among the states. It ensures that no state is overrepresented in the House by linking each state's delegation to the state's population. The Clause says nothing about how district lines must be drawn. It is true, of course, that the Census Clause affects the states' obligation to redistrict. When the census is released every ten years, states are required to redistrict in order to accommodate changes in population and to bring its districts into conformity with the Equal Protection rule of one man, one vote. But the Census Clause does not expressly limit the states' ability to redistrict more frequently. Indeed, the

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[19] U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 3.

[20] U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 3.

Census Clause does not mention the states or their power to redistrict,[21] and we fail to see how it can limit a power it never references.

Plaintiffs concede that the constitutional text itself is silent regarding repeated reapportionment. They nonetheless insist that the Supreme Court's decision in *U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton*[22] prevents States from "adding" to the Constitution a provision entitling states to redistrict mid-decade. Plaintiffs' reliance on *U.S. Term Limits* is misplaced.

U.S. Term Limits was not based on the Elections or Census Clauses, but on the Qualifications Clause of Article I.[23] In *U.S. Term Limits,* the Court rejected an effort by Arkansas to impose term limits on its Representatives because a state cannot add qualifications to those enumerated in the Constitution. The Court noted that, "in certain limited contexts, the power to regulate the incidents of the federal system is not a reserved power of the States, but rather is delegated by the Constitution."[24] "In the absence

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[21] Plaintiffs' argument depends, to some extent, on the assumption that states are required by the Constitution to draw district lines. This assumption, however, is unfounded. As we noted above, in the early years of this nation, many states did not draw district lines, but rather used statewide at-large districts. Since the Constitution itself does not require a state to draw district lines, it is difficult to see how the Census Clause could limit the states' power to redistrict.

[22] 514 U.S. 779 (1995).

[23] Article I, Section 2, Clause 2 specifies that "[n]o person shall be a Representative who shall not have attained to the Age of twenty five years, and been seven Years a citizen of the United States, and who shall not, when elected, be an Inhabitant of that State in which he shall be chosen."

[24] *U.S. Term Limits*, 514 U.S. at 805.

of any constitutional delegation to the States of power to add qualifications to those enumerated in the Constitution, such a power does not exist."[25] Drawing on this language, Plaintiffs urge that, by undertaking mid-decade redistricting, Texas has in effect "added" to the text of the Elections Clause a power to redistrict intradecenially.

We disagree. As a preliminary matter, Texas has "added" nothing to the text of the Constitution by redrawing its district lines mid-decade. The Elections Clause is a broad grant of authority to the states that is checked only by the power of Congress to make or alter voting regulations. Nowhere in the text of the Elections Clause or in judicial interpretations is there a limitation of the frequency with which states may exercise their power. Since the power given the states is broad enough to encompass mid-decade redistricting, it cannot be fairly said – as Plaintiffs assert – that Texas has "added" anything to the Constitution's text. *U.S. Term Limits*, by contrast, dealt with a very different situation. It dealt with the Qualifications Clause, a provision that is of a "precise, limited nature."[26] By adding a term limit, Arkansas engrafted a provision into the Qualifications Clause that was not there before. The same cannot be said here. The Qualifications Clause in *U.S. Term Limits* by its terms gave the states no role to play in setting the qualifications of representatives.[27] The Elections Clause is different: it appeals to both

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[25] *Id.*

[26] *Id.* at 796.

[27] Indeed, because Article I, Section 2 specifies that "the *Electors* in each State shall have the Qualifications requisite for Electors of the

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state legislatures and Congress to set the "time, manner and place" of holding elections. When a state exercises this authority, it adds nothing to the Constitution.

Fairly viewed, it is Plaintiffs who seek to "add" to the Constitution. They ask us to add an implicit limitation to the Elections Clause that states may prescribe the "times, places and manner" of holding elections only after each decennial census. There is no basis for this addition, either in the text of the Constitution or in court decisions interpreting it. In sum, neither the Census Clause nor the Qualifications Clause limits state power to redraw district lines intradecennially.

C

The Elections Clause grants Congress the power to pass voting regulations or to alter voting regulations enacted by the states. Several Plaintiffs argue that Congress has exercised its power to limit the authority of the states to redistrict.

The most relevant statutory provisions are in Title 2. Section 2a specifies that the President must inform Congress after each decennial census of the population of each state and the corresponding number of representatives each state is entitled to send to the House of Representatives.[28] Section 2c requires every state entitled to more

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most numerous Branch of the State Legislature," the failure to give the states power over representatives' qualifications is all the more telling.

[28] Section 2a reads in pertinent part:

> On the first day, or within one week thereafter, of . . . each fifth Congress thereafter, the President shall transmit to the

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than one representative under these census figures to create a number of districts equivalent to the number of representatives it sends to the House.[29]

Congress has given courts a significant role in redrawing district lines. Should a state legislature not redistrict after the decennial census, for example, a court is empowered to remedy any defects in the state's maps.[30] At the same time, the Supreme Court has emphasized that primary responsibility for drawing the lines of congressional districts remains with state legislatures.[31] The Court has reaffirmed this principle in a series of decisions constraining federal courts in redistricting cases. The

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> Congress a statement showing the whole number of persons in each State . . . as ascertained under . . . each subsequent decennial census of the population, and the number of Representatives to which each State would be entitled under an apportionment of the then existing number of Representatives by the method known as the method of equal proportions, no State to receive less than one Member.

2 U.S.C. § 2a (2003).

[29] Section 2c provides in pertinent part:

> In each State entitled . . . to more than one Representative under an apportionment made pursuant to the provisions of section 2a(a) of this title, there shall be established by law a number of districts equal to the number of Representatives to which such State is so entitled, and Representatives shall be elected only from districts so established, no district to elect more than one Representative. . . .

2 U.S.C. § 2c (2003).

[30] *Wise v. Lipscomb*, 437 U.S. 535, 539-540 (1978); *Connor v. Finch*, 431 U.S. 407, 415 (1977).

[31] *Branch v. Smith*, 123 S.Ct. 1429, 1435 (2003); *Growe v. Emison*, 507 U.S. 25, 34 (1993).

Court, for example, insists that the judiciary defer to legislative districting if the legislative plan meets population equality and racial fairness standards applicable to court-ordered plans.[33] In addition, the judicial role is remedial; courts are not to replace valid legislative judgments with their own preferences.[34] Absent evidence that a state will fail to perform its redistricting duty in a timely fashion, a federal court can neither obstruct the State's redistricting efforts nor allow federal litigation to impede it.[34] Similarly, courts conducting redistricting are obliged to honor the State's redistricting traditions.

Plaintiffs assert that § 2c constrains the power of states to redraw district lines at will. Their argument comprises three basic steps. First, in § 2c Congress revoked the power granted to state legislatures by the Elections Clause and delegated a far more limited power. Second, they urge that § 2c allows redistricting once after the decennial census. As a result, they urge that when *Balderas* imposed Plan 1151C, the judgment effectively "used up" the redistricting power delegated to the states through § 2c. Under this view, Plan 1374C is invalid

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[33] *Upham v. Seamon*, 456 U.S. 37, 39 (1982).

[34] *Id.* ("We have never said that the entry of an objection by the Attorney General to any part of a state plan grants a district court the authority to disregard aspects of the legislative plan not objected to by the Attorney General. There may be reasons for rejecting other parts of the State's proposal, but those reasons must be something other than the limits on the court's remedial actions. Those limits do not come into play until and unless a remedy is required; whether a remedy is required must be determined on the basis of the substantive legal standards applicable to the State's submission.").

[34] *Branch*, 123 S.Ct. at 1435.

because Texas had no power to enact it once *Balderas* installed Plan 1151C.

We are not persuaded. First, we cannot agree that by passing § 2c, Congress revoked the authority granted states by the Elections Clause. To be sure, § 2c constrains the redistricting decisions that states can make, but it cannot fairly be said to revoke the states' power. Plaintiffs advance a specie of preemption argument: that by passing legislation that relates in some way to congressional districting, Congress has effectively usurped the entire redistricting field.

This interpretation of § 2c ignores the text of § 2c and misreads the Elections Clause. Section 2c has no language suggesting that Congress is "revoking" the authority granted by the Elections Clause, or even that Congress is "redelegating" a more limited authority. If Congress wishes to revoke the states' redistricting authority, it must do so clearly.[35] Moreover, Plaintiffs' argument tacitly assumes that any congressional regulation relating to election procedures automatically revokes the broad authority given states under the Elections Clause. The structure of the Clause, however, suggests that the primary source of election regulation is state law, federal law supplementing state procedures or overriding them only when necessary. Reading § 2c for what it is – a congressional

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[35] To put the argument in slightly different terms, had the Framers intended to deprive states of authority to regulate whenever Congress spoke on the subject, they would surely have phrased the Elections Clause differently. For example, the Framers could have written: "The legislatures of the states may prescribe the time, places and manner of holding elections *until* Congress does so."

regulation imposing a single election requirement on the states – preserves the relative roles of Congress and the states under the Elections Clause.

Second, even if § 2c did somehow revoke and redelegate redistricting authority, we disagree that § 2c would allow redistricting only on the decennium. Plaintiffs base their argument on the text of § 2c, which provides in pertinent part;

> In each State entitled . . . to more than one Representative under an apportionment made pursuant to the provisions of section 2a(a) of this title [the decennial census], there shall be established by law a number of districts equal to the number of Representatives to which such State is so entitled, and Representatives shall be elected only from districts so established, no district to elect more than one Representative. . . . [36]

Plaintiffs argue that this provision directly links the "time" at which the state must redistrict to the "mode" in which it must exercise its redistricting power. That is, the clause requiring states to establish districts immediately follows the reference to the decennial census.[37] Plaintiffs also reference several other federal statutes imposing "time" and "manner" restrictions, apparently in an effort to bolster the notion that federal law restricts a state's ability to redistrict frequently.

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[36] 2 U.S.C. § 2c (2003).

[37] Plaintiffs also cite to the Supreme Court's decision in *Utah v. Evans*, 536 U.S. 452, 461 (2002), presumably in an effort to bolster their linkage argument. *Evans*, however, does not discuss whether federal law limits the frequency with which a state can redistrict.

While it is true that states are under an obligation to redistrict after each census, we find nothing in § 2c that limits the frequency with which they may do so. It would have been remarkably easy for Congress to impose such a limitation in the text of § 2c, but it did not. It merely required states with more than one representative to divide their territory into a like number of districts.[38] Other courts have similarly failed to find such a limitation in § 2c. As we noted above, numerous courts have either allowed or invited state legislatures to enact redistricting plans in the middle of the decade when a court has previously imposed a plan.[39] Section 2c was in force when each of these decisions was handed down.

The final step in Plaintiffs' § 2c argument is similarly flawed. Plaintiffs conclude that *Balderas*, by establishing a constitutional redistricting plan, "used up" the state's constitutional authority to redistrict. Plaintiffs frame their argument by again focusing on the meaning of § 2c – which, they assert, reveals that court redistricting is constitutionally "equivalent" for purposes of Article I, Section 4 to state legislative redistricting.[40] We agree that

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[38] Incidentally, there is no question that Plan 1374C complies with this requirement.

[39] *See supra* note 14 and accompanying text.

[40] To reach this conclusion, Plaintiffs first observe that § 2c is "just as binding" on the courts as it is on state legislatures. Second, when a federal court creates congressional districts under § 2c, it necessarily does so in the manner provided by state law. Finally, § 2c is a valid exercise of Congress's reserve power under the Elections Clause. Taken together, these three principles are said to prove that court-drawn districts are "functionally equivalent" to congressional districts drawn by state legislatures through the exercise of the power by Article I, Section 4, cl. 1.

court-drawn maps are functionally equivalent to legislative maps, although there are key differences between the two. But our agreement on this point is of little help to Plaintiffs because they fail to persuade that a state cannot redraw district lines after a valid court-imposed plan is in place. That is, *Balderas* could only "use up" the State's constitutional authority to redistrict if the state is somehow constrained to draw district lines only once per decade. We have rejected Plaintiffs' argument that redistricting following a judicially imposed plan is forbidden, and we do not reach Plaintiffs' *Balderas* claim.

D

Plaintiffs also assert that Texas "tradition" prevents the State Legislature from redrawing district lines in the middle of the decade. They argue that, under Supreme Court precedent, the State Legislature was bound to follow its traditional redistricting principles in creating a new map. Since Texas does not have either a history or tradition of mid-decade redistricting, Plan 1374C is said to be invalid.

Plaintiffs' argument misreads Supreme Court precedent. Although the Supreme Court has required *courts* to use a state's "districting traditions" when drafting voting maps, the Court has never held that a state *legislature* is bound to follow its prior districting practices indefinitely. Indeed, "tradition" normally fills a very different role in redistricting suits.[41] Plaintiffs cite two Supreme Court

[41] Initially, the Court used tradition as a lens through which charges of racial gerrymandering are analyzed. Thus, in *Easley v. Cromartie*, 532 U.S. 234 (2001), the Court reiterated that "that those

(Continued on following page)

decisions, *White v. Weiser*[42] and *Branch v. Smith*,[43] to support their argument, but neither decision holds that states are bound to follow state tradition in drawing maps. In *White*, the Supreme Court held that *federal courts*, not state legislatures, must abide state districting traditions; the Court iterated that legislatures, not courts, have "primary jurisdiction" over reapportionment, and reinforced the notion that court intervention in the redistricting process is meant to be minor and remedial.[44] *Branch v. Smith* is also inapposite. In *Branch*, the Court attempted to reconcile § 2c with the seemingly conflicting requirements of § 2a(c)(5).[45] The Court explained that when a "federal court redistricts a State in a manner that complies with that State's substantive districting principles, it does so 'in the manner provided by the law thereof.'"[46] Plaintiffs cite this passage as evidence that states are constrained by tradition. Presumably, their argument is that since the Court held that a federal court redistricts "in the manner provided by the law [of the state]" only when it follows the state's districting traditions, so too a

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who claim that a legislature has improperly used race as a criterion, in order, for example, to create a majority-minority district, must show at a minimum that the 'legislature subordinated traditional race-neutral districting principles . . . to racial considerations.'" 532 U.S. 234, 241 (2001) (quoting *Miller v. Johnson*, 515 U.S. 900, 928 (1995)).

[42] 412 U.S. 783 (1973).

[43] 123 S.Ct. 1429 (2003).

[44] *White*, 412 U.S. at 795.

[45] Section 2a(c)(5) requires that representatives shall be elected in at-large elections "[u]ntil a State is redistricted in the manner provided by the law thereof after any apportionment," whereas § 2c requires states to be divided into single-member districts and prohibits courts from ordering at-large elections. *See* 2 U.S.C. §§ 2a(c)(5), 2c.

[46] *Branch*, 123 S. Ct. at 1444 (citations omitted).

state legislature can only redistrict "in the manner provided by the law [of the state]" when it follows the state's districting traditions. Plaintiffs misread this passage. *Branch* does not hold that a state must follow its redistricting traditions without deviation. Rather, the passage is focused solely on the power of federal courts. It specifically holds that if a federal court redistricts a state using the state's traditions and preferences, the court does so "in the manner provided by the law" of the state, such that § 2a(c)(5)'s requirement that at-large districts be used is not invoked.

In any event, it would be illogical to require a state legislature to adhere strictly to the state's districting principles whenever it undertook to redraw the state's map. Any such rule would, in effect, freeze the state's districting traditions in place.[47] We can find no reasoned basis for such a rule.[48]

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[47] Technically, the state would be bound to follow whatever districting traditions were in force as of the passage of § 2c.

[48] As further evidence of Texas's districting "traditions," Plaintiffs assert that the Texas Constitution bars mid-decade redistricting. We have already rejected the notion that the Texas Legislature is limited by its own traditions; therefore, we need not address this constitutional assertion. However, even if Texas's own traditions did limit the Texas Legislature, Plaintiffs have shown this court nothing in the Texas Constitution that would limit mid-decade redistricting. The State has not questioned this court's authority to enforce state law against the State of Texas. Given our finding that state law is no prohibition to mid-decade redistricting, we have no occasion to face the jurisdictional issue sua sponte.

The Texas Constitution does not explicitly allocate responsibility for drawing congressional districts. Plaintiffs point to this fact and argue that without an affirmative constitutional grant allowing the Legislature to undertake mid-decade redistricting, it may not do so.

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Plaintiffs' argument fails, however, precisely because the Texas Constitution is altogether silent on the topic of congressional redistricting. That is, not only does it not explicitly give the State Legislature the power to redistrict *mid-decade*; it does not explicitly give the State Legislature the power to draw congressional districts *at all*. Yet there is no doubt under Texas law that the State Legislature is in fact empowered to draw congressional district lines. The Texas Supreme Court reached this precise conclusion in *Perry v. Del Rio*, 67 S.W.3d 85, 91 (Tex. 2001), and numerous other courts have implicitly reached the same conclusion. It is well-established under Texas law that the Texas Legislature may legislate in any area not specifically proscribed by the Texas Constitution. Since the Texas Constitution does not deprive the Legislature of the power to pass congressional redistricting plans mid-decade, the Legislature has the power under Texas law to enact redistricting schemes intradecenially.

Although the Texas Constitution does not explicitly allocate the power to draw congressional districts, Article III, § 28 does address redistricting for state legislative districts. It requires the Texas Legislature to draw state representative and senatorial districts at its first regular session after the publication of the decennial census. If the Legislature fails to do so, § 28 confers the responsibility on a special body, the Legislative Redistricting Board.

Section 28 is generally thought to apply only to state legislative redistricting, but Plaintiffs assert that it applies to congressional redistricting as well, by analogy if not directly. Plaintiffs argue that § 28 prevents the Legislature from redrawing district lines mid-decade. For support, they point to a provision in the Texas Constitution of 1876 that limits the Texas Legislature to once-a-decade redistricting. While this provision was removed from the Constitution by an amendment to Article III, there is evidence that the 1876 provision remains in force.

The difficulty is that Plaintiffs ask us to do more than just apply Article III, § 28. They ask that we restore a provision removed over 100 years ago, apply it beyond its plain text to congressional redistricting, and strike down in the name of state law the first redistricting plan passed by the State Legislature since 1991. We are aware of no Texas case that has ever directly held that Article III, § 28 applies in full to congressional redistricting; all Texas decisions of which we are aware have assumed that § 28 does not control. And the Texas Attorney General Opinion Letters that Plaintiffs cite to bolster their argument also do not opine that Article III, § 28 applies in full to congressional

(Continued on following page)

E

Plaintiffs' final argument focuses on the effect of the *Balderas* judgment. They argue that *Balderas* was a final judgment that is binding on the State because it was a party to the proceeding. They argue that the State in enacting Plan 1374C is attempting to avoid the judgment in that case, and that the State is collaterally estopped from contesting the use of Plan 1151C.

The prerequisites for collateral estoppel are not met here. Issue preclusion has four basic requirements: (1) the issue must be identical to an issue involved in prior litigation; (2) the issue must have been fully and vigorously litigated; (3) the issue must have been necessarily decided in the prior litigation; and (4) special circumstances must not render preclusion inappropriate or unfair.[40] The first two requirements are not met here. It is true, as Plaintiffs argue, that the two majority-minority districts – Districts 18 and 30 – are involved in both cases, as are several other features of the two plans. But the *Balderas* court's tasks were different: it had to bring the district map into line with the equal population rule, while accommodating the two new congressional districts and obeying the Voting Rights Act. The issues are different here. We must first decide whether the State has the constitutional power under the Elections Clause or § 2c to redraw district lines mid-decade. This issue did not arise

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redistricting. The letters address the State's duties under Article III, § 28 without addressing the Legislature's power to draw congressional districts.

[40] *Winters v. Diamond Shamrock Chem. Co.*, 149 F.3d 387, 391 (5th Cir. 1998).

in *Balderas*. We also must examine a never-before-considered legislative districting plan, Plan 1374C, and decide whether it passes muster under the Constitution and the Voting Rights Act. We find no merit in Plaintiffs' collateral estoppel argument.

F

Perhaps the most compelling arguments offered by Plaintiffs against mid-decade redistricting focus on the impropriety – rather than the illegality – of frequent redistricting. A significant portion of Plaintiffs' arguments raise policy concerns. For example, Plaintiffs argue that frequent redrawing of district lines will undermine democratic accountability and exact a heavy cost on state independence as federal congressional leaders exert their influence to shape state districting behavior.

As persuasive as these arguments may be, they are directed to the wrong forum. If Congress chooses to ban intradecennial redistricting, it has the power to do so under the Elections Clause. We have found no provision in either the U.S. Constitution, federal law, or state law that proscribes mid-decade redistricting, and our mandate ends there.

G

We deny Plaintiffs' Motions to Dismiss and Motions for Summary Judgment on the issue of mid-decade redistricting and collateral estoppel.

III

Turning to the merits, we will first consider Plaintiffs' claims in their two most sweeping forms. First, Plaintiffs

argue that the proposed plan must be set aside in its entirety because it is laced with impermissible racial discrimination against Blacks and Latinos in violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the United States Constitution. Second, they allege that Plan 1374C is an impermissible partisan gerrymander. After addressing these allegations, we will then discuss a kindred but "analytically distinct claim" of racial discrimination under the Equal Protection Clause that in the drawing of various districts the Legislature was predominately motivated by race. We will reject the broad-based claims at the outset and return to these *Shaw* claims in our consideration of the more focused claims under § 2 leveled against specific districts. That process will amplify the findings that underpin our conclusion that Plaintiffs have failed to prove purposeful racial discrimination.

A

Since *Washington v. Davis*,[80] a claimed denial of Equal Protection has required proof that discrimination was purposeful; differential or adverse impact alone is not sufficient. In *Davis*, the Supreme Court considered an employment discrimination claim brought under the Equal Protection Clause in the District of Columbia before Title VII was extended to the District. Writing for the Court, Justice White rejected the argument that a party alleging racial discrimination under the Equal Protection Clause could focus solely on the racially differential impact

[80] 426 U.S. 229 (1976).

of the challenged state practice.[51] He explained that the Court had "never held that the constitutional standard for adjudicating claims of invidious racial discrimination [was] identical to the standards applicable under Title VII,"[52] which in certain circumstances allowed the adverse impact upon a protected minority to constitute sufficient proof of a statutory violation. He concluded that the Equal Protection Clause required more; it demanded proof that the challenged state action was intended to be discriminatory. *Davis* marked only the first step in the Court's analysis of Equal Protection claims, and in its wake came a range of questions, including questions about the allocations of the burden of proof and about the character of proof demanded by the requirement that racial discrimination be purposeful.

The next term, in *Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Corp.*,[53] the Court repudiated the Seventh Circuit's emphasis on the adverse impact of a challenged zoning decision in a Chicago suburb, rather than its purpose. Writing for the majority, Justice Powell – while acknowledging that proof of purpose would seldom be easy – explained that it was not necessary to prove that a decision was motivated by a single concern, or even that a particular purpose was the dominant or primary one. There need only be proof "that a discriminatory purpose has been a motivating factor in the decision."[54] The inquiry, he explained, may start with the impact of the

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[51] *Id.* at 239.

[52] *Id.*

[53] 429 U.S. 252 (1977).

[54] *Id.* at 265-66.

legislative act, which while not alone sufficient to prove purpose remains relevant, and continue to the exploration of the act's history, including any contemporary statements by members of the decision-making body.

Two years later in *Personnel Administrator of Mass. v. Feeney*,[55] the Court upheld a Massachusetts statute granting lifetime preferences to veterans for civil service positions. The Court rejected claims that because few women could qualify, the statute discriminated against women in violation of the Equal Protection Clause. Writing for the majority, Justice Stewart pointed to findings of the district court that the statute had a legitimate purpose – awarding benefits to veterans – and was not a pretext for discriminating against women. He then offered a critical observation, one that proved to be a powerful and enduring feature of Equal Protection Clause jurisprudence:

> It would [be] disingenuous to say that the adverse consequences of this legislation for women were unintended, in the sense that they were not volitional or in the sense that they were not foreseeable.
>
> "Discriminatory purpose," however, implies more than intent as volition or intent as awareness of consequences. It implies that the decision maker, in this case a state legislature, selected or reaffirmed a particular course of action at least in part "because of," not merely "in spite of," its adverse effects upon an identifiable group.[56]

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[55] 442 U.S. 256 (1979).

[56] *Id.* at 278-79 (internal citations omitted); Justice Stewart went on to explain that the impact was relevant as in *Arlington Heights*. *Id.*

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After grappling with the explicit remedial use of race by courts, legislative bodies, and various federal and state institutions, the Court turned to redistricting plans drawn to enhance the opportunity of minorities protected by the Voting Rights Act where race had become more than another of many necessary considerations in line-drawing. Justice Ginsberg put it succinctly in *Miller v. Johnson*:

> Two Terms ago, in *Shaw v. Reno*, this Court took up a claim "analytically distinct" from a vote dilution claim. *Shaw* authorized judicial intervention in "extremely irregular" apportionments, in which the legislature cast aside traditional districting practices to consider race alone – in the *Shaw* case, to create a district in North Carolina in which African-Americans would compose a majority of the voters.[57]

In short, *Miller* instructs that we are to engage in a searching review of district lines "predominantly motivated" by race when a state subordinates traditional districting practices to race.

Plaintiffs have not proven their claim of racial discrimination. There is little question but that the single-minded purpose of the Texas Legislature in enacting Plan

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at 279 n.24 ("Proof of discriminatory intent must necessarily usually rely on objective factors, several of which were outlined in *Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Dev. Corp.* The inquiry is practical. What a legislature or any official entity is 'up to' may be plain from the results its actions achieve, or the results they avoid. Often it is made clear from what has been called, in a different context, 'the give and take of the situation.'" (citations omitted)).

[57] *Miller v. Johnson*, 515 U.S. 930, 934 (1995) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (internal citations omitted).

1374C was to gain partisan advantage. With the Republican sweep of statewide offices in 2000 came control of the Legislative Redistricting Board. The Legislature was initially unable to redraw district lines for either state legislative or congressional seats. The federal courts drew a congressional district plan[58] and after one modification held that the plans for the Texas House of Representatives and Senate drawn by the Republican-controlled Board were legal.[59] Although the judicial plan for the congressional districts reflected the growing strength of the Republican Party in Texas, with 20 of the 32 seats offering a Republican advantage, the voters in 2002 split their tickets and elected only 15 Republicans. Six incumbent Anglo Democrats were elected by narrow margins in Republican-leaning districts. With Republicans in control of the State Legislature, they set out to increase their representation in the congressional delegation to 22. As we will explain, all that happened thereafter flowed from this objective, with the give-and-take inherent in the legislative process along the way. The result disadvantaged Democrats. And a high percentage of Blacks and Latinos are Democrats.[60]

The majority of Plaintiffs' Equal Protection claims focus on District 26 in Plan 1374C, which reflects Republican

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[58] *See Balderas v. Texas*, No. 6:01-CV-158, slip op. (E.D. Tex. Nov. 14, 2002), *aff'd mem.*, 536 U.S. 919 (2002).

[59] *See Balderas v. Texas*, No. 6:01-CV-158, slip op. (E.D. Tex. Nov. 28, 2001), *available at* 2001 WL 34104833; *Balderas v. Texas*, No. 6:01-CV-158, slip op. (E.D. Tex. Nov. 28, 2001), *available at* 2001 WL 34104836.

[60] *See, e.g.*, Tr. 12/11 PM (Lichtman), at 67-68; Jackson Pls.' Exs. 1, 10, 12-13, and 15.

refusal to preserve Democratic Congressman Martin Frost's District 24 while at the same time preserving adjoining Republican districts. To remove Congressman Frost, he needed to lose a large portion of his Democratic constituency, many of whom lived in a predominantly Black area of Tarrant County. This group of voters was taken from previous District 24 and grouped with Denton and Cooke Counties, which are north of Tarrant County. Plaintiffs view the protrusion that reaches down to include the Black Democrats as evidence of intentional racial discrimination.

We disagree. That African-Americans in Texas vote overwhelmingly for Democratic candidates and that various political compromises were reached to arrive at the current district lines belie the assertion that Texas intentionally discriminated against the African-American voters. Bob Davis, who assisted the Texas Senate in drawing various plans and submitting them to the Legislative Redistricting Board, credibly testified as to the various political considerations that combined to result in the lines of current Congressional District 26. First, Representative Kent Grusendorf, who served on the House side of the districting committee, wanted his State House District – which covers the city of Arlington – to remain whole.[61] Arlington's western boundary forms most of the

[61] Tr. 12/18 AM (Davis), at 77. State Representative Phil King, the bill sponsor for redistricting on the House side, added: "my job was to get eight votes aye on the redistricting committee then 76 on the Floor and then six in the conference committee. And Kent Grusendorf had said that he – that he would not support any plan – he was on the redistricting committee – that did not keep the City of Arlington whole.

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eastern edge of District 26's southern protrusion. Second, the court-drawn map, Plan 1151C, split State House Representative Glenn Lewis's District 95 into two different congressional districts. Representative Lewis wanted his district to fall completely within one congressional district.[82] House District 95 now forms the southern tip of Plan 1374C's District 26, explaining the southernmost boundaries of District 26. Third, Democrats could not be placed in Congressional District 12 to the west because District 12 would then become "far more Democrat and very marginally Republican, if Republican at all."[83] Finally, Representative Phil King, the chairman of the redistricting bill in the Texas House, wanted Parker and Wise Counties to be included completely in Congresswoman Granger's District 12.[84] But if the Tarrant County population fell in District 12, population would need to be taken out, likely from Parker or Wise counties.

> So, the net result was the political consequences of putting that territory, either in District 12 or

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He said Arlington always gets split up. He wanted it whole." Tr. 12/18 PM (King), at 135-36.

[82] Tr. 12/18 AM (Davis), at 78. Representative King reinforced Davis's testimony, stating: "I had also been directed by the Speaker of the House – Glenn Lewis, was the first Democrat and the first minority member to come out supporting him publicly for Speaker. And Glenn Lewis had asked the Speaker that his District not be divided up, but remain intact within a Congressional District, nonspecific as to which District, although he made it clear his preference was that it stay in a Martin Frost District. So I was directed by the Speaker of the House to under no circumstances split up Glenn Lewis's House seat, which is 95." Tr. 12/18 PM (King), at 136.

[83] Tr. 12/18 AM (Davis), at 79.

[84] *Id.* at 79: 19-24.

> District 6, were not good. And District 26, which was, in the Court Plan, this area in here, adjacent to it, and so it was placed on the District 26 because the political structure of 26 could handle that particular component of the Tarrant County population and still produce Republican results for District 26.[65]

We find these unchallenged explanations to be credible, and we find that including the large Democratic area of southeast Tarrant County in District 26 was the sole product of political give-and-take by legislative members over their own state districts and the effort to not create another Democratic district. The actions were not taken because of race; they were taken in spite of it.

Plaintiffs' expert's testimony supports our conclusion that politics, not race, drove Plan 1374C. The Jackson Plaintiffs' expert, Dr. John Alford, professor of political science at Rice University, testified that "one would have a very hard time not recognizing that the State has a very strong partisan motivation in this particular map."[66] Representative Phil King testified that the purpose of the plan was to make the congressional delegation more reflective of state voting trends. The amicus brief of the

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[65] *Id.* at 80: 2-9. Representative King testified to the same political result: "[W]hat we did in Tarrant County, the only way we could do that is basically took Stop Six Poly and Handley and Meadowbrook area and all of that and moved it up into north and tied it in with the Denton County area. And those – we tried to, the best we could, maintain the city limit lines for Ft. Worth and for Arlington in that measure. And generally, you had that level of politics going on in every county, particularly the metropolitan ones throughout the State." Tr. 12/18 PM (King), at 137.

[66] Tr. 12/15 AM (Alford), at 109.

Texas House Democratic Caucus and Representatives John Lewis, Chris Bell, Martin Frost, Sheila Jackson Lee, and Nick Lampson filed in *Vieth v. Jubelirer* in support of Appellants told the Supreme Court that "[t]he newly dominant Republicans ... decided to redraw the state's congressional districts solely for the purpose of seizing between five and seven seats from Democratic incumbents." It was clear from the evidence that this assertion is true. Former Lieutenant Governor Bill Ratliff, one of the most highly regarded members of the Senate and commonly referred to as the conscience of the Senate, testified that political gain for the Republicans was 110% of the motivation for the Plan, that it was "the entire motivation."[87] He explained that he is leaving the Senate before the expiration of his term in large part out of disappointment at its partisan turn. In the course of the redistricting bill's passage, Senator Ratliff, a Republican, refused to abandon the two-thirds rule, which does not allow a bill to come to the floor without the support of 21 members, a practice calculated to promote consensus building.

Plaintiffs nonetheless insist that there was racial discrimination along the way in the specific drawing of the lines. We will examine this less sweeping assertion as we examine the particular districts that are alleged to have been drawn in violation of § 2 of the Voting Rights Act, or in defiance of the principles of *Shaw v. Reno*.

While keenly aware of the long history of discrimination against Latinos and Blacks in Texas, and recognizing that their long struggle for economic and personal freedom

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[87] Tr. 12/15 AM (Ratliff), at 35.

is not over, we are compelled to conclude that this plan was a political product from start to finish. The myriad decisions made during its creation were made in spite of, and not because of, its effects upon Blacks and Latinos. To find otherwise would frustrate the fundamentals of *Washington v. Davis* and inject the federal courts into a political game for which they are ill-suited, and indeed in which they are charged not to participate under the most basic principles of federalism and separation of power. Concluding that the purpose requirement of the Equal Protection Clause was met on these facts would pass redistricting from the state legislatures and redistricting boards to the federal courts. This is not to say that we wholly withdraw, of course. We simply recognize the fundamental decision in *Washington v. Davis* that federal judges are not legislative players; we are only the guardians of the boundaries. As Justice Ginsburg put it, while "[l]egislative districting is highly political business ... [g]enerations of rank discrimination against [minorities] account for [the court's] surveillance."[28]

Having been watchful, we are not persuaded that this most fundamental boundary of the Equal Protection Clause was crossed. In the redistricting arena, an area that has proven most reluctant to yield discernible standards, there are large incentives to reach for the seeming certainty of the Equal Protection Clause's familiar condemnation of purposeful racial discrimination and draw upon its comforting moral force, rather than confront the task of developing proper standards or concede their

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[28] *Miller v. Johnson*, 515 U.S. 930, 934 (1995) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).

ephemeral political character. To our eyes, the certainty is an illusion, and its deployment to heel radical partisan line-drawing by state legislatures is a mistake. And turning to *Washington v. Davis*'s insistence of purpose, rather than confronting directly the questions now before the Court in *Vieth v. Jubelirer*, is just an old Texas two-step.[69]

B

We have no hesitation in concluding that, under current law, this court cannot strike down Plan 1374C on the basis that it is an illegal partisan gerrymander. Seventeen years ago, the Supreme Court held in *Davis v. Bandemer*[70] that an excessively political or partisan gerrymander presents a justiciable issue under the Equal Protection Clause. But the Court was unable to settle upon a manageable standard for addressing such claims. It is now painfully clear that Justice Powell's concern that the decision offered a "'constitutional green light' to

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[69] The Appellants in *Vieth v. Jubelirer* note the problems resulting from litigants turning to race-based claims when they have no chance of proving a *Bandemer* claim: "[W]ith no prospect of prevailing on a forthright claim of partisan gerrymandering under the lower courts' interpretation of *Bandemer*, aggrieved partisans instead often allege racial gerrymandering or minority vote dilution in violation of the Voting Rights Act. The incentive to couch partisan disputes in racial terms bleeds back into the legislative process, too, as members of the 'out' party – believing they can win only in court, and only on a race-based claim – may be tempted to spice the legislative record with all manner of racialized arguments, to lay the foundation for an eventual court challenge." Brief for Appellant at 10-11, *Vieth v. Jubelirer*, 2003 WL 22070244 (2003) (internal citations and footnotes omitted).

[70] 478 U.S. 109 (1986).

would-be gerrymanderers" has been realized.[71] *Bandemer* insisted upon proof of both discriminatory purpose and discriminatory effect, two requirements that are difficult to meet in the courtroom, particularly as they have been interpreted by the lower courts. That the response to this difficulty must be to develop a new standard does not necessarily follow. The question remains how much of a role the judiciary ought to play in policing the political give-and-take of redistricting. It may be the most difficult question, but it is certainly the most important.

When the Supreme Court resolves *Vieth*, it may choose to retreat from its decision that the question is justiciable, or it may offer more guidance on the nature of the required effect. Perhaps the Court will draw on its experience in developing federal common law in the antitrust arena, which draws a fine line between competitive effect and injury to competition.[72] We have learned firsthand what will result if the Court chooses to do neither. Throughout this case we have borne witness to the powerful, conflicting forces nurtured by *Bandemer*'s holding that the judiciary is to address "excessive" partisan line-drawing, while leaving the issue virtually unenforceable. Inevitably, as the political party in power uses district lines to lock in its present advantage, the party out of power attempts to stretch the protective cover of the Voting Rights Act, urging dilution of critical standards that may, if accepted, aid their party in the short-run but

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[71] *Id.* at 173 (Powell, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).

[72] Professor Samuel Issacharoff has explored this idea in a recent article. *See* Samuel Issacharoff, *Gerrymandering and Political Cartels*, 116 HARV. L. REV. 593 (2002).

work to the detriment of persons now protected by the Act in the long-run. Casting the appearance both that there is a wrong and that the judiciary stands ready with a remedy, *Bandemer* as applied steps on legislative incentives for self-correction.

There are ameliorations available short of a grand judicial pronouncement, remedies which are perhaps superior. In Texas, redistricting advantages can be overcome through the political process. The exchange of political advantage between the Democrats in 1990 and the Republicans in 2000 demonstrates this reality. If the Democratic party takes the main statewide offices, Democrats can block a state legislative redistricting plan and write their own through the Legislative Redistricting Board. The resulting State Legislature could then redraw the congressional lines.

Even if the partisan gerrymander issue were not justiciable but Congress allowed the drawing of new lines only when there was no extant legal plan, and in any event no more often than once in a decade, the picture would likely be quite different. That the limitation would only reach congressional seats and not state legislatures themselves does not mean that its effects would not be larger. As the record in this case makes clear, Congress often plays a large role in state redistricting, not only of congressional districts but also of the state chambers themselves. Members of Congress work to protect their incumbency and to affect the partisan makeup of the House, with keen interest in the election of members of the State Legislature. Accordingly, a rule that the game is played only once per decade could matter a great deal in the real world of politics. It is fair to ask what if Congress had imposed a once-a-decade rule seventeen years ago,

even if *Bandemer* had dismissed the case as presenting a non-justiciable political question.

Our point is that if the judiciary must rein in partisan gerrymanders, limitations that focus upon the time and circumstance of partisan line-drawing and less upon the "some but not too much" genre of strictures offer the best of an ugly array of choices. Drawing upon the Voting Rights Act jurisprudence to give *Bandemer* teeth may be the worst of choices.

IV

For convenience, we record some of the general principles to which we will refer in addressing Plaintiffs' challenges to specific districts. Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 (as amended) provides:

> (a) No voting qualification or prerequisite to voting or standard, practice, or procedure shall be imposed or applied by any State or political subdivision in a manner which results in a denial or abridgement of the right of any citizen of the United States to vote on account of race or color, or in contravention of the guarantees set fort in section 1973b(f)(2) of this title, as provided in subsection (b) of this section.
>
> (b) A violation of subsection (a) of this section is established if, based on the totality of the circumstances, it is shown that the political processes leading to nomination or election in the State or political subdivision are not equally open to participation by members of a class of citizens protected by subsection (a) of this section in that its members have less opportunity than other members of the electorate to participate in

> the political process and elect representatives of their choice. The extent to which members of a protected class have been elected to office in the State or political subdivision is one circumstance which may be considered: Provided, That nothing in this section establishes a right to have members of a protected class elected in numbers equal to their proportion in the population.[73]

To prevail on a claim of vote dilution under § 2, a plaintiff must, as a threshold requirement, satisfy the three now-familiar preconditions set forth in *Thornburg v. Gingles*: (1) a minority group must be "sufficiently large and geographically compact to constitute a majority in a single-member district"; (2) the group must be "politically cohesive"; and (3) sufficient racial bloc voting must exist such that the white majority usually defeats the minority's preferred candidate.[74] *Gingles* withheld deciding whether

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[73] 42 U.S.C. § 1973.

[74] *Thornburg v. Gingles*, 478 U.S. 30, 50-51 (1986). To aid courts in investigating a plaintiff's § 2 claim, the *Gingles* Court identified other factors that may, in "the totality of the circumstances," support a claim of racial vote dilution. Derived from the Senate Report accompanying the 1982 amendment to § 2, those factors include:

> 1. the extent of any history of official discrimination in the state or political subdivision that touched the right of the members of the minority group to register, to vote, or otherwise to participate in the democratic process;
>
> 2. The extent to which voting in the elections of the state or political subdivision is racially polarized;
>
> 3. the extent to which the state or political subdivision has used unusually large election districts, majority vote requirements, anti-single shot provisions, or other voting practices or procedures that may enhance the opportunity for discrimination against the minority group;

(Continued on following page)

there could ever be a showing of potential success without a showing that a clear majority could gather in the absence of the accused practice or structure. The lower courts, with the exception of a recent decision by a divided panel of the First Circuit,[75] have strictly enforced the 50% rule, including the Fifth Circuit.[76] There are powerful

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4. if there is a candidate slating process, whether the members of the minority group have been denied access to that process;

5. the extent to which members of the minority group in the state or political subdivision bear the effects of discrimination in such areas as education, employment and health, which hinder their ability to participate effectively in the political process;

6. whether political campaigns have been characterized by overt or subtle racial appeals; and

7. the extent to which members of the minority group have been elected to public office in the jurisdiction.

Additional factors that may be probative of vote dilution in some cases are:

8. whether there is a significant lack of responsiveness on the part of elected officials to the particularized needs of the members of the minority group; and

9. whether the policy underlying the state or political subdivision's use of such voting qualification, prerequisite to voting, or standard, practice or procedure is tenuous.

Id. at 37 (quoting S.Rep. No. 97-417, 97th Cong., 2nd Sess., at 28-29 (1982), reprinted in U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News 1982, at 206-07).

[75] *See Metts v. Murphy*, 347 F.3d 346 (1st Cir. 2003). We note, however, that the First Circuit elected to take *Metts* en banc and issued an order expressly withdrawing and vacating the panel decision. *See Metts v. Murphy*, No. 02-2204 (1st Cir. Dec. 3, 2003) (order granting petition for rehearing en banc).

[76] *See, e.g., Valdespino v. Alamo Heights Ind. School Dist.*, 168 F.3d 848, 852-53 (5th Cir. 1999), *cert. denied*, 528 U.S. 1114 (2000); *Cousin v. Sundquist*, 145 F.3d 818, 827-29 (6th Cir. 1998); *Colleton County Council v. McConnell*, 201 F. Supp. 2d 618, 643 (D.S.C. 2002).

reasons to be exacting, as we will explain, but the facts of this case offer no occasion to decide if there is a tolerable deviation from the rule that a minority must demonstrate that, absent an accused practice or structure, it had the potential to elect a candidate of its choice by proof that it could constitute 50% of the district.

Although satisfying the *Gingles* factors is a prerequisite, meeting the three conditions is alone not enough to prevail under § 2. If they are met, the court is to consider the totality of the circumstances, including a searching inquiry into whether the political process is equally open to minority voters. In *Johnson v. De Grandy*, the Court explained how to evaluate dilution under a single-member districting plan and discussed the extent of a state's duty to create additional majority-minority districts under § 2.[77] In *De Grandy*, the plaintiffs attempted to establish liability by pointing to a number of places where minority voters had been "cracked" and placed in majority-white districts where their votes would be "submerged" and ineffective. The Court rejected the dilution claim of the Hispanic and African-American voters because the challenged districting plan provided both sets of voters "rough proportionality," the opportunity to exercise electoral control in a number of districts that roughly corresponded to their share of the relevant population.[78] The Court emphasized that proportionality does not provide a complete or mechanical defense to a § 2 suit.[79] The Court also

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[77] 512 U.S. 997 (1994).

[78] *Id.* at 1015-16.

[79] *Id.* at 1018-19, 1023-24; *see also, Barnett v. City of Chicago*, 141 F.3d 699, 705 (7th Cir. 1998); J. Gerald Hebert, *Redistricting in the*

(Continued on following page)

made it clear that proportionality is significant in evaluating dilution claims and has become a preeminent measure of fairness in redistricting.[80] Now known as "*De Grandy* proportionality," dilution may be found to be absent under the totality of the circumstances when the protected minority groups "constitute effective voting majorities in a number of districts . . . substantially proportional to their share in the population."[81]

In *Shaw v. Reno* ("Shaw I"), the Court addressed the constitutionality of a district drawn with race as the predominant motivation, as evidenced by a bizarrely-shaped district drawn to augment minority voting strength.[82] The Court held that such a district could be challenged, depending on how it was drawn, under the Equal Protection Clause. In *Shaw v. Hunt* ("Shaw II"), the Court concluded that a racially gerrymandered district would be subject to strict scrutiny, and that compliance with § 2 could justify a racially gerrymandered district only if the remedial district was narrowly tailored toward that end.[83] In so holding, the

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Post-2000 Era, 8 GEO. MASON L. REV. 431 (2000) ("As a practical matter, . . . one factor is particularly important: the 'proportionality,' or lack thereof, between the number of minority-controlled districts and the minority's share of the state's relevant population.").

[80] A redistricting plan may, of course, achieve proportionality and yet violate § 2. *See, e.g.*, *Rural West Tennessee African-American Affairs Council v. Sundquist*, 209 F.3d 835 (6th Cir. 2000); *Harvell v. Blytheville Sch. Dist. No. 5*, 126 F.3d 1038 (8th Cir. 1997); *Harvell v. Blytheville Sch. Dist. No. 5*, 71 F.3d 1382 (8th Cir. 1995); *Little Rock Sch. Dist. v. Pulaski County Special Sch. Dist., #1*, 56 F.3d 904 (8th Cir. 1995); *Barnett v. Daley*, 32 F.3d 1196 (7th Cir. 1994).

[81] *De Grandy*, 512 U.S. at 1020.

[82] 509 U.S. 630 (1993).

[83] 517 U.S. 899 (1996).

Court held that a remedy for vote dilution in one part of the state, where it was possible to draw an additional, compact majority-minority district, is not narrowly tailored to comply with § 2 if the remedial district is drawn in a different part of the state where polarized voting also exists, but where a compact district cannot be crafted. In so holding, the Court stated:

> Arguing, as appellees do and the District Court did, that the State may draw the district anywhere derives from a misconception of the vote-dilution claim. To accept that the district may be placed anywhere implies that the claim, and hence the coordinate right to an undiluted vote (to cast a ballot equal among voters), belongs to the minority as a group and not to its individual members. It does not.[84]

Similarly, in *De Grandy,* the Court stated that one reason for rejecting the inflexible safe harbor rule the state advocated in that case, under which no dilution can occur as a matter of law if the percentage of single member districts in which minority voters form an effective majority mirrors the minority voters' percentage of the relevant population, was that it rested on

> an unexplored premise of highly suspect validity: that in any given voting jurisdiction (or portion of that jurisdiction under consideration), the rights of some minority voters under § 2 may be traded off against the rights of other members of the same minority class. Under the State's view, the most blatant racial gerrymandering in half of a

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[84] *Id.* at 917.

> county's single-member districts would be irrelevant under § 2 if offset by political gerrymandering in the other half, so long as proportionality was the bottom line.[55]

With these basic principles in mind, we now turn to Plaintiffs' specific claims.

V

We first examine the § 2 challenges to the districts in Central and East Texas, most notably District 24 in the Dallas-Fort Worth area. As a preliminary matter, it bears emphasis that the majority requirement of the first *Gingles* precondition cannot be met in these districts by summing Black and Hispanic voter populations.[56] Plaintiffs cite *Brewer v. Ham*[57] for the proposition that minority groups may be combined to satisfy *Gingles*'s majority requirement. *Brewer*, however, allowed for minority combination when the groups vote cohesively. Here, there is no serious dispute but that Blacks and Hispanics do not vote cohesively in primary elections, where their allegiance is free of party affiliation.[58] Minority voters must

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[55] *De Grandy*, 512 U.S. at 1019.

[56] *Valdespino v. Alamo Heights Ind. Sch. Dist.*, 168 F.3d 848, 852-53 (5th Cir. 1999), *cert. denied*, 528 U.S. 1114 (2000).

[57] 876 F.2d 448, 453 (5th Cir. 1989).

[58] *See* Post-Trial Brief of Jackson Plaintiffs, at 39 (conceding that "African-American and Hispanics in the Metroplex are not consistently 'jointly' cohesive in Democratic primaries"). Furthermore, even assuming that Blacks and Hispanics vote cohesively, Plaintiffs have failed to meet their burden to disprove partisanship as the driving force behind the bloc voting. *See LULAC v. Clements*, 999 F.2d 831, 850 (1993) (en banc).

have the potential to elect in the absence of the accused practice or structure if their claim of injury by that practice or structure is to be sustained."[89]

A

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Georgia v. Ashcroft[90] is the most recent discussion of the factual and legal distinctions between majority-minority, coalition, and influence districts.[91] Majority-minority or "safe" districts are voting districts with a majority of minority voters, making it "highly likely that minority voters will be able to elect the candidate of their choice."[92] Coalition districts are voting districts where minority voters "'are able to form coalitions with voters from other racial and ethnic groups, having no need to be a majority within a single district in order to elect candidates of their choice.'"[93] Influence districts are voting districts "where minority voters may not be able to elect a candidate of choice but can play a substantial, if not decisive, role in the electoral process."[94] The elected representatives in influence districts, as a result of the

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[89] *Gingles*, 478 U.S. at 51 n.17.

[90] 123 S.Ct. 2498 (2003).

[91] The parties assign various names to these districts, but we will follow the Supreme Court's taxonomy.

[92] *Ashcroft*, 123 S.Ct. at 2511.

[93] *Id.* at 2512 (quoting *De Grandy*, 512 U.S. at 1020).

[94] *Id.*

influence of minority voting, take minority interests into account."[55]

Georgia tested the limits of these types of districts when it redrew its state senate's voting districts following the 2000 census. The previous map, which was finally precleared after much litigation, included various safe districts. Shifting its strategy, the Democratic-controlled Legislature "unpacked" three of the safe districts and spread the minority voters to create influence and coalition districts.[56] The goal was to increase the overall influence of minorities in Georgia politics. The Justice Department challenged the plan as retrogressive because of the reduction of minorities in the previously safe districts. The district court found the plan retrogressive because the change in the three safe districts created less opportunity for minorities to elect the representatives of their choice.

Georgia appealed the decision to the Supreme Court, arguing that preclearance was appropriate because the new map did not harm the minorities' "effective exercise of the electoral franchise." Georgia asked the Court to examine the voting plan as a whole so that the increase in voting strength in other influence and coalition districts could offset the decrease in the three previously safe districts. The Justice Department argued that the district court correctly found retrogression based solely on the

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[55] *Id.*

[56] *Id.* at 2507-08. The districts reduced the minority populations from 60.58%, 55.43%, and 62.45% to 50.31%, 50.66%, and 50.80%, respectively.

decrease in minority population in the three previously safe districts.

Georgia's argument prevailed. The Court held that states are free to choose the best way to avoid retrogression and ensure equal opportunity to minority voters. To determine whether a new map is retrogressive, the Court examined the state as a whole and considered all the relevant circumstances, "such as the ability of minority voters to elect their candidate of choice, the extent of the minority group's opportunity to participate in the political process, and the feasibility of creating a nonretrogressive plan."[87] The Court accepted that minority interests may be better served by coalition and influence districts rather than safe districts. The Court noted that although safe districts ensure descriptive representation, they also "isolat[e] minority voters from the rest of the state, and risk[] narrowing political influence to only a fraction of political districts"[88] – that "various studies have suggested that the most effective way to maximize minority voting strength may be to create more influence or coalitional districts,"[89] and, critically, Georgia may make that choice. Georgia's alteration of its safe districts would have been problematic at best in the 1980s and early 1990s, but the Court allowed it as a valid political choice that Georgia might choose to make in an effort to increase minority voting strength – an alternative to its obligation under *Gingles* to draw a safe majority-minority district.

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[87] *Id.* at 2511.

[88] *Id.* at 2512.

[89] *Id.* at 2513.

The Court held that the district court erred in focusing too heavily on the decrease of voting power in the previously safe districts, and in ignoring the offsetting influence and coalition districts. In the Court's view, the ability of minorities to elect their preferred candidates is important, but not dispositive. Despite the views of the Justice Department, the ACLU, and lower federal courts, the Court held that creating safe districts was not the only means of assuring an effective vote for minorities.

While *Ashcroft* is a § 5 preclearance case addressing the question of retrogression, the Court's opinion makes plain that safe districts are no longer untouchable. States previously read *Gingles* as requiring safe districts to ensure the election of minorities by countering racially polarized voting. But *Georgia v. Ashcroft* makes clear that safe districts are not necessarily required; states may choose to avoid retrogression by creating coalition and influence districts. Georgia decreased the percentage of minority voters in three previously safe districts to such a degree that, in the opinion of the Justice Department, minorities could not elect their candidate of choices. Yet, the addition of coalition and influence districts countered possible retrogression.

2

All parties here rely upon *Georgia v. Ashcroft*. Plaintiffs argue that *Ashcroft* effectively overruled *Gingles*'s first requirement that "the minority group must be able to demonstrate that it is sufficiently large and geographically compact to constitute a majority in a single-member

district."[100] Plaintiffs base this assertion on *Ashcroft*'s reasoning that a district may provide effective representation to minorities despite the absence of a mathematical majority.[101] From this, Plaintiffs conclude that influence districts must be protected under § 2 of the Voting Rights Act.

In response, Texas argues that under *Ashcroft* redrawing an influence district does not inevitably dilute minority votes under § 2. Texas argues that if majority-minority districts may be altered without running afoul of the Voting Rights Act, then *a fortiori* an influence district may be altered. *Ashcroft* provided states with the flexibility to choose the means of complying with the Voting Rights Act, and although the Court opined that coalition and influence districts may be the most effective means of increasing minority influence, they are not required. *Ashcroft* did not dictate that a state must maximize both majority-minority and influence districts. Indeed, the question whether federal law requires influence districts has been avoided many times,[102] reflecting, the State argues, the Court's wariness of being drawn further into the political arena. Finally, the State notes that the Supreme Court faced the exact question and rejected it when it summarily affirmed a district court's rejection of the contention "that the first *Gingles* precondition is not fully applicable" to districts "where a distinct

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[100] *Gingles*, 478 U.S. at 50.

[101] *See* Post-Trial Brief of Jackson Plaintiffs, at 5 n.3.

[102] *See Uno v. City of Holyoke*, 72 F.3d 973, 979 n.2 (1st Cir. 1995); *Rural West Tenn. African-Am. Affairs Council, Inc. v. McWherter*, 877 F.Supp. 1096, 1101 (W.D. Tenn. 1995).

[minority] group cannot form a majority, but they are sufficiently large and cohesive to effectively influence elections, getting their candidate of choice elected."[103]

Texas's argument finds support in the language of *Ashcroft*:

> On one hand, a smaller number of safe majority-minority districts may virtually guarantee the election of a minority group's preferred candidate in those districts. . . . And while such districts may result in more "descriptive representation" because the representatives of choice are more likely to mirror the race of the majority of voters in that district, the representation may be limited to fewer areas.
>
> On the other hand, spreading out minority voters over a greater number of districts creates more districts in which minority voters may have the opportunity to elect a candidate of their choice. Such a strategy has the potential to increase "substantive representation" in more districts, by creating coalitions of voters who together will help to achieve the electoral aspirations of the minority group. It also, however, creates the risk that the minority group's preferred candidate may lose. . . . Section 5 gives States the flexibility to choose one theory of effective representation over the other.[104]

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[103] *Parker v. Ohio*, 263 F. Supp. 2d 1100, 1104 (S.D. Ohio) (three-judge panel), *aff'd*, 124 S. Ct. 574 (2003).

[104] *Ashcroft*, 123 S.Ct. at 2512 (internal citations omitted).

As we see it, these choices are for the states to make, as long as they avoid other constitutional and statutory violations under the Equal Protection Clause and § 2. Allowing influence districts to meet a *Gingles*-imposed obligation to create a majority-minority district does not mean that a state must create an influence district in the absence of an obligation to create a majority-minority district. We are not persuaded that Texas had the duty in drawing a new map to trace the old lines to avoid any disruption of coalitions. To so conclude would have profound consequences, freezing ephemeral political alliances, which are the bull's eyes of partisan redistricting. We will turn to a concrete example. The 24th is a Democratic district, and its "coalitions" are simply minority Blacks joining with majority Anglos voting a Democratic ticket in the general election. Plaintiffs' understandable efforts to freeze this "coalition" by locating some duty under § 2 not to redraw the district is a transparent effort to use race as a shield from a partisan gerrymander when the district itself was a child of identical efforts to gerrymander. As we will explain, under the new plan, Democrats – both Anglo and Black – lose control of the District 24.

B

We turn first to District 24, located in the Dallas-Fort Worth metroplex in an area referred to as the mid-cities. The congressman from the district is Martin Frost, an Anglo Democrat elected in 1978. This area between Dallas and Fort Worth experienced enormous growth from the early 1960's, leading to the creation of the 24th in 1972. With some iteration, the district has remained in place until the passage of Plan 1374C in 2003. The old 24th touched both Dallas and Fort Worth and included the

communities of Duncanville and Cedar Hill on its south side. It also included large plants of Bell Helicopter, General Motors, Northrop Grumman, and Lockheed Martin, as well as the Texas Rangers' baseball stadium and the Six Flags Over Texas theme park.[105]

Frost, then thirty-two years old, ran for the seat two years after it was created but was defeated in the Democratic primary by Dale Milford, the Anglo incumbent. Congressman Frost won the next race and has held the seat since then. Allied with Speaker Wright of Fort Worth, he quickly won leadership positions, including a seat on the Rules Committee. Frost is a major fund raiser for the Democratic party, and he so effectively chaired a redistricting panel in 1991 that he is widely seen as the architect of the redistricting plan of 1991.[106] This plan, drawing on the developing computer technology, is cited by political scientists as the shrewdest of the 1990s.[107] Congresswoman Eddie Bernice Johnson, who holds a seat in an adjacent largely Black district, testified that Frost drew the 24th for an Anglo Democrat.[108]

The judicial plan replaced by 1374C left the 24th largely in place. It had a Black voting age population of 21.4% and a Hispanic voting age population of 33.6%. The latter number falls when citizenship (CVAP) is considered,

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[105] MICHAEL BARONE, THE ALMANAC OF AMERICAN POLITICS 2004, at 1580 (Nat'l Journal Group 2003).

[106] *Id.* at 1581.

[107] *Id.* at 1448 ("The plan carefully constructs democratic districts with incredibly convoluted lines and packs heavily Republican suburban areas into just a few districts.").

[108] Tr. 12/17 PM (Johnson), at 154-155, 161, 164-165.

as it must be. The result is that neither Blacks nor Hispanics have 50% of the voters in the district alone or combined, where they constitute only 46.4%. Measured by the statewide races and the Lieutenant Governor's race in 20[illegible] District 24 is approximately 60% Democrat, although Al Gore carried the district with 54% of the vote and Governor Bush carried the entire state with 59% of the statewide vote and 61% in the Dallas-Fort Worth metroplex. It bears mention that Houston and Dallas-Fort Worth cast 47% of all votes cast in the state.[109] Bush carried only 5% of the Black vote but enjoyed 42% of the Hispanic vote and 73% of the Anglo vote.[110]

Facing the absence of a minority with 50% of the voting age population of the district singly or combined, Plaintiffs contend that the 24th nonetheless meets the first two preconditions of *Gingles* because it "functions as a fully effective Black opportunity district." They offer three reasons why we should not adhere to *Perez v. Pasadena Independent School District*[111] and *Valdespino v. Alamo Heights Independent School District*,[112] which hold that *Gingles* requires a cohesive group of minority voters comprising a majority of the adult citizen population in at least one proposed single-member demonstration district. First, insisting on a level of 50% is reasonable only when the court is asked to speculate on the potential performance of a minority district, not when an existing district is shown to actually perform for minorities. Second,

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[109] BARONE, supra note 105, at 1508.

[110] *Id.* at 1510.

[111] 165 F.3d 368 (5th Cir. 1999), *cert. denied*, 528 U.S. 1114 (2000).

[112] 168 F.3d 848 (5th Cir. 1999), *cert. denied*, 528 U.S. 1114 (2000).

Plaintiffs point to a divided decision issued only weeks ago by a panel of the First Circuit, *Metts v. Murphy*, which dispensed with the 50% rule. The panel's decision, we note, was expressly withdrawn and vacated when the First Circuit voted to take the case en banc.[113] Third, *Perez* and *Valdespino* involved challenges to non-partisan at-large election systems involving only single elections; here, we examine a single-member districting system with primary and general elections. Plaintiffs assert that if a minority can "control" the primary election and then find support with a coalition of minorities in the general election, the *Gingles* requirements are met and the district cannot be modified. Plaintiffs also offer a fourth, seemingly free-standing principle, urging that in any event District 24 cannot be intentionally dismantled because it is an influence or coalition district.

Defendants respond that § 2 requires a showing of strength at a level of at least 50% is a command of § 2, a requirement that is an inevitable byproduct of the statute's protection of the ability of minorities to elect representatives of their choice. A minority group lacking a majority cannot elect its candidate of choice, and denying the group a separate district cannot be a denial of any opportunity protected by the Act. Rather, such a group can elect their candidate of choice only with the votes of non-majorities through coalitions, but the Voting Rights Act does not protect such political coalitions. Defendants urge that whether a minority can meet the 50% standard is a quite different question from asking "whether a bi-racial

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[113] 347 F.3d 346 (1st Cir. 2003), *vacated and reh'g en banc granted*, No. 02-2204 (1st Cir. Dec. 3, 2003).

coalition of African Americans and 'crossover' Anglos can elect a Black-preferred Black candidate. Any such interpretation would render the first *Gingles* precondition an entirely superfluous subpart of the third *Gingles* precondition." Defendants argue further that the Supreme Court has never held that § 2 protects influence districts and such a proposal is foreclosed by the rationale of *Georgia v. Ashcroft*. Finally, defendants reply that there has been no showing that the 24th would probably elect a Black candidate, pointing to Congressional District 25 in the judicial Plan 1151C in which the demographics are strikingly similar – 21.4% BVAP and 33.6% HVAP – where an Anglo, Bell, defeated Carroll Robinson, the Black candidate of choice, in the 2002 Democratic primary.

Plaintiffs' arguments are creative, but they ask this court to do more than well-settled law will allow. To the heart of the matter: the contention that § 2 protects District 24 from redrawing asks us to extend § 2's protection of Blacks and Latinos from vote dilution to the protection of groups whose cementing force is membership and loyalty to a political party. *Gingles* and the cases that followed it have been keenly aware that the defining concepts of *Gingles* – numbers and cohesion – are critical to its studied effort to confine the limits of the Act to those situations that dilute minorities' opportunity to vote without protecting coalitions that may be helpful or even essential to the leveraging of their strength.[114] Properly confined,

[114] Dr. Keith Gaddie credibly testified that Plaintiffs' view of influence districts "would lock in a majority of seats for the party getting the minority of the vote." Deposition of Keith Gaddie, November 22, 2003, at 101. Further, he testified that it was not protected under § 2 and that it was not possible to draw a second, sufficiently compact

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the Act implements the fundamentals of factions. Unconfined it reaches into the political market and supports persons joined, not by race, but by common view. Serious constitutional questions loom at that juncture.

We are told that Blacks control the Democratic primary with less than 22% of the CVAP because Anglos and Latinos vote either in the Republican primary or not at all, but return home out of party loyalty in the general election. It is argued that this is a Black opportunity district. More accurately, however, it is a strong Democratic district. That there is no cohesion between Black and Latino voters in the primary contests is beyond serious dispute. Black opportunity here lies in coalitions with Anglos who

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majority-minority district in Dallas. *Id.* at 75 ("[District 24] is not going to meet the first prong of the *Gingles* criteria. . . . It is not a district in which you have one minority group which can constitute a majority of the population. It's not a district where that minority group controls primary and the general election. It's not possible to draw a second sufficiently compact majority district in Dallas if you draw District 30."). Accordingly, if § 2 protection is afforded to old District 24 despite the absence of the *Gingles* factors, the Voting Rights Act begins to protect political affiliation and not race. If the Voting Rights Act protects a district where coalitions are required to elect a candidate of choice –

> you're on a slippery slope to essentially saying, "Well, if it's a Democratic district, you can't re-draw it." And intellectually, that to me is troubling because it sets up a circumstance where one party has its constituency protected under the Voting Rights Act and . . . the other party doesn't have any protections at all.

Id. at 100. Protecting districts that are defined and controlled by political coalition and not race would infringe on the clear right of the state to choose its method of compliance with the Voting Rights Act. If there is no obligation to create an influence district, there is no obligation to retain one.

vote with them in the general election for Democrats. Dr. Lichtman's calculations produce an Anglo crossover rate of 30.75 (unweighted mean). He conceded that in the general election Black turnout will fall to the range of 31, 32 or perhaps 33%, while Anglo turnout will jump into the 60's, approximately a two to one margin. Just how far this argument departs from the *Gingles* construct is exposed by the reminder that such a crossover rate has been found to establish the absence of Anglo bloc voting under *Gingles*'s third precondition as a matter of law.[115]

The history of the 24th illustrates that Plaintiffs overstate the impact of the Black Democrats' control of the primaries. The reality is that Frost has not had a primary opponent since his incumbency began. That no Black candidate has ever filed in a Democratic primary against Frost in a district assertedly controlled by Blacks reflects the accuracy of Congresswoman Johnson's claim that District 24 was drawn for an Anglo Democrat.[116] We have no measure of what Anglo turnout would be in a Democratic primary if Frost were opposed by a Black candidate. Plaintiffs' asserted control of Blacks in the primary rests upon the shaky ground that much of the dominating Anglo Democratic vote does not bother to vote in the primary with Frost filing as an unchallenged Anglo. Its premise is that Frost challenged by a Black candidate would not result in a return to primary voting

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[115] *See Abrams v. Johnson*, 521 U.S. 74, 92 (1997).

[116] *See supra* note 108. District 24 adjoins Johnson's District 30, a *Gingles*-mandated district, meaning it exists because Anglos vote as a block to defeat Black preferences.

by the Anglo Democrats. In short, that Anglo Democrats control this district is the most rational conclusion.

Nor is the cohesiveness of this 21.6% black voting age population clear. Plaintiffs' expert relied heavily upon the high vote in the district for Ron Kirk, an African-American and former popular mayor of Dallas, in his race for the United States Senate. Dr. Lichtman resisted the suggestion that the "friends and neighbors" effect was distorting the results with the counter suggestion that the effect would be offset by Kirk's opponent in the Democratic primary, Victor Morales. That explanation is not persuasive. Morales is actually from Crandall, a town of 3,000 people some 75 miles away. In the 1998 Attorney General race, Judge Morris Overstreet, a widely known, respected, and distinguished lawyer and judge, took 66% of the Black vote in Dallas County and 76% of the Black vote in Tarrant County. Julius Whittier, a Black candidate in the 2002 race for the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals, received 32% of the Anglo vote and 40% of the Black vote. In short, whether Blacks vote cohesively in the primary is far from certain.

That Blacks wield influence in the district is plain. Perhaps recognizing the difficulty of arguing that some specie of a relaxed *Gingles* construct imposes an obligation to create an influence or coalition district, Plaintiffs offer a fall-back alternative: that as an "influence district," the 24th cannot be "intentionally" redrawn. But this turns the principle of *Georgia v. Ashcroft* on its head. As we have explained, *Ashcroft* gave states greater latitude in complying with the Voting Rights Act. The Court recognized that while *Gingles* in application has resulted in significant gains in elected positions held by minorities, with the keener edge of computer drawn lines, it has also created

"safe" white and minority districts, significantly reducing the necessity for the pull and tug to secure support from those with political influence. By locking in safe districts for minorities and Anglos alike – instead of encouraging competition and the pull and tug of politics – this legal regime began to undermine the core idea that the House of Representatives would be the branch of government directly responsive to the people. *Ashcroft* responds to these and other political realities with greater concern for forces that divide and fractionalize, especially those that would divide along racial lines. We do not read *Ashcroft* as fencing even more territory from state legislative reach. Considering that District 24 as a pure influence district is unprotected by § 2, we are persuaded that alterations to it raised questions primarily of § 5, which have been answered by the Department of Justice.

C

Although the bulk of Plaintiffs' argument focuses on District 24, Plaintiffs also assert that Plan 1374C violates § 2 by modifying minority influence districts in Central and East Texas, specifically districts 1, 2, 4, 9, 10, 11, and 17 from Plan 1151C. According to Plaintiffs, the minority population in these districts will have only a minimal role in the electoral process under the new plan.

However, as the State points out, Plaintiffs never argue – and certainly never prove – that any of these districts satisfies the *Gingles* preconditions. Even a cursory glance at the population data reveals that none of these districts passes muster under *Gingles*'s first prong. In none of these districts does the citizen voting age population of any cognizable minority group surpass 22%,

and in most the percentage is significantly lower. Indeed, even if we were to follow Plaintiffs' suggestion and combine the Black and Hispanic citizen voting numbers – despite the lack of evidence of cohesion among these groups[117] – the districts would still fail the first *Gingles* precondition by large margins. The evidence convinces us that these districts are influence districts at best, although we note that these districts vary considerably in the opportunity they afford minorities as a group to play any significant role in the electoral process. The population statistics summarized below bring this conclusion into sharper focus.

District	Plan 1151C			Plan 1374C		
	Black CVAP	Hispanic CVAP	B+H CVAP	Black CVAP	Hispanic CVAP	B+H CVAP
1	15.8	3.3	19.1	18.2	3.9	22.1
2	14.0	5.2	19.1	19.3	8.2	27.5
4	11.5	4.1	15.6	10.3	3.9	14.2
9	21.3	9.7	31.0	46.8	16.8	63.6
10	11.8	22.0	33.8	9.7	12.1	21.8
11	15.2	11.6	26.8	4.3	21.9	26.2
17	4.0	14.5	18.5	10.0	9.8	19.8

Plaintiffs admit that these seven districts are at most influence districts, but nonetheless urge that the State,

[117] The record, we should note, is largely bereft of evidence that Hispanics and Blacks vote cohesively as a group in these districts. We therefore echo our conclusion on District 24 and find that Plaintiffs have failed to prove that the Latino and Black communities in Districts 1, 2, 4, 9, 10, and 11 function as a cohesive voting bloc.

after *Ashcroft*, is forbidden from altering them. Plaintiffs, however, do not argue that any of these districts is protected individually; they focus instead on these districts as a group and suggest that the State, by redrawing these seven influence districts plus the coalition districts in Districts 23 and 24, has gone too far in limiting minority influence statewide. We cannot agree. As we explained above, the State was under no § 2 obligation to create these districts, and we find that the State labors under no corresponding compulsion to preserve these districts. The allegation that the minority voting strength in these districts has been diluted is in truth no more than a claim that these districts have been drawn to add Republican voting strength to overcome the election advantage that the current Democrat incumbents hold.

VI

We next examine the challenge brought by and on behalf of Latino plaintiffs and intervenors to the impact of the legislative plan on Latino voting strength in South and West Texas. At the outset, it is useful to understand that the difficulties Texas presents to a redistricter are nowhere greater than in the Southern and western part of the State. The area can be described as a huge and rough inverted triangle, beginning in El Paso at the far western corner, extending south and east for hundreds of sparsely populated miles on or near the border to the cities of Laredo in Webb County, McAllen in Hidalgo County, and Brownsville in Cameron County, turning north up to the coastal city of Corpus Christi in Nueces County, then turning west to cover many miles that are lightly populated except for the areas to the south of San Antonio in Bexar County and Austin in Travis County. The sheer size

of the land, its irregular shape, and the distribution of the bulk of the population in various pockets of the State are the basics that shape the map before the redistricter even begins. This part of the State also contains the greatest concentrations of Hispanic population. In the State as a whole, Latinos account for approximately 32% of the total population, 29% of the voting age population, and 22% of the citizen voting age population. In the South and West Texas regions at issue here, Hispanics represent 58% of the citizen voting age population. The largest numbers of Hispanics are located in the same areas of South and West Texas as are the large pockets of Anglo population: in El Paso County in the southwest corner; in Webb County, Hidalgo County, and Cameron County in South Texas along the border and in the Rio Grande Valley; in Nueces County in the east along the coast; and in Central Texas in Bexar County and Travis County.

The plan the *Balderas* court approved to account for the population changes documented in the 2000 census, Plan 1151C, placed six congressional districts in South and West Texas, each containing the 651,620 individuals needed for equal population distribution and the mandate of one-man-one-vote. In Plan 1374C, the Legislature drew seven congressional districts in the same area, each containing the necessary 651,620 individuals. In both plans, six districts have a majority Hispanic citizen voting age population. Of the 44 counties included in the six districts in Plan 1151C and the 58 counties included in the seven districts in Plan 1374C, only the seven counties listed above – El Paso, Webb, Hidalgo, Cameron, Nueces, Travis, and Bexar – have populations above 100,000.

This combination of geography and population distribution fixes certain characteristics of the redistricting map

for South and West Texas, reflected in both Plan 1151C and Plan 1374C. Both have a district in the far western corner of the State, in El Paso County, which has a population approaching 680,000. Under both Plan 1151C and Plan 1374C, Congressional District 16 in part of El Paso County has a majority Hispanic citizen voting age population and is an effective "safe" Hispanic opportunity district. Plan 1374C leaves Congressional District 16 essentially unchanged, a decision not challenged in this case. But east of this far western population pocket, the counties are so sparsely populated that the district next to 16 – Congressional District 23 – must extend far to the east to reach the numbers of people necessary to satisfy equipopulosity.[118] A map drawer must travel east almost 800 miles to reach another county that approaches, much less exceeds, 100,000 souls: Webb County, at the western edge of the southern tip of Texas.

In Plan 1151C, Webb County, with 193,117 people, is kept entirely in Congressional District 23; in Plan 1374C, Webb County is divided between Congressional District 23 and Congressional District 28, directly to the east. Whether Webb County is divided or not, the districts that begin in the relatively narrow and relatively densely

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[118] The map reveals that Hudspeth County, next to El Paso County, includes 3,344 people; Culberson County and Jeff Davis County directly to the east contain 2,975 and 2,207 people, respectively. Presidio County to the southeast is the only county between El Paso and Maverick Counties with an excess of 50% or more Hispanic voting age population, and it has only 7,304 people. The vast area between Presidio and Maverick Counties includes Brewster County, with 8,866 people; Terrell County, with 1,081 people; Val Verde County, with 44,856 people; and Kinney County, with 3,379 people.

populated southern part of Texas, which includes the Rio Grande Valley, must extend north to gather enough population to satisfy equality among the districts. Both Plan 1151C and Plan 1374C share this characteristic. Plan 1151C has two "strip" districts that begin in South Texas and travel to the north toward the center of the State to gather the requisite number of people.[119] Plan 1374C has three "strip" districts that begin in South Texas; each of those districts follows the same north-south path and has the same shape as in Plan 1151C, but is narrower and longer to accommodate three districts rather than two. In both Plan 1151C and Plan 1374C, the redistricter traveling north largely avoided the area that is Congressional District 20, which includes San Antonio in Bexar County and is a "safe" Hispanic district.

The map drawer defining the district in the southeastern corner of the State must also begin in the Rio Grande Valley and proceed north to include enough people to satisfy equipopulosity. The map drawer need not travel as far north as in the "strip" districts to find the necessary population for this southeastern coastal district, however, because Nueces County, which contains Corpus Christi, has over 300,000 people.

Both Plan 1151C and Plan 1374C exhibit similar features, resulting from this combination of geography and population distribution. The district that begins just east

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[119] Many of the counties north of Hidalgo County (569,463) and Cameron County (335,227) in the Rio Grande Valley are thinly populated. They include Jim Hogg County, northwest of Hidalgo County (5,281); McMullen County (851); Kenedy County (414); Live Oak County (12,309); and Goliad County (6,928).

of El Paso County must be large and must run east from far West Texas, stretching deeply into Central and South Texas. The districts that begin in far South Texas must run north in "strip" fashion into Central Texas. The district that begins in the southern tip of Texas and travels up the coast must also proceed north.

Against this backdrop, we examine the record as to the effects of the legislative plan in South and West Texas on Latino voting strength.

A

In Plan 1151C, the court drew six districts in South and West Texas, each with a majority of the Latino citizen voting age population. As noted, two of those districts, Congressional District 16, consisting primarily of part of the city of El Paso, and Congressional District 20, consisting primarily of part of the city of San Antonio, are not at issue in the change from Plan 1151C to Plan 1374C and are not challenged in this suit. Both were, and are, effective Hispanic opportunity districts. One of the districts in Plan 1151C, Congressional District 23, had a bare majority of Hispanic citizen voting age population and had not performed consistently as a Hispanic opportunity district. Congressional Districts 28, 15, and 27 made up the remainder of the districts in South and West Texas, each with a majority Hispanic citizen voting age population and a majority of the Spanish-surnamed registered voters, and each performing as effective Hispanic opportunity districts. Each of the six districts in South and West Texas under Plan 1151C was reliably Democratic in both congressional and other elections, with the exception of

Congressional District 23. That district has since 1992 elected a Hispanic Republican to Congress, Henry Bonilla.

In Plan 1374C, the Legislature sought to apply to South and West Texas its primary partisan goal of increasing the likelihood that Republican candidates would be elected to Congress, while avoiding violations of the Voting Rights Act, the Equal Protection Clause, and the mandate of one-man-one-vote. The record presents undisputed evidence that the Legislature desired to increase the number of Republican votes cast in Congressional District 23 to shore up Bonilla's base and assist in his reelection. The evidence showed that Bonilla had lost a larger amount of Hispanic support in each successive election. In 2002, Bonilla attracted only 8% of the Latino vote. In order to make Congressional District 23 more Republican, the map drawers extended the district north to take in largely Republican and Anglo areas in the north-central part of the State, including Bandera, Kerr, and Kendall counties. That change added approximately 101,260 people to Congressional District 23. The legislative plan moved the district line at the eastern edge to divide the southern border city of Laredo, in Webb County. That change resulted in 99,776 individuals, who were more than 90% Hispanic in voting age population and 86.5% Democratic in voting according to the 2002 statewide election data, being placed in the adjacent district, Congressional District 28. Although Congressional District 23 still had a majority of Hispanics – 55.1% – and a bare majority of Hispanics of voting age – 50.9% – it no longer had a majority of citizen voting age Hispanics. In the reconfigured Congressional District 23 in Plan 1374C, Hispanics accounted for 46% of the citizens of voting age, and only 44% of the registered voters had Spanish surnames. By

contrast, Congressional District 23 in Plan 1151C had a 57.5% Hispanic citizen voting age population and 55.3% Spanish-surnamed registered voters. To avoid retrogression under § 5, the State created another district in South and West Texas, in which Hispanics were a clear majority of the citizen voting age population. The State then had to adjust the population distributions to avoid inequality among the districts.

To accomplish the first goal, Plan 1374C added a third district to the two already long and relatively narrow districts that covered the bottom of the inverted triangle of South Texas and extended north. To maintain the requisite population numbers, each of these three districts had to extend farther north than the two districts had in Plan 1151C. The three districts under Plan 1374C ran from the population pockets near the border north through sparsely-populated areas to reach the pockets of population in the central part of the State, south and east of San Antonio and Austin. The reconfigured districts each added counties in the process.[130] The two preexisting districts – Congressional Districts 28 and 15 – maintained a majority Hispanic citizen voting age population and a majority of Spanish-surnamed registered voters in Plan 1374C. The newly created District – Congressional District 25 – also

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[130] Congressional District 23 in Plan 1151C was made up of 24 counties; in Plan 1374C, it included 25 counties. Congressional District 28 included 11 counties in both Plan 1151C and Plan 1374C. New Congressional District 25 in Plan 1374C comprised 9 counties. Congressional District 15 in Plan 1151C included 8 counties; in Plan 1374C, Congressional District 15 included 13 counties. Congressional District 27 in Plan 1151C included 5 counties; in Plan 1374C, it included 6 counties.

had a majority Hispanic citizen voting age population and a majority of Spanish-surnamed registered voters. The district that runs along the eastern border of South Texas, Congressional District 27, similarly maintained a majority Hispanic citizen voting population and a majority of Spanish-surnamed registered voters. As a result, Plan 1374C had seven congressional districts in South and West Texas, six with a majority of Latino citizen voting age population that are, as explained further below, effective Hispanic opportunity districts, and one that is a Hispanic influence district. Plan 1151C had six congressional districts in South and West Texas with a majority of Latino citizen voting age population, one of which was not an effective Hispanic opportunity district, but was moving in that direction.

Plaintiffs raise a number of challenges to the redrawn districts in South and West Texas. The GI Forum Plaintiffs claim that Plan 1374C is deficient for the same reason its predecessor, Plan 1151C, was deficient: an additional Latino majority citizen voting age population district should be drawn to achieve compliance with § 2 of the Voting Rights Act. Plaintiffs claim that the legislative plan dilutes Latino voting strength, in violation of § 2. Finally, Plaintiffs claim that in deciding where to draw the lines, the map drawers were predominately driven by ethnicity, in violation of the Equal Protection Clause. Plaintiffs assert that in drawing the excessively long "bacon-strip" districts, Congressional Districts 15, 25, and 28, the Legislature subordinated the traditional redistricting criteria of compactness and respect for communities of interest and political divisions to the need to include

sufficient numbers of Latino voters to create majority-minority districts, in a manner forbidden by *Shaw v. Reno* (*Shaw I*)[121] and its progeny.

The State responds by arguing that there have been no developments since the *Balderas* panel issued its opinion to call into question that court's holding that § 2 did not require an additional Latino majority citizen voting age population district in South and West Texas. The State argues that the Supreme Court's decision in *De Grandy v. Johnson*[122] strongly supports its position because the number of effective Latino majority citizen voting age population districts in the relevant area is more than roughly proportional to the Latino citizen voting age population in that area and as proportional to the Latino citizen voting age population in the State as the *Gingles* requirements support. The State argues, and presented evidence to show, that the changes made to the South and West Texas districts in Plan 1374C resulted from the politically motivated decision to make Congressional District 23 more Republican and improve the reelection chances of the Hispanic Republican incumbent, Congressman Henry Bonilla. The State presented evidence that it could not achieve its political end without splitting Laredo and Webb County to remove reliably Democratic voters; that it added a new district, Congressional District 25, which, with Congressional Districts 15, 28, and 27, provides the same number of effective Latino opportunity districts as did Plan 1151C and meets the requirements of *De Grandy* proportionality; and that ethnicity did not

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[121] 509 U.S. 630 (1993).

[122] 512 U.S. 997 (1994).

predominate in the numerous decisions involved in the placement of the district lines in Congressional Districts 28, 15, 25, and 27.

The claims that Plaintiffs make as to this part of the State do not raise the questions of coalition districts in which Anglos, Hispanics, and African-Americans are all present, although no minority group is a majority of the relevant population. Rather, Plaintiffs make claims that are more familiar in Voting Rights Act litigation. They claim that in South and West Texas, they are a minority meeting the *Gingles* requirements; that in one district, they have been "cracked" and submerged into an Anglo majority, such that they cannot elect candidates of their choice; and that as to the rest of the districts in the area, although they are a majority of the citizen voting age population, a functional examination reveals that their ability effectively to elect their candidates of choice has been weakened. The fact that the dilution claim is familiar, however, does not make the analysis simple. As the Supreme Court stated in *De Grandy*, "Plaintiffs challenging single-member districts may claim, not total submergence, but partial submergence; not the chance for some electoral success in place of none, but the chance for more success in place of some. When the question thus comes down to the reasonableness of drawing a series of district lines in one combination of places rather than another, judgments about inequality may become closer calls."[122]

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[122] *Id.* at 1012-13.

B

The GI Forum Plaintiffs allege that they are entitled under § 2 to an additional district in South and West Texas in which Latinos are a majority of the citizen voting age population and can effectively elect candidates of their choice. In both Plan 1151C and Plan 1374C, six districts in South and West Texas have a majority of Latino citizens of voting age. The GI Forum Plaintiffs present a demonstration district, Plan 1385C, that shows an additional Latino citizen voting age majority district in South and West Texas. The record contains variations of proposed districting plans that meet the same goal. These Plaintiffs, however, have presented no convincing basis to reject the *Balderas* holding that § 2 did not require an additional district in South and West Texas after the 2000 census.

The GI Forum Plaintiffs argue that since *Balderas*, additional data has become available distinguishing the citizen voting age population by race and ethnicity, making it easier to establish that an additional *Gingles* district can be drawn in South and West Texas. Plaintiffs presented demonstration plans to the *Balderas* panel that they claimed showed the feasibility of drawing an additional Hispanic citizen voting age population majority district in the area. The *Balderas* panel found that Plaintiffs had failed to prove that § 2 required the creation of an additional Latino citizen voting age majority congressional district in South and West Texas. Plaintiffs appealed that finding; the Supreme Court summarily affirmed. The

additional census data Plaintiffs present does not alter the validity of that finding.[134]

The GI Forum Plaintiffs assert that they have met the *Gingles* criteria because their demonstration plan, 1385C, creates seven districts with a Hispanic citizen voting age population above 50%. The record, however, does not show that their demonstration plan would satisfy *Gingles*. Plan 1385C proposes districts that are more unusually shaped than in either Plan 1151C or Plan 1374C.[135] The demonstration plan Plaintiffs present

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[134] There is an obvious difference between the roles of the *Balderas* court and this court. The *Balderas* court had the remedial task of crafting a congressional redistricting plan according to neutral factors because the Legislature had failed to implement a plan following the 2000 census. This court, by contrast, must carefully and thoroughly examine the legislative redistricting plan to determine whether the Legislature used factors and reached results that violate federal law. This court is "barred from intervening in state apportionment in the absence of a violation of federal law precisely because it is the domain of the States, and not the federal courts, to conduct apportionment in the first place. Time and again [the Supreme Court has] emphasized that 'reapportionment is primarily the duty and responsibility of the State through its legislature or other body, rather than [that] of a federal court'" *Voinovich v. Quilter*, 507 U.S. 146, 156 (1993) (quoting *Growe v. Emison*, 507 U.S. 25, 34 (1993)). "Because the 'States do not derive their reapportionment authority from the Voting Rights Act, but rather from independent provisions of state and federal law,' . . . the federal courts are bound to respect the States' apportionment choices unless those choices contravene federal requirements." *Id.* The difference in the roles played by the *Balderas* court and this court does not lead to a difference in outcome as to the issue of an additional Hispanic majority citizen voting age population district in South and West Texas.

[135] In the demonstration plan, 1385C, Congressional District 23 is almost bisected by Congressional District 25, which surrounds the intruding district on three sides. Congressional District 25 travels north, then west, with an arm that projects to the northeast into Central Texas. Congressional District 15 goes from the Rio Grande

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underscores the difficulty of drawing seven, rather than six, Latino opportunity districts that meet the *Gingles* requirements in the vast geography and irregularly distributed population of South and West Texas.

Even if this court were to assume that the finding in *Balderas* rejecting the claim that an additional Hispanic

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Valley east to the coast north of Nueces County, then cuts north into Central Texas. A comparison of the compactness scores between the two plans understates the unusual shapes of the proposed demonstration district, as compared to both 1151C and 1374C. The "smallest circle" figure is a "dispersion" measure that captures the density of a district by calculating the ratio of the district's area to the area of the minimum circle that could circumscribe it. The "perimeter to area" measure captures the irregularity or jaggedness of a district's border by calculating the ratio of the district's area to the square of its perimeter. At trial, Plaintiffs vigorously criticized the legislative plan for high compactness scores, particularly for Congressional Districts 15 and 25. While those districts have slightly better compactness scores in the demonstration plan, the perimeter to area scores for Congressional Districts 23 and 28, which begins in Bexar County and moves toward Travis County, taking small parts of five different counties, are significantly worse. And Plaintiffs' criticisms of parts of Plan 1374C for extending certain districts across disparate and distant communities would seem even more applicable to parts of demonstration Plan 1385C.

	Perimeter to Area		Smallest Circle	
Congressional District	1374c	1385c	1374c	1385c
15	11.6	8.8	6.5	5.4
16	3.8	4.1	2.9	4.6
20	7.3	5.8	3.0	2.7
23	5.1	9.4	3.8	4.5
25	9.6	5.9	8.5	2.8
27	5.1	3.4	3.1	3.1
28	5.7	10.0	5.0	6.0

citizen voting age population majority district should be drawn in South and West Texas was entitled to no weight, and even if this court were to overlook the *Gingles* problems reflected in the proffered demonstration plan, the GI Forum Plaintiffs have failed to make the necessary showing under § 2. This court recognizes that Plaintiffs have established racially polarized voting and a political, social, and economic legacy of past discrimination. But any examination of the totality of the circumstances beyond *Gingles* must include proportionality. Plaintiffs argue that because Latinos represent 22% of the citizen voting age population of the State, seven out of the thirty-two districts in the State should be drawn to produce Latino citizen voting age majorities. The State responds by noting that Latinos comprise 58% of the citizen voting age population in South and West Texas and constitute the majority of the citizen voting age population in six out of the seven districts in that region, exceeding rough proportionality for the area.[126] The State also argues that even considering all of Texas as the relevant area for measuring proportionality, an examination of the totality of the

[126] The State provides an analysis, as follows:

1374C Districts	Total CVAP	Percent Hispanic
15	379,368	58.5%
16	359,793	69.9%
20	419,668	60.8%
23	407,130	45.8%
25	358,683	55.0%
27	398,328	60.4%
28	404,341	56.2%
TOTAL	2,727,311	57.94%

(State's Post-Trial Br. at 62).

circumstances does not lead to the conclusion that an additional Latino majority citizen voting age population district must be drawn in South and West Texas.

The Supreme Court has explained that "proportionality," a word not expressly used in § 2, involves a comparison between (1) the percentage share of legislative districts in which the population of the protected class has a majority and (2) the protected class's percentage share of the "relevant population."[127] Proportionality is an important aspect in evaluating "equality of opportunity, [but is] not a guarantee of electoral success for minority-preferred candidates."[128]

The Supreme Court has not resolved what geographic frame of reference should be used to analyze proportionality, whether it is by district, county, region, or state. In *DeGrandy*, "the plaintiffs . . . passed up the opportunity to frame their dilution claim in statewide terms"; the Court applied the *Gingles* factors and analyzed proportionality

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[127] *De Grandy*, 512 U.S. at 1014 n. 11. "Proportionality" in this sense is only one factor to be considered in assessing the totality of circumstances to determine if unlawful vote dilution has created an "unequal political and electoral opportunity" for a protected class. *Id.* at 1022. Just as the Supreme Court in *De Grandy* made clear that "proportionality" of opportunity cannot be a "safe harbor" precluding § 2 liability, which turns on total circumstances, *id.* at 1017-22, so, too, a showing of lack of proportionality is but one factor in the total circumstances analysis. The Supreme Court has made clear that "the degree of probative value assigned to proportionality may vary with other facts. No single statistic provides courts with a shortcut to determine whether a set of single-member districts unlawfully dilutes minority voting strength." *Id.* at 1020-21.

[128] *Id.* at 1014 n. 11.

as limited to "Hispanics in the Dade County area."[129] In this case, however, Plaintiffs do not argue that the *Gingles* criteria justify the creation of any additional Latino citizen voting age majority districts outside South and West Texas. Despite the presence of large numbers of Hispanics elsewhere in the State, and despite the presence of racially polarized voting throughout the State, no plaintiff asserts that the *Gingles* criteria would permit an additional Latino citizen voting age population majority district anywhere but in South and West Texas. Again, the combination of geography and population distribution quickly explain why. The areas in which Latinos account for 50% or more of the voting age population are confined to El Paso County in far West Texas, surrounded by counties of vast space and little population; Presidio County in West Texas along the border, which has only 7,304 people and is surrounded by vast space with little population; and the South Texas area from Maverick County to the Rio Grande Valley. The Latino population in the rest of the State is numerous, but dispersed over large areas.[130] Lower courts that have analyzed "proportionality" in the *De Grandy* sense have been consistent in using the same frame of reference for that factor and for the factors set forth in *Gingles*.[131] If South and West Texas is the only area in

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[129] *Id.* at 1022.

[130] *See* Jackson Pls.' Ex. 64.

[131] *See, e.g., Old Person v. Brown*, 312 F.3d 1036, 1047-49 (8th Cir. 2002) (emphasizing that the same frame of reference should be used for analyzing proportionality and the *Gingles* factors); *Rural W. Tenn. African-Am. Affairs Council v. Sundquist*, 209 F.3d 835, 840-41 (6th Cir. 2000) (using the same six-county frame of reference to examine proportionality and the *Gingles* factors); *Solomon v. Liberty County*

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which *Gingles* is applied and can be met, as Plaintiffs argue, it is also the relevant area for measuring proportionality. Because the Supreme Court has not yet provided precise guidance on the proper standard for assessing proportionality, however, we also examine proportionality on a statewide basis.

Under the legislative plan, 1374C, as under the court-imposed plan it replaces, 1151C, six out of the seven districts in South and West Texas are Latino citizen voting age majority districts. Given the fact that Latinos comprise 58% of the citizen voting age population in South and West Texas, proportionality is satisfied as to that area.

As noted, the Supreme Court has not made clear what geographic unit is the relevant area to measure proportionality. *De Grandy* did not discuss the role of a district such as Congressional District 29 in the Houston area of Harris County, or Congressional District 23 in West Texas, in which Latinos constitute approximately 47% of the citizen voting age population, less than a majority but large enough to constitute an influence district, in assessing proportionality as part of the totality of the circumstances. Plaintiffs are correct in their calculation that six districts in which Latinos hold a majority of citizen voting age population, out of the thirty-two districts that comprise Texas, do not equate to arithmetic proportionality

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Comm'rs, 221 F.3d 1218, 1220 (11th Cir. 2000) (using the same county as a frame of reference in analyzing all factors); *African-Am. Voting Rights Legal Def. Fund, Inc. v. Villa*, 54 F.3d 1345, 1354-55 (8th Cir. 1995) (using all 28 wards of the city of St. Louis as the frame of reference for analyzing both proportionality and the *Gingles* preconditions).

between the number of Latino majority-minority districts and the Latinos' percentage of the citizen voting age population in the State. *De Grandy* emphasizes, however, that the inquiry is not merely mathematical.[132] Rather, *De Grandy* requires an examination of whether the totality of circumstances includes rough proportionality between the number of *effective* majority-minority districts that can be drawn meeting the *Gingles* factors and the minority members' share of the relevant population.[133]

One of the districts that Plaintiffs would create in their demonstration plan, proposed Congressional District 28 has a Hispanic citizen voting age population of only 50.3%, and five of the seven districts have a Hispanic citizen voting age population that is below 60%. Plaintiffs vigorously criticize the legislative plan, 1374C, in part because three of the districts it creates – Congressional Districts 15, 25, and 28 – have Hispanic citizen voting age population numbers that are below 60%. Plaintiffs' own experts and argument reminded this court that because of

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[132] 512 U.S. at 1023.

[133] *Id.* at 1024. This circuit, along with every other circuit to consider the question, has concluded that the relevant voting population for Hispanics is citizen voting age population. *See Valdespino v. Alamo Heights Indep. Sch. Dist.*, 168 F.3d 848, 853 (5th Cir. 1999); *Perez v. Pasadena Indep. Sch. Dist.*, 165 F.3d 368, 372 (5th Cir. 1999); *Campos v. City of Houston*, 113 F.3d 544, 548 (5th Cir. 1997) (courts "must consider the citizen voting-age population of the group challenging the electoral practice when determining whether the minority group is sufficiently large and geographically compact to constitute a majority"); *Barnett v. City of Chicago*, 141 F.3d 699, 704 (7th Cir. 1998) ("We think that citizen voting-age population is the basis for determining equality of voting power that best comports with the policy of [§ 2].").

the lower turnout of Latino voters, a low majority of the Hispanic citizen voting age population does not produce an *effective* Latino opportunity district.[124]

Under Plan 1151C, Congressional District 23 was not an effective minority opportunity district, despite the fact that it had a 57.4% Latino citizen voting age majority. Plaintiffs specifically criticize Congressional District 15 in Plan 1374C, which has a Hispanic citizen voting age population of 58.5% – reduced from 69.3% in Plan 1151C – as weakened to the extent that it is better classified as a Latino influence district rather than a Latino opportunity district, although other witnesses contradicted this

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[124] Dr. Jerry Polinard, a political scientist testifying for the Valdez-Cox Intervenors, testified that there is "no magic number" as to the level of Spanish-surname voter registration required in order for Hispanics to effectively nominate and elect their candidates of choice, but he noted that "you become comfortable with opportunity districts once you break into those 60%-plus ranges." (Tr. File 8 at 50-51). Dr. Allan J. Lichtman, an expert retained by the Jackson Plaintiffs, testified that reductions in Hispanic citizen voting age population, even to a point where Hispanics still constitute a majority of the electorate, along with low Hispanic voter turnout, can move a district toward "the danger zone" in terms of Latino voting opportunity. (Tr. File 1 at 156-57). Congressman Charlie Gonzalez testified that, "If you just go with population figures ... [t]hat really doesn't translate to having an effective voice or ability to elect someone of your choice" because the more pertinent indicator is the percentage of Hispanic citizens of voting age who register to vote and actually turn out on election day, which results in far less effectiveness. (Tr. File 1 at 118-19). Congressman Rubén Hinojosa testified that "along the Texas border region from Brownsville to McAllen to Laredo to El Paso ... in order to win an election, you need to have about 57, 58% or higher Hispanic voter age population because of the low turnout." (Tr. File 4 at 48).

characterization.[155] The legislative plan has one fewer district in which Latinos constitute a majority of the citizen voting age population than the demonstration plan. The legislative plan and the demonstration plan, however, have the same number of districts in which Latinos equal or exceed 55% of the citizen voting age population. The legislative plan has one more district in which the

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[155] Dr. Keith Gaddie, a political science expert retained by the State, testified in his deposition that in Congressional District 15 under Plan 1374C, Latinos would control the primary elections but, if turnout was low, might not unilaterally control the outcome of general elections, although Latino candidates of choice would generally be elected. (*See* Gaddie Dep., Jackson Pls.' Ex. 140 at 46-47; Gaddie Report, Jackson Pls.' Ex. 141 at 8). Dr. Gaddie submitted regression data showing that in Congressional District 15, in seven primary or runoff elections, all the Latino candidates of choice would be successful, and five out of six Latino candidates of choice would win in the general elections. (Gaddie Report, Jackson Pls.' Ex. 141 at 7-8). Dr. Lichtman concluded that the turnout of Latino voters in the general election decreased from a mean of 52% under Plan 1151C to a mean of 38% under Plan 1374C, but testified that Congressional District 15 remains a minority opportunity district rather than an influence district. (Lichtman Report, Jackson Pls.' Ex. 1 at 69; Tr. File 1 at 156, 166-67). Dr. Richard Engstrom, an expert retained by the GI Forum Plaintiffs, testified that in Congressional District 15 under Plan 1374C, there was no racially contested election that he examined in which the Latino-preferred candidate lost and that the reduction in Latino turnout in the general election did not make Congressional District 15 ineffective as a Latino opportunity district. (Tr. File 7 at 53, 64-65; *see* Table 3 of Addendum to Engstrom Report, GI Forum's Ex. 130).

Hispanic citizen voting age population exceeds 60% than the demonstration plan.[136]

The GI Forum Plaintiffs have shown neither that seven districts can be drawn, meeting the threshold *Gingles* requirements, that have a majority of Hispanic citizen voting age population, nor that all such districts, if they could be drawn, would function effectively as Latino opportunity districts. We reject the claim of the GI Forum Plaintiffs that § 2 demands a seventh Hispanic citizen voting age population majority district in South and West Texas. Part of the analysis of the dilution claim, to which we now turn, will explain why we believe the six Hispanic citizen voting age population majority districts drawn in Plan 1374C are effective Hispanic opportunity districts.

C

It is undisputed that Plan 1374C eliminated Congressional District 23 as a district with a Latino majority

[136] The GI Forum provided an analysis, as follows:

	1385C		1374C	
Congressional district	HVAP	HCVAP	HVAP	HCVAP
15	68.7	63.2	64.0	58.5
16	72.7	67.7	74.8	69.9
20	60.7	57.9	63.6	60.8
23	63.5	56.9	50.9	45.8
25	63.8	58.4	63.4	55.0
27	63.5	59.9	64.2	60.4
28	54.3	50.3	60.1	56.2

(GI Forum's Post-Trial Br. at 14).

citizen voting age population for the political purpose of increasing Republican voters in the district and shoring up the reelection chances of the Republican incumbent. To avoid retrogression, Plan 1374C added a new Latino majority citizen voting age population district to the east and reconfigured the existing districts. Plaintiffs complain that the weakening of Congressional District 23, preventing it from continuing to move toward becoming an effective opportunity district, results in dilution in violation of § 2. Plaintiffs argue that the dilution cannot be addressed by the creation of Congressional District 25 as a Latino opportunity district. Plaintiffs also complain that even if dilution is to be measured on a broader basis than a single district, Plan 1374C is dilutive because the reconfiguration of Congressional Districts 15, 28, and 27 weakens Latino voting strength in these districts.

Congressional District 23 is unquestionably not a Latino opportunity district under Plan 1374C. The map drawers divided Webb County, which is 94% Latino. This change removed reliably Democratic voters in Laredo out of Congressional District 23. Under Plan 1374C, the Hispanic citizen voting age population is 46%, reduced from 57.5% in Plan 1151C; the percentage of Spanish-surnamed registered voters is 44% under Plan 1374C, reduced from 55.3% in Plan 1151C. Even as configured under Plan 1151C, however, Congressional District 23 did not perform as an effective opportunity district. The GI Forum Plaintiffs' regression analysis of election data showed that Latino candidates of choice were elected in five out of eight racially contested elections from 1994 to

2002.[137] The record showed, however, that Latino voters in Congressional District 23 were voting against the Republican candidate Bonilla by larger margins in each successive election. Latino voting strength in Congressional District 23 is, unquestionably, weakened under Plan 1374C. The GI Forum regression analysis of election data for Congressional District 23 under Plan 1374C showed that the Hispanic candidates of choice won only one out of eight racially contested elections from 1994 to 2002.[138] Dr. Gaddie's regression data showed that, in Congressional District 23 under Plan 1374C, Hispanic candidates of choice won seven out of seven statewide primaries, but none of the six Hispanic candidates of choice in general elections carried the district.[139]

Plaintiffs claim that the map drawers impermissibly reduced Hispanic voting strength in Congressional District 23 to pursue their political end. Plaintiffs urge that the political end could have been achieved by leaving Webb County whole and redrawing Congressional District 23 to put Bonilla's home in Congressional District 11, where he could have run in an open seat. The State points out that this approach would not have served either the political goal of incumbency protection or of increasing Republican districts, since Congressional District 11 already reliably elects Republicans in congressional and other elections. The change to Congressional District 23 served the dual goal of increasing Republican seats in general and protecting Bonilla's incumbency in particular, with the additional

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[137] GI Forum's Post-Trial Br. at 15.

[138] Table 3 of Addendum to Engstrom Report, GI Forum's Ex. 130.

[139] Gaddie Report, Jackson Pls.' Ex. 141 at 9-10.

political nuance that Bonilla would be reelected in a district that had a majority of Latino voting age population – although clearly not a majority of citizen voting age population and certainly not an effective voting majority.

Plaintiffs argue that the admittedly political decision to draw the line through the city of Laredo, placing the largely Democratic, Hispanic voters in Congressional District 28 to the east and "stranding" 359,000 Hispanics in Congressional District 23, where they will be submerged in a Republican, Anglo majority district, violates § 2. *De Grandy*, however, rejected the claim of separating heavily Hispanic neighborhoods, fragmenting them in certain districts and packing them into others, as a basis for liability, even if the *Gingles* factors are met, because the totality of the circumstances included a showing that Hispanic voters had effective voting majorities in the relevant area in rough proportion to the their voting age population.[140]

Typically, vote dilution claims address redistricting schemes that take a minority group whose members have the potential to comprise a numerical majority in a geographically compact district and disperse the group across two or more districts, thereby precluding the minority members from constituting an effective majority in either one.[141] Plan 1374C, however, does not produce such an

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[140] 512 U.S. at 1015-16. The Court noted in *De Grandy* that findings that certain lines were drawn to separate portions of Hispanic neighborhoods, while others drew several Hispanic neighborhoods into a single district, in themselves, "would be to say only that lines could have been drawn elsewhere, nothing more." *Id.*

[141] *See, e.g., Voinovich*, 507 U.S. at 153.

effect in South and West Texas. Instead, Plan 1374C changes the district boundary in a way that divides Democratic Hispanic voters in Webb County, keeping half in Congressional District 23, in which Republican voting strength is increased and Hispanic voting strength is weakened, and placing half in Congressional District 28, in which Latinos have a clear majority of the citizen voting age population, even after a new district, 25, is added as a majority Latino citizen voting age population district. The Legislature also reconfigured Congressional Districts 15, 28, and 27 in ways that both achieved equal population distribution and preserved the majority Latino citizen age voting populations in each of those districts.

Plaintiffs rely on *Shaw v. Hunt* (*Shaw II*)[142] to argue that the State cannot "offset" the reduction of Latino voting strength in Congressional District 23 by creating a new Latino majority citizen voting age district, Congressional District 25, because to do so would "swap" the voting rights of citizens in Congressional District 23 for the rights of those in new Congressional District 25. In *Shaw II*, the Court held that the creation of a remedial district in one area of a state, where polarized voting existed but where a compact majority-minority district could be not drawn, could not compensate for the failure to place a remedial district in another area where it was possible to draw a compact majority-minority district and where polarized voting also existed.[143] The Court held that a bizarrely shaped district "somewhere else in the State"

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[142] 517 U.S. 899 (1996).

[143] *Id.* at 917.

does not remedy the "vote-dilution injuries suffered" by minority voters residing where the remedial district could have been drawn.[144] The Court rejected a district drawn in the center of the state to remedy the dilution injury of voters on the southeastern side of the state, not because there were differences in polarization, but because a remedial *Gingles* district could not be drawn in the part of the state that the map drawers selected.[145] In this case, by contrast, in South and West Texas, six *Gingles* Latino citizen voting age population majority districts could be and were drawn.[146] The Legislature did not place the lines of those districts in parts of the State where the *Gingles* requirements were not satisfied; the problem present in *Shaw II* is not involved in this case.

Analysis of the *Gingles* factors shows that the Latino population is sufficiently numerous and distributed as to support the creation of a number of effective districts in South and West Texas with a majority of Latino citizen voting age population. The *Gingles* districts in South and West Texas could be drawn in different ways, within the constraints of geography and population distribution. Both Plan 1151C and Plan 1374C have six districts with a

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[144] *Id.*

[145] This case reflects what commentators have recognized as a tension in the cases under § 2 between recognizing the individual right to an undiluted vote and the fact that dilution can be determined and remedied only by addressing the aggregate treatment of group members. *See generally* Heather K. Gerken, *Understanding the Right to an Undiluted Vote*, 114 HARV. L. REV. 1663 (2001).

[146] Indeed, in arguing for an additional Latino majority citizen voting age population district, the GI Forum Plaintiffs emphasize that the *Gingles* criteria are met throughout the South and West Texas area.

majority of Latino citizens of voting age. The choices available to the State included the lines of Plan 1374C, which created a new remedial district that had not been present under the previous plan, or the lines of Plan 1151C, keeping Congressional District 23 as a bare majority Hispanic citizen voting age population district, but not drawing another district with a stronger Latino citizen voting age population majority. Most of the Plaintiffs argue that the State should be compelled to return to the lines of Plan 1151C for South and West Texas. Plaintiffs do not argue that the State should both retain the lines of Congressional District 23 under Plan 1151C and add a new majority Hispanic citizen voting age population district along the lines of Congressional District 25. Indeed, there is neither sufficiently dense and compact population in general nor Hispanic population in particular to support such a configuration. But to say that the State could have retained the lines of Congressional District 23 drawn under Plan 1151C and not created a third district based in the Rio Grande Valley with a majority of Hispanic citizen voting age population is different from saying that the State was obligated to make that choice. *Shaw II* does not preclude the State from choosing where and how to draw majority-minority districts in areas where *Gingles* is satisfied. The states retain broad remedial power to choose where and how to draw remedial districts.[147] As the Court noted in *Shaw II*, even if

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[147] *See Bush v. Vera*, 517 U.S. 952, 978 ("the States retain a flexibility that federal courts enforcing § 2 lack . . . insofar as deference is due to their reasonable fears of, and to their reasonable efforts to avoid, § 2 liability"); *see also Lawyer v. Dep't of Justice*, 521 U.S. 567, 575-77 (1997).

a violation of § 2 is shown, it does not confer on individual plaintiffs "the right to be placed in a majority-minority district" because "[s]tates retain broad discretion in drawing districts to comply with the mandate of § 2."[148]

To examine whether Plan 1374C impermissibly dilutes the votes of Latinos in South and West Texas, this court must conduct a "comprehensive . . . canvassing of relevant facts" making up the totality of the circumstances, including proportionality, to determine whether the districts drawn under Plan 1374C in South and West Texas are effective Latino opportunity districts.[149] Congressional District 23 is clearly not a minority opportunity district; Congressional Districts 16 and 20 do clearly provide effective Latino citizen voting age population majorities. The disputes center on whether Congressional Districts 15, 25, 28, and 27 as drawn in Plan 1374C will be effective Latino opportunity districts.

Some of the relevant data from the voluminous record is as follows:

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[148] 517 U.S. at 917 n.9; *cf. Georgia v. Ashcroft*, 123 S.Ct. 2498, 2511 (2003) (under § 5, a state may choose to create a certain number of effective majority-minority districts or a greater number of minority influence districts).

[149] *De Grandy*, 512 U.S. at 1011.

	Congressional District	%HCVAP	% SSR (2002)
1151	15	69.3	67.0
1374	15	58.5	56.7
1151	25	18.6	15.2
1374	25	55.0	55.6
1151	28	61.4	59.6
1374	28	56.2	54.3
1151	27	63.5	61.6
1374	27	60.4	58.0

The parties also presented detailed regression analyses of election data, performed by different experts.[150] The regression analyses confirmed that in Congressional Districts 15, 25, 28, and 27 under Plan 1374C, the Latino candidate of choice won in nearly every primary and runoff examined. The GI Forum's regression analysis of election data reveals that under Plan 1374C, Latinos elected their candidate of choice in eight out of eight racially contested elections from 1994 to 2002 in every one of the six Latino majority citizen voting age population districts, including Congressional District

[150] Table 3 of Engstrom Report, GI Forum's Ex. 89; Table 3 of Addendum to Engstrom Report, GI Forum's Ex. 130; Attachments to Gaddie Report, State's Ex. 31.

15.[181] Dr. Gaddie's report similarly concluded that the Latino candidate of choice won in seven of seven primaries and five of six general elections in Congressional District 15.[182] In Congressional District 25, Dr. Gaddie concluded that Hispanic candidates of choice carried seven of seven statewide primaries and six of six statewide general elections involving candidates of different ethnicity or race, and that in the 2002 contested statewide Democratic primaries and statewide general elections, Hispanic candidates of choice prevailed in five of six primaries and all fifteen general elections.[183] In Congressional District 27, Dr. Gaddie concluded that Hispanic candidates of choice won seven of seven statewide primaries and five of six statewide general elections

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Congressional	Number of Times Latino-Preferred Candidate was Elected under Plan 1374C in Eight Racially-Contested Elections from 1994-2002
15	8
16	8
20	8
23	1
25	8
27	8
28	8

(GI Forum's Post-Trial Br. at 15).

[182] The one Hispanic-preferred candidate loss occurred when 37% of the Hispanic voters supported a Hispanic Republican over an Anglo Democrat. (Gaddie Report, Jackson Pla.' Ex. 141 at 8).

[183] *Id.* at 10.

involving candidates of different ethnicity or race.[154] In Congressional District 28, Dr. Gaddie concluded that Hispanic candidates of choice prevailed in all seven statewide primaries and all six statewide general elections involving candidates of different ethnicity or race.[155]

Although Dr. Lichtman expressed concern when testifying for Plaintiffs that Congressional District 15 and Congressional District 25 might be marginal, or moving toward a "toss-up," he acknowledged on cross-examination that all four of the districts at issue, 15, 25, 27, and 28, are Hispanic opportunity districts, defined as a district in which Hispanic voters have an effective opportunity to control outcomes in both primary and general elections.[156] Dr. Lichtman expressed concern that in Congressional District 25 under Plan 1374C, while Hispanic voters would control the primaries, Congressman Lloyd Doggett, the incumbent in Congressional District 10 under Plan 1151C and an Anglo Democrat, might run and win the general election without a majority of Hispanic votes.[157] Dr. Lichtman nonetheless agreed that Congressman Doggett has had "overwhelming Latino support" in his current congressional district.[158]

Several witnesses expressed particular concern over Congressional District 15, which under Plan 1374C has a Latino citizen voting age population of 58.5% and a

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[154] *Id.* at 11.

[155] *Id.*

[156] Tr. File 1 at 157, 167-68.

[157] *Id.* at 151-52.

[158] *Id.* at 153.

Spanish-surnamed registered voter population of 56.7%. Although these numbers are lower than the levels that had been present in Congressional District 15 under Plan 1151C, the regression analyses showed that the Hispanic-preferred candidate won every primary and runoff election studied, and lost in only one general election out of six.[159] Both Dr. Lichtman and Dr. Engstrom testified that Congressional District 15 was a minority opportunity district, although not as strong as it had been under Plan 1374C.[160] In contrast, Dr. Polinard testified that given this reduction in strength, Congressional District 15 was no longer an effective or performing opportunity district, merely an influence district.[161]

In Plan 1151C, Congressional District 27 included all of Cameron County along the border, but only part of Nueces County to the north. In Plan 1374C, Congressional District 27 includes all of Nueces County but divides Cameron County. The result did not significantly change the relevant data. In Plan 1374C, Congressional District 27 has a Hispanic citizen voting age population of 60.4% and a Spanish-surnamed registered voter population of 58%, reduced from a Hispanic citizen voting age population of 63.6% and a Spanish-surnamed registered voter population of 61.6% under Plan 1151C.[162] As noted, the regression analyses showed that Hispanic candidates of choice won seven of seven statewide primaries and five of

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[159] Gaddie Report, Jackson Pls.' Ex. 141 at 8.

[160] Lichtman Test., Tr. File 1 at 167; Engstrom Test., Tr. File 7 at 64-65.

[161] Tr. File 8 at 53-54, 64.

[162] Gaddie Report, Jackson Pls.' Ex. 141 at Table 3.

six statewide general elections involving candidates of different ethnicity.[183] Dr. Lichtman testified that Congressional District 27 under 1374C is a minority opportunity district.[184] Dr. Engstrom testified that Congressional District 27 in Plan 1374C is a district in which Hispanics have the opportunity to elect their preferred candidate.[185]

Congressional District 28 under Plan 1374C includes part of Laredo in South Texas and extends north to the relatively heavily populated areas of Central Texas. The demographic figures show that the district maintains a decisive Hispanic citizen voting age population majority, although reduced from the levels present under Plan 1151C. In Congressional District 28 under Plan 1374C, the Hispanic citizen voting age population is 56.2% and the Spanish-surnamed registered voter population is 54.3%, slightly less than the 61.5% of Hispanic citizen voting age population and 59.6% Spanish-surnamed registered voter population under Congressional District 28 in Plan 1151C.[186]

At trial, witnesses familiar with the areas covered by Congressional Districts 15, 25, 27, and 28 and with the difficulties faced by candidates supported by Latino voters expressed concern as to whether these districts would be

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[183] *Id.* at 11.

[184] Tr. File 1 at 166-67.

[185] Tr. File 7 at 53-54. Again, Dr. Polinard disagreed, testifying that Congressional District 27 was weakened as compared to Plan 1151C to the point of becoming an influence district. (Tr. File 8 at 48-49).

[186] Gaddie Report, Jackson Pls.' Ex. 141 at Table 3.

effective as Latino opportunity districts.[187] The witnesses testified that the size of the districts; the fact that they include several media markets; and the fact that they combine communities along the border with communities in Central Texas, with diverse needs and interests, could make it more difficult for thinly financed Latino-preferred candidates to achieve electoral success and to provide adequate and responsive representation once elected.[188] These concerns bear on the extent to which the new districts are functionally effective Latino opportunity districts, important to understanding whether dilution results from Plan 1374C.[189]

The "bacon-strip" districts – Congressional Districts 15, 25, and 28 – are unquestionably long. Congressional District 25 is 300 miles long and 77% of its total population comes from either end of the district; 39% from Travis County in Central Texas and 38% from Hidalgo County at the southern end. Congressional District 15 is also 300 miles long, from Cameron County in South Texas to Bastrop County in Central Texas, and its population is also concentrated at either end. Congressional District 28

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[187] *See, e.g.*, Gonzalez Test., Tr. File 1 at 123-24; Hinojosa Test., File 4 at 53; Richard Raymond Test., Tr. File 6 at 85-86; Aaron Peña Test., Tr. File 6 at 168.

[188] These concerns also bear on Plaintiffs' *Shaw* claim that the map drawers subordinated traditional districting concerns, such as compactness and respecting communities of interest, to the goal of collecting enough Latinos to achieve a majority of citizen voting age population in the districts. *See* Part VI.D.

[189] As *De Grandy* makes clear, the ultimate conclusions about equality of opportunity are to be based on a comprehensive examination of the relevant facts. 512 U.S. at 1011; *see also Harvell v. Blytheville Sch. Dist. No. 5*, 71 F.3d 1382, 1390-91 (8th Cir. 1995).

runs nearly 300 miles from Hays County south to Zapata County on the border with Mexico. Districts that began in the same area in Plan 1151C were also long and relatively narrow, extending from the border of South Texas to Central Texas, although not as far. The record does not disclose the number of media markets covered in the districts under Plan 1151C, but it is clear that several of the areas joined in districts under Plan 1374C were also joined together in districts under Plan 1151C. It is also clear that adding a third district based in the Rio Grande Valley made each of the three districts extend north and include residents of both the Rio Grande Valley and Central Texas. While Latino residents in both areas generally have lower socio-economic indicators than Anglos, the evidence at trial showed that the needs and interests of Latino communities on the South Texas border are different from the needs and interests of Latino communities in Central Texas. The issue is whether these features mean that the newly-configured districts dilute the voting strength of Latinos.

At trial, the court was greatly assisted by the testimony of elected officials from the districts at issue. These witnesses, including Congressman Hinojosa, representing Congressional District 15; State Representative Aaron Peña, who resides in Congressional District 15 and represents a district located in Congressional District 25; State Representative Jim Solis from Cameron County in Congressional District 27; and County Judge Ramon Garcia and County Commissioner Ricardo Godinez from Hidalgo County, were most concerned that the districts would no longer be dominated by the border cities in the Rio Grande Valley. Instead, the districts would also contain a number

of constituents from northern, less impoverished communities. The witnesses testified that the size and diversity of the newly-configured districts could make it more difficult for the constituents in the Rio Grande Valley to control election outcomes. For example, witnesses testified that Congressional District 27 under Plan 1374C includes more affluent and higher-turnout voting areas in Nueces County, in contrast to Congressional District 27 in Plan 1151C, which included only half of Nueces County, and expressed concern that Latinos from the border might have difficulty in maintaining control over election outcomes because of low turnout.[170] The district, however, has a Latino citizen voting age majority population of 60.4%, and 58% of the registered voters have Spanish surnames. Witnesses consistently testified that Congressional District 27 under Plan 1374C is a district where Hispanics have an effective opportunity to elect their preferred candidate, and the regression data supports this conclusion.[171] As noted, witnesses testified that Congressional District 25, while a more effective Latino opportunity district than Congressional District 23 had been in Plan 1151C, might elect Lloyd Doggett, a well-known and well-financed Anglo Democrat from Central Texas, to Congress, but acknowledged that many Hispanics support this Anglo Democrat.[172] The legal test of an effective opportunity district is not whether a Hispanic candidate is elected each

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[170] *See, e.g.*, Hinojosa Test., File 4 at 48-53; Peña Test., Tr. File 6 at 167.

[171] *See, e.g.*, Lichtman Test., Tr. File 1 at 166-67; Engstrom Test., Tr. File 7 at 53-54; Gaddie Report, Jackson Pls.' Ex. 141 at 11.

[172] *See, e.g.*, Lichtman Test., Tr. File 1 at 151-53; Peña Test., Tr. File 6 at 168-69; Polinard Test., Tr. File 8 at 57-58.

time, but whether a Hispanic-preferred candidate has an effective opportunity to be elected.[173] Witnesses testified that Congressional Districts 15 and 25 would span *colonias* in Hidalgo County and suburban areas in Central Texas, but the witnesses testified, and the regression data show, that both districts are effective Latino opportunity districts, with the Hispanic-preferred candidate winning every primary and general election examined in District 25 and, in District 15, winning every primary and runoff election studied and losing in only one general election out of six.[174] Witnesses testified that Congressional District 28 had been, and would continue to be, an effective Hispanic opportunity district, confirmed by the regression data showing that Hispanic candidates of choice won in every primary and general election examined.[175]

A close examination of the voluminous record and the testimony at trial leads to a finding that Plan 1374C does not impermissibly dilute the voting strength of Latinos in South and West Texas in violation of § 2. The newly-configured Districts 15, 25, 27, and 28 cover more territory and travel farther north than did the corresponding districts in Plan 1151C. The districts combine more voters from the central part of the State with voters from the border cities than was the case in Plan 1151C. The

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[173] *See De Grandy*, 512 U.S. at 1014 n. 11; *Lewis v. Alamance County, N.C.*, 99 F.3d 600, 607 (4th Cir. 1996).

[174] *See, e.g.*, Peña Test., Tr. File 6 at 169-72; Polinard Test., Tr. File 8 at 63-65; Ron Kirk Test., Tr. File 4 at 23-24; Gaddie Report, Jackson Pls.' Ex. 141 at 8, 10.

[175] *See* Lichtman Test., Tr. File 1 at 166-67; Engstrom Test., Tr. File 7 at 54; Gaddie Report, Jackson Pls.' Ex. 141 at 11.

population data, regression analyses, and the testimony of both expert witnesses and witnesses knowledgeable about how politics actually works in the area lead to the finding that in Congressional Districts 25 and 28, Latino voters will likely control every primary and general election outcome; in Congressional Districts 15 and 27, Latino voters will likely control every primary outcome and almost every general election outcome; and in Congressional District 23, Latino voters will likely control every primary outcome but not the general elections. The fact that Hispanic-preferred candidates will have to campaign for votes not only from Latinos in the Rio Grande Valley but also from Latinos in Central Texas in Congressional Districts 25, 28, and 15 does not mean that Latinos have suffered an impermissible dilution of voting strength in those districts. The fact that Latinos from the Rio Grande Valley in Congressional District 27 are combined with voters from Nueces County, while maintaining a decisive citizen voting age population and Spanish-surnamed registered voter majority, as well as consistent electoral control, does not mean that Latinos have suffered an impermissible dilution of voting strength in that district.[178]

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[178] *See De Grandy*, 512 U.S. at 1014 n. 11 ("[T]he ultimate right of § 2 is equality of opportunity, not a guarantee of electoral success for minority-preferred candidates of whatever race."); *Gingles*, 478 U.S. at 47 ("The essence of a § 2 claim is that a certain electoral law, practice, or structure interacts with social and historical conditions to cause an inequality in the *opportunities* enjoyed by black and white voters to elect their preferred representatives.") (emphasis added); *Sanchez v. State of Colorado*, 97 F.3d 1303, 1310 (10th Cir. 1996) ("The lack of electoral *opportunity* is the key."); *Uno v. City of Holyoke*, 72 F.3d 973, 979 (1st Cir. 1995) ("While the statutory scheme does not provide an

(Continued on following page)

As the Court stated in *Gingles*, "[T]he relative lack of minority electoral success under a challenged plan, when compared with the success that would be predicted under the measure of undiluted minority voting strength the court is employing, can constitute powerful evidence of vote dilution."[177] Whether compared to Plan 1151C or to the GI Forum Plaintiffs' demonstration plans, Plaintiffs have not shown an impermissible reduction in effective opportunities for Latino electoral control or in opportunities for Latino participation in the political process. Section 2 guarantees minority voters an effective opportunity to exercise electoral control, not overwhelming electoral majorities or guarantees of success. The totality of facts and circumstances, including those pointing to proportionality, as well as past and predicted election outcomes and evidence as to the likely functioning of the newly-configured districts, does not show a violation of § 2 in South and West Texas under Plan 1374C.

Plaintiffs argue that taking a broad view of the statewide effect of Plan 1374C, dilution results because of the loss of the "influence districts" in other parts of the State in which Latino voters played a role, specifically, Congressional District 24 in Dallas and Tarrant County and Congressional District 10 in Travis County. The State responds in part by pointing to the strengthening of Congressional District 29 in Harris County as a Latino influence district. But Plaintiffs have not urged that additional *Gingles* Latino majority-minority districts can

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assurance of success at the polls for minority candidates, it does provide an assurance of fairness.") (citations omitted).

[177] 478 U.S. at 99.

be placed in those areas; they have not identified a wrong in those areas under § 2 that would justify requiring the State to effect a remedy. As the Court explained in *Growe*, "Unless [the *Gingles* prerequisites] are established, there neither has been a wrong nor can be a remedy."[178] Plaintiffs have not met the burden of showing that § 2 forbids the State from making the political choices that primarily shaped the changes reflected in Plan 1374C because the effects of those changes impermissibly diluted the opportunity of Latinos to participate in the political process.

In *De Grandy*, the Court emphasized that one reason it would not embrace "bottom line" proportionality as a "safe harbor" was that it could make "the most blatant racial gerrymandering in half of a county's single-member Districts . . . irrelevant under § 2 if offset by political gerrymandering in the other half."[179] Plaintiffs argue that the reduction of Congressional District 23 from an emerging effective Hispanic opportunity district for political purposes was political gerrymandering and that the creation of six majority Hispanic citizen voting age population districts in the remainder of West and South Texas resulted from racial gerrymandering. We turn to an examination of this claim.

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Plaintiffs contend that in Plan 1374C, the map drawers used ethnicity to an unlawful degree and drew districts

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[178] 507 U.S. at 40-41; *see also Harvell*, 71 F.3d at 1393; *Johnson v. Mortham*, 926 F.Supp. 1460, 1473 (N.D. Fla. 1996).

[179] 512 U.S. at 1019.

that reflect a derogation of the traditional districting values of compactness, respect for political lines, and communities of interest. The Supreme Court has phrased the test for a plaintiff bringing such a *Shaw* claim in different ways. In 1995, in *Miller v. Johnson*,[180] the Court struck down a Georgia districting plan on the ground that race had been "the predominant factor motivating the Legislature's decision to place a significant number of voters within or without a particular district."[181] That conclusion will generally follow, the Court explained, where "the legislature subordinated traditional race-neutral districting principles ... to racial considerations."[182] In her concurrence in *Bush v. Vera*,[183] Justice O'Connor reaffirmed that test, but explained it in slightly different terms: "[S]o long as they do not subordinate traditional districting criteria to the use of race for its own sake or as a proxy, States may intentionally create majority-minority districts, and may otherwise take race into consideration, without coming under strict scrutiny .... Only if traditional districting criteria are neglected *and* that neglect is predominantly due to the misuse of race" is the district presumptively unconstitutional.[184] States are not required to ignore race; indeed, the Supreme Court has acknowledged that states will always be aware of race when they draw district lines.[185] The factor of race or

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[180] 515 U.S. 900 (1995).

[181] *Id.* at 916.

[182] *Id.*

[183] 517 U.S. 952 (1996).

[184] *Id.* at 993 (O'Connor, J., concurring).

[185] *Miller*, 515 U.S. at 916; *Shaw I*, 509 U.S. at 646.

ethnicity may be considered in the process as long as it does not predominate over traditional race-neutral districting principles.[186] The fact that race is given consideration in the process and the fact that majority-minority districts are intentionally created do not suffice to trigger strict scrutiny.[187]

Plaintiffs bear the burden of proving that race was the predominate factor in the Legislature's districting decisions.[188] That burden is significant.[189] As the Court stated in *Miller*, "To invoke strict scrutiny, a plaintiff must show that the State has relied on race in substantial disregard of customary and traditional districting practices ... [A]pplication of the Court's standard helps achieve *Shaw's* basic objective of making extreme instances of gerrymandering subject to meaningful judicial review."[190]

Courts analyzing *Shaw* claims frequently examine: (a) district shape and demographics; (b) statements made by legislators and their staff; and (c) the nature of the data used to determine whether race played an excessive and unjustifiable role in the redistricting process.[191] The parties

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[186] *Id.*; *Shaw II*, 517 U.S. at 907 (race is predominate when it is "the criterion that, in the State's view, [can] not be compromised").

[187] *Shaw I*, 509 U.S. at 646; *Bush*, 517 U.S. at 962.

[188] *See Bush*, 517 U.S. at 958-59; *Miller*, 515 U.S. at 916.

[189] *Easley v. Cromartie*, 532 U.S. 234, 241 (2001); *Miller*, 515 U.S. at 928 (O'Connor, J., concurring); *see Cano v. Davis*, 211 F.Supp.2d 1208, 1215 (C.D. Cal. 2002) ("All of the racial gerrymandering cases emphasize that a plaintiff bringing such a claim faces an extraordinarily high burden.").

[190] 515 U.S. at 928-29 (O'Connor, J., concurring).

[191] *See Bush*, 517 U.S. at 959; *Miller*, 515 U.S. at 916-19; *Shaw I*, 509 U.S. at 647.

presented evidence of two widely accepted measures of compactness, "smallest circle" and "perimeter to area" scores.[122] The compactness scores of the challenged districts in Plan 1374C are as follows:

	CD 23	CD 28	CD 25	CD 15	CD 27
Smallest Circle	3.8	5.0	8.5	6.5	3.1
Perimeter to Area	5.1	5.7	9.6	11.6	5.1

The scores for the corresponding districts in Plan 1151C are:

	CD 23	CD 28	CD 25	CD 15	CD 27
Smallest Circle	4.2	3.7		5.0	3.1
Perimeter to Area	6.1	5.4		8.5	4.1

The general measures of compactness do not lead to a conclusion that the districts in Plan 1374C are bizarre in a *Shaw* sense. Dr. John Alford, an expert witness for the Jackson Plaintiffs, testified that he did not find the perimeter to area scores for Congressional Districts 15, 25, and 28 in Plan 1374C to be troublesome on their own.[123] Neither the smallest circle nor perimeter to area scores of

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[122] *See* Richard H. Pildes & Richard G. Niemi, *Expressive Harms, "Bizarre Districts," and Voting Rights: Evaluating Election-District Appearances After Shaw v. Reno*, 92 MICH. L. REV. 483 (1993), cited in *Shaw II*, 517 U.S. at 923, 931.

[123] Tr. File 6 at 25.

Plan 1374C approach those of districts so bizarrely and irregularly drawn that courts interpret their creation as "an effort to segregate the races for purposes of voting, without regard for traditional districting principles."[184]

Compactness scores cannot be considered in isolation; the issue is whether a district's shape, as measured by compactness scores, provides evidence of a constitutional violation when considered in relation to the geography and population distribution in the relevant part of the State.[185] Texas has vast geographical areas with widely dispersed population; except for areas around major cities, the State is a challenge for any redistricter who cherishes compactness as a value.[186] For example, Congressional District 23 in both Plans 1151C and 1374C extends approximately 800 miles along the border. In Plan 1151C, Congressional District 17 in the north-central part of the State includes 36 counties. Under Plan 1151C, Congressional District 13 in North Texas is larger than a number of states, spanning 40,000 square miles and 43 counties, but many with fewer than three thousand people.[187]

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[184] *Shaw I*, 509 U.S. at 642; *Hunt v. Cromartie*, 526 U.S. 541, 548 n. 3 (1999).

[185] *See Miller*, 515 U.S. at 917 ("Although by comparison with other districts the geometric shape of the Eleventh District may not seem bizarre on its face, when its shape is considered in conjunction with its racial and population densities, the story of racial gerrymandering . . . becomes much clearer.").

[186] Indeed, Dr. Alford conceded that Texas has not valued compactness during the period in which Texas has engaged in districting. Tr. File 6 at 21.

[187] BARONE, supra note 105, at 1548, 1557, 1576.

Texas geography and population dispersion limit the availability of district compactness in the southern and western regions of the state. Under Plan 1374C, the population densities in Congressional Districts 28, 25, and 15, both Anglo and Hispanic, are highest in the Valley and in Central Texas, separated by relatively sparsely populated areas. The high-density population pockets necessary to achieve the one-man-one-vote requirement are situated at either end of the elongated "bacon-strip" shaped districts. As a result, the boundaries of such "strip" districts in Plan 1374C must reach into Central Texas to obtain the requisite number of people, whether Anglo or Latino. For example, in Congressional District 15, the "dumbbell" district, 90% of the population is in the northern and southern tips. Congressional District 15 was already a "strip" district in Plan 1151C; in Plan 1374C, legislators elongated it to add people because part of the lower half was used to create new Congressional District 25. The smallest circle measure of compactness for the southern and western districts in Plan 1374C, examined in relation to the geography and population, reflect the sheer size and population distribution of the area, rather than a calculated stretch to find voters of a particular ethnic makeup.[186]

The perimeter to area scores for Plan 1374C similarly do not reflect the predominance of ethnicity in drawing the district lines. Perimeter to area calculations are useful for

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[186] *Cf. Theriot v. Parish of Jefferson*, 185 F.3d 477, 487-88 (5th Cir. 1999) (rejecting a claim of racial gerrymandering where one-man-one-vote considerations and the district's geography substantially limited the ability of map drawers to adhere to compactness standards).

determining whether the map drawers used convoluted lines to bring members of one racial group into a district while excluding members of another racial group. An examination of Congressional Districts 25, 28, 15, and 27, in relation to the population distribution within and without the district lines, does not reveal lines precisely drawn to include Hispanics and exclude Anglo voters, to ensure Hispanic citizen voting age majority districts, but rather lines drawn to include enough voters to meet the one-man-one-vote constitutional requirement. An examination of the record, including the maps that show the relationship of Hispanic voting age population to district lines in Congressional Districts 15, 25, and 28, does not show that the districts were extended north in a determined search for Hispanics, in contrast to the way in which the districts in *Miller, Bush,* and *Shaw* twisted or spanned diverse areas to reach every available minority of voting age population.[189] Neither the districts' shape nor their shape in relation to ethnic demographics and population densities provides circumstantial evidence of forbidden racial gerrymandering.

Plaintiffs criticized the Legislature for "cracking" Webb County in a way that removed a large number of Latino voters from Congressional District 23 and placed them in Congressional District 28. The State presented undisputed evidence that the Legislature changed the lines of Congressional District 23 to meet the political purpose of making the district more Republican and protecting the incumbent, Congressman Bonilla. Plaintiffs

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[189] *See* Jackson Pls.' Ex. 59-63.

agree that the primary purpose of this change was political and concede that there is a strong correlation between Latino and Democratic voters. Dr. Lichtman stated in his report that the change in the Webb County district boundary affected an area of voters who were more than 90% Hispanic in voting age population and 86.5% Democratic in voting, according to the 2002 statewide elections.[200] Plaintiffs nonetheless fault the Legislature for drawing a line that separated Hispanic voters, recognizing that they were also reliably Democratic voters, to achieve the political purpose.[201]

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[200] *See* Jackson Pls.' Ex. 1 at 57.

[201] The GI Forum Plaintiffs presented Dr. Morgan Kousser, a political scientist, as an expert witness on determining legislative intent to discriminate in a redistricting plan. Dr. Kousser criticized the Legislature for "tak[ing] a correlation between voting and race that's true in Texas now . . . and freez[ing] it in place. . . . It would be possible, had the redistricting chosen other means, that in some future redistricting partisanship and race would not be so highly correlated and that you could attain a partisan end without using racial means. But the Republicans chose to do it in a different way, a way that only achieves the partisan end by using the racial means. And my conclusion is that they chose that on purpose and that was a racially discriminatory intent." (Tr. File 7 at 118-19). Dr. Kousser's conclusion of discrimination is not supported by the current case law, which recognizes that a partisan goal is permissible and that where, as here, there is a strong correlation between race or ethnicity and party, drawing district lines along political lines that may coincide with racial or ethnic lines does not evidence intentional racial discrimination. *See Hunt*, 526 U.S. at 551-52. Dr. Kousser's criticism of the State's choice to create a "safe" Hispanic majority district in Congressional District 25 rather than allow Congressional District 23 to continue as an evolving Hispanic influence district is a criticism of the wisdom of the Legislature's redistricting approach, rather than its legality. As the Supreme Court recently stated in *Georgia v. Ashcroft*, "[A] State may choose to create a certain number of 'safe' districts, in which it is highly likely that

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The Supreme Court has recognized that a legislature "must have discretion to exercise the political judgment necessary to balance competing interests," and that courts must "exercise extraordinary caution in adjudicating claims that a State has drawn district lines on the basis of race."[202] In this case, the State has articulated a political reason for the districting decision, protecting a Republican incumbent. The Supreme Court has recognized that incumbency protection can explain a state's decision to depart from other traditional districting principles as well as, or even better than, race.[203] In *Theriot v. Parish of Jefferson*,[204] the Fifth Circuit rejected a racial gerrymander claim where "the inclusion or exclusion of communities was inexorably tied to issues of incumbency."[205] The decision to move the southeastern edge of Congressional District 23 to the west affected voters whose ethnicity and political partisanship voting achieved strong correlation. Under such circumstances, caution requires this court to defer to the Legislature's discretion.[206] As the Supreme

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minority voters will be able to elect the candidate of their choice. . . . Alternatively, a State may choose to create a greater number of districts in which it is likely – although perhaps not quite as likely as under the benchmark plan – that minority voters will be able to elect candidates of their choice." 123 S. Ct. at 2511.

[202] *Miller*, 515 U.S. at 915-16.

[203] *Bush*, 517 U.S. at 967; *Karcher v. Daggett*, 462 U.S. 725, 740 (1983) (recognizing incumbency protection as a legitimate state goal in reapportionment).

[204] 185 F.3d 477 (5th Cir. 1999).

[205] *Id.* at 486.

[206] *See Easley*, 532 U.S. at 242 ("Caution is especially appropriate . . . where the State has articulated a legitimate political explanation for its districting decision, and the voting population is one in which race and political affiliation are highly correlated.").

Court has stated, "a jurisdiction may engage in constitutional political gerrymandering, even if it so happens that the most loyal Democrats happen to be Black Democrats and even if the state were *conscious* of that fact."[207] The geography and population distribution, in relation to the lines drawn in Congressional Districts 15, 23, 25, 27, and 28, do not provide support for Plaintiffs' claim of impermissible racial gerrymandering.

Plaintiffs' primary evidence of a deviation from traditional districting principles is that Congressional Districts 23, 25, 28, 15, and 27 do not observe political lines or respect communities of interest. However, credible testimony from the State's witnesses demonstrated that factors at the heart of traditional districting criteria, including political goals, predominately influenced the numerous decisions embodied in the location of each district line.

In response to Plaintiffs' criticisms, the State provided credible race-neutral explanations for Plan 1374C's county cuts, city divisions, and linking of border and Central Texas communities. The legislative motivation for the division of Webb County between Congressional District 23 and Congressional District 28 in Plan 1374C was

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[207] *Hunt*, 526 U.S. at 551; *see id.* at 551-52 ("Evidence that blacks constitute even a supermajority in one congressional district while amounting to less than a plurality in a neighboring district will not, by itself, suffice to prove that a jurisdiction was motivated by race in drawing its district lines when the evidence also shows a high correlation between race and party preference."); *Bush*, 517 U.S. at 968 (finding that district lines that correlate with race because they are drawn on the basis of a political affiliation that correlates with race do not amount to a racial classification); *see also Shaw II*, 517 U.S. at 905; *Miller*, 515 U.S. at 916; *Shaw I*, 509 U.S. at 646.

political. The State provided evidence that in dividing Webb County, the map drawers in part used the interstate highway as a district boundary, deviating where necessary to achieve population balance.[208] Plaintiffs faulted the inclusion of part of Comal County in Central Texas in Congressional District 28, arguing that legislators drew the line between Congressional District 21 and Congressional District 28 to place the heavily Hispanic part of Comal County in Congressional District 28. The State provided evidence of a political reason for this county split: to make Congressional District 21 more safe for its Republican incumbent, who was concerned about the effect of including Democratic-leaning voters in his district because of changes to what had been Congressional District 10 in Plan 1151C. Map drawers placed reliably Democratic voters from Comal County into Congressional District 28 to make up for the inclusion in Congressional District 21 of Democratic voters from Travis County resulting from the changes to former Congressional District 10. The State also presented evidence that the part of Comal County placed in Congressional District 28 corresponded to a local election boundary.[209]

Plaintiffs also faulted the inclusion of a heavily Hispanic part of Hays County, also in Central Texas, in Congressional District 28. The State presented evidence that this decision resulted from the Legislature's desire to keep Texas State University, located in Hays County, out

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[208] Davis Test., Tr. File 11 at 85.

[209] *Id.* at 81 (explaining that Plan 1374C splits Comal County along a city council district line).

of Congressional District 21, which contains the University of Texas at Austin.[210]

Plaintiffs criticized the split that placed part of Cameron County into Congressional District 15. The State responded with credible evidence that Congressional District 15 extends into Cameron County in order to keep the city of Harlingen together in a single district. Plaintiffs castigated the division of Hidalgo County between Congressional District 15 and Congressional District 25. The State introduced testimony that Congressman Hinojosa asked that the cities of Mission and Edinburg be kept whole, which could be accomplished only by splitting Hidalgo County.[211] Plaintiffs criticized the Legislature for extending Congressional District 27 to include all of Nueces County and part of San Patricio County; under Plan 1151C, only half of Nueces County was included in Congressional District 27. The State introduced evidence that a state senator on the Redistricting Commission, Senator Luna, wanted to keep Nueces County and San Patricio County undivided in a single district. Although that was not feasible because of the need to achieve population balance, the Legislature was able to keep the port of Corpus Christi, located in Nueces County, in a single district with the port communities of San Patricio County.[212] The Legislature's primary map drawer, Bob Davis, and the sponsor of the redistricting bill in the State

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[210] *Id.* at 90-91.

[211] *Id.* at 89.

[212] In all, Plan 1374C split 122 cities and 14 Census Designated Places. By comparison, Plan 1151C split 132 cities and 15 Census Designated Places.

House of Representatives, Representative Phil King, provided credible testimony that the numerous decisions embodied in the location of each district line combined the broad political goal of increasing Republican seats with local political decisions that are the most traditional of districting criteria.[213]

The Supreme Court has focused on the specific features of a district that cause it to depart from compactness in assessing whether those features are justifiable on traditional districting grounds. In *Bush*, as here, the State attempted to justify its decisions on the traditional ground of partisan politics.[214] In that case, the Court found it significant that "the maps reveal that political considerations were subordinated to racial classification in the drawing of many of the most extreme and bizarre district lines."[215] The *Bush* Court found as clear evidence of the subordination of politics to race the fact that the State was willing, in the course of extending a noncompact tentacle engulfing a pocket of African-American voters, to include a large number of Republican voter tabulation districts in a congressional district ostensibly designed to maximize Democratic power.[216] In the present case, by contrast, the evidence did not reveal such internal inconsistencies. Instead, the Legislature's line-drawing decisions were

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[213] *Cf. Theriot*, 185 F.3d at 485-86 (rejecting a claim of racial gerrymandering where map drawers testified that reapportionment was based on political negotiations).

[214] 517 U.S. at 959.

[215] *Id.* at 971.

[216] *Id.*

primarily driven by the political goal of increasing Republican strength in Congressional District 23; the related political goal of ensuring that newly created Congressional District 25, as well as reconfigured Congressional Districts 15, 28, and 27, did not weaken Republican strength in adjacent Congressional District 21; a number of localized political considerations; and the overall need for a balanced population distribution.[217] Although the Legislature clearly intended to create a majority Latino citizen voting age population district in Congressional District 25 and maintain Congressional Districts 15, 28, and 27 as majority Latino citizen voting age population districts, the evidence does not show that it subordinated all other traditional districting criteria to a scheme in which ethnicity predominated.[218] To the contrary, the evidence shows that many of the lines were drawn for such reasons as balancing population, keeping certain cities or areas intact in a district, and satisfying requests from state or federal legislators to keep certain areas together, or place universities in different districts.[219] The evidence also shows that

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[217] *See Bush*, 517 U.S. at 964 (suggesting that the achievement of political goals, including incumbency protection, constitutes a traditional districting criterion); *Chen v. City of Houston*, 206 F.3d 502, 507 (5th Cir. 2000) (same); *Clark v. Putnam*, 293 F.3d 1261, 1266 (11th Cir. 2002) (same); *see also Shaw I*, 509 U.S. at 651 (citing *United Jewish Orgs. of Williamsburgh, Inc. v. Carey*, 430 U.S. 144, 168 (1977) (opinion of White, J., joined by Stevens and Rehnquist, JJ.)) (characterizing the achievement of population equality as a traditional districting principle).

[218] *See Bush*, 517 U.S. at 962 (noting that the drawing of majority-minority districts is not objectionable unless traditional districting criteria are subordinated to race).

[219] *Cf. Theriot*, 185 F.3d at 487-88 (holding that race was not the predominate factor in a reapportionment based on political negotiation,

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the lines did not make twists, turns, or jumps that can be explained only as efforts to include Hispanics or exclude Anglos, or vice-versa. Plan 1374C does not reveal a subordination of traditional districting principles to ethnic considerations.

Plaintiffs urge that a derogation of traditional districting principles in Plan 1374C is evidenced by the fact that it links disparate communities in single districts, compromising the ability of the most impoverished and needy areas to obtain necessary representation. Plaintiffs complain that the new plan places border towns with large Hispanic populations in the same districts as Central Texas areas with large Hispanic populations, with ethnicity as their only common characteristic.

According to the Supreme Court, manifestations of a community of interest include, "for example, shared broadcast and print media, public transport infrastructure, and institutions such as schools and churches."[220] The district challenged in *Shaw I* was clearly not driven by communities of interest; the Court described the district as one that "winds in snakelike fashion through tobacco country, financial centers, and manufacturing areas" in an attempt to gather up "enclaves of black neighborhoods" and "even towns are divided."[221] And in *Miller,* because the challenged district reached out to

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including incumbency protection, and limited by one-man-one-vote concerns and irregular geography).

[220] *Bush*, 517 U.S. at 964.

[221] *Shaw I*, 509 U.S. at 635-36 (internal citations omitted); *see Chen*, 206 F.3d at 512.

include African-American pockets in several entirely separate urban communities, linked by narrow corridors to a sparsely populated and wholly rural core, the "social, political and economic makeup of the Eleventh District [told] a tale of disparity, not community."[222]

The "bacon-strip" districts of Plan 1374C, Congressional Districts 15, 25, and 28, include disparate communities of interest. Plaintiffs presented evidence of differences in socio-economic status, education, employment, health, and other characteristics between Hispanics who live near Texas's southern border and those who reside in Central Texas. However, like the deviations from compactness, these deviations from the traditional districting principle of protecting communities of interest were necessary to meet the constitutional requirement of equal district populations in an area in which population is clustered at the southern tip and the center of the State. Plaintiffs' evidence has not demonstrated that the linking of disparate border and Central Texas Hispanic communities was caused by the factor of ethnicity, rather than the factors of geography and population distribution and the need to achieve equipopulosity.[223] Given the presumption in favor of legislative integrity,[224] we cannot say that the combination of communities of interest here provides circumstantial evidence of the predominance of ethnicity.

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[222] 515 U.S. at 908.

[223] *Cf. Chen*, 206 F.3d at 513 (noting that, at least when relatively large districts are involved, the mere existence of socioeconomic variations within a district is generally not probative of the predominance of race or ethnicity in districting decisions).

[224] *Miller*, 515 U.S. at 915.

The record does not present evidence of statements by legislators or staff supporting the claim that ethnicity predominated in the redistricting process. To the contrary, the emails, statements, and other communications from those involved in the process reveal that politics predominated.[225] Similarly, the data the Legislature used in the districting process does not support a claim of unwarranted reliance on ethnicity to make the line-drawing decisions. In *Bush*, the Court condemned the use of census blocks as the fundamental unit for a redistricting plan because the use of such units allows a state to focus too heavily on race in drawing district lines.[226] In the present case, by contrast, the State presented undisputed testimony that the map drawers examined race at the block level in the South and West Texas districts on only a few occasions in order to avoid splitting minority communities.[227]

The Supreme Court has made it clear that a legislature may give consideration to race and ethnicity in the districting process, as long as those factors do not predominate and districting decisions are explainable on grounds other than race.[228] The districting decisions involved in Plan 1374C are best explained by Texas's geography and population distribution and its Legislature's predominately political intent. The record in this

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[225] Davis Test., Tr. File 11 at 85-125; King Test., Tr. File 12 at 135-40; Jackson Pls.' Ex. 136.

[226] 517 U.S. at 961-62.

[227] Davis Test., Tr. File 11 at 92, File 12 at 27-28.

[228] *Hunt*, 526 U.S. at 546; *Bush*, 517 U.S. at 993 (O'Connor, J., concurring); *Miller*, 515 U.S. at 916.

case does not show that ethnicity predominated or that the South and West Texas district boundaries in Plan 1374C cannot be explained except by ethnic considerations. Plaintiffs have not met their significant burden of demonstrating racial gerrymandering.[229]

VII

Congressional District 18 is a historically significant African-American majority district in Houston, Harris County, Texas. Its first representative was Congresswoman Barbara Jordan. Jordan was elected at the creation of the district in 1972 as one of the two first African-Americans elected to Congress from the South since Reconstruction and the first African-American elected to Congress from Texas. Congressional District 18 is currently represented by Congresswoman Sheila Jackson Lee. Congressional District 30 is also a historically significant district, the first African-American majority district in Dallas, Dallas County, Texas. Congresswoman Eddie Bernice Johnson represents Congressional District 30. Both Congresswomen Jackson Lee and Johnson provided helpful testimony in this case, adding their voices to those emphasizing that racial polarization and appeals to racial prejudice persist in Texas politics and political campaigns.

Plaintiffs Jackson Lee and Johnson, supported by the NAACP and other plaintiffs, criticize Plan 1374C as diluting the African-American voting strength in Congressional Districts 18 and 30. As to Congressional District 18, Plaintiffs claim that in order to create Congressional

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[229] *See Bush*, 517 U.S. at 959.

District 9 as an additional African-American opportunity district in Houston, Plan 1374C moved high turnout African-American voters out of Congressional District 18 and placed them in Congressional District 9. In Congressional District 18, according to Plaintiffs, those voters were replaced with what the NAACP characterized as "transient and Hispanic voters who are noted for their low participation in elections."[220] Plaintiffs criticize Congressional District 30 in Plan 1374C on a similar ground. Plaintiffs assert that the plan removes from Congressional District 30 a predominately Anglo area from Irving, Texas and replaces it with an area of largely Hispanic voters from Congressional District 24 in Plan 1151C. Congresswoman Johnson criticized the effects on Congressional District 30 as removing an economically strong area from the district and combining areas of African-American and Hispanic voters, setting up a competition between them that could dilute African-American voting strength. Recognizing that both districts retain a strong African-American majority in Plan 1374C, Plaintiffs rely on projections of the relative growth of the Latino population in the years 2005 and 2010 to support the argument that dilution is threatened, if not present.

The evidence that Plaintiffs present does not support their claim of dilution, present or threatened. Congressional Districts 18 and 30 are effective African-American opportunity districts under Plan 1374C.[221] Plaintiffs' own population and voting data support this conclusion. In

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[220] Texas NAACP Pl.'s Post-Trial Brief at 27.

[221] Gaddie Report, Jackson Pls.' Ex. 141 at 13, 14; *see* Murray Report, Jackson Lee and Johnson Pls.' Ex. 27.

Plan 1374C, Congressional District 18 has an African-American voting age population of 40.3% and an African-American citizen voting age population of 48.3%. This is only slightly below the figures that were present in Plan 1151C, which had a Black voting age population of 42.1% and a Black citizen voting age population of 49.8%. Plaintiffs argue that Plan 1374C increases the number of Hispanics and reduces the number of high-turnout African-American voters. The Hispanic citizen voting age population in Congressional District 18 under Plan 1374C is 19.6%, only slightly higher than it was under Plan 1151C (17.9%). And the percentage of Spanish-surnamed voters in Congressional District 18 under Plan 1374C in 2002 is 16%, only slightly higher than the 14.2% under Plan 1151C.[232] Plaintiffs' comparisons of voting patterns in the areas removed from and added to Congressional District 18 under Plan 1374C support the conclusion that the exchange does not dilute the strength of African-American voters in the district. In the U.S. Senate primary for 2002, which pitted African-American candidate Ron Kirk against Latino candidate Victor Morales, African-American candidate Kirk won by 78% in the area removed from the district, and 76% in the area added to the district.[233] In the 2002 general election, the African-American Democratic candidate received 78.8% of the vote in the area removed from the district and 65.8% in the area added to the district.[234] These changes are too slight to support the claim that the strength or status of

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[232] Jackson Pls.' Ex. 141 at Table 3.

[233] Jackson Lee and Johnson Pls.' Ex. 27 at 8, Table 6.

[234] *Id.*

Congressional District 18 as an effective African-American opportunity district, that has and will reliably elect the African-American candidate of choice, is diluted.

The projections of the population changes between 2000 and 2010 by Dr. Richard Murray, expert witness for Plaintiffs Jackson Lee and Johnson, do not alter this conclusion.[225] Indeed, Dr. Murray's projections shed little light on the issue because while he projected the growth of African-American and Hispanic voting age population, he simply did not include any projections of Hispanic citizen voting age population. The failure to include this information makes his projections interesting but of little value to assessing any trend toward future dilution in the relevant period.

As to Congressional District 30, Congresswoman Johnson remained confident that the district would continue to send her to Congress and to elect other African-American candidates of choice. Again, the figures support her conclusion. In Congressional District 30, under Plan 1374C, the Black citizen voting age population is 50.6%, while the Hispanic citizen voting age population is 15.6%. This is only slightly more than the Black citizen voting age population (48.6%) and only slightly more than the Hispanic citizen voting age population (14.3%) in Plan 1151C. And in Congressional District 30 under Plan 1374C, the Spanish-surnamed voters in 2002 accounted for only 12.5% of registered voters. The comparison of vote patterns verifies the continuing strength of Congressional District 30 as an effective African-American opportunity

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[225] *See id.* at 4-9.

district in Plan 1374C. In the 2002 Democratic primary runoff for the Senate, the African-American candidate of choice, Ron Kirk, received 64.2% of the vote in the area removed from Congressional District 30 and Victor Morales, the Latino candidate of choice, received 35.8% of the vote.[236] In the area added to Congressional District 30, Ron Kirk received 61.9% of the vote and Victor Morales received 38.1% of the vote.[237] Again, the reduction in the votes received by the African-American candidate of choice is too slight to support any inference of dilution. And in the 2002 general election for the Senate, in the area removed from the district, Ron Kirk received 39% of the vote, while he received 61.9% of the total vote in the area added to the district.[238] Dr. Murray's population projections are no more useful in understanding the likely African-American voting strength of Congressional District 30 in 2005 and 2010 than they were for Congressional District 18.[239] Again, Dr. Murray neglects to include any analysis of the likely Hispanic citizen voting age population in the district in the future. He concludes that Congressional District 30 is an effective opportunity district for African-Americans now and offers no basis for believing that its status will change before the next decennial census.

The record, in short, offers no support for the dilution claim as to Congressional Districts 18 and 30. Rather, the arguments underscore that there is no cohesion between

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[236] Jackson Lee and Johnson Pls.' Ex. 27 at 12, Table 9.

[237] *Id.*

[238] *Id.*

[239] *See id.* at 9-13.

African-American and Latino voters in primary elections, particularly those that pit an African-American candidate against a Latino candidate. Although the congresswomen representing these districts ask this court to create districts that are almost exclusively African-American and to create a separate majority Latino citizen voting age population district in Dallas, there is no *Gingles* analysis to support this request and the record does not suggest that one could be provided. Plan 1374C does not violate § 2 of the Voting Rights Act.

VIII

For the foregoing reasons, we deny all relief requested by Plaintiffs. Judgment will be entered for Defendants.

Ward, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part.

I.

I join the court's opinion that the law does not preclude the State's Legislature from enacting a mid-decade redistricting plan following a court-ordered remedial plan such as the one enacted by the court in *Balderas v. State of Texas*. I understand the court's opinion to be limited to that question. I write separately to emphasize that it is one question to ask whether the law prohibits a state from enacting a mid-decade redistricting plan. It is quite another to ask whether a state may dictate electoral outcomes by using its Article I authority to thwart the Supreme Court's mandate that votes cast in a Congressional election be given as nearly equal weight as possible.

I do not read the Court's decisions in *U.S. Term Limits v. Thornton*, 514 U.S. 779 (1995) and *Cook v. Gralike*, 531 U.S. 510 (2001) quite as narrowly as my colleagues. Admittedly, those cases rejected state laws which sought to add to the Qualifications Clause either directly as in *Term Limits*, or indirectly, through pejorative ballot descriptions as in *Cook*. From that standpoint they are easier cases than this one to decide. Nonetheless, these decisions underscored that "the Framers understood the Elections Clause as a grant of authority to issue procedural regulations, and not as a source of power to dictate electoral outcomes, to favor or disfavor a class of candidates, or to evade important constitutional restraints." *Term Limits*, 514 U.S. at 833-34; *Cook*, 531 U.S. at 523.

Although the state's authority to issue procedural regulations is broad, at some point a state exceeds the power granted to it by the Elections Clause. Modern technology effectively allows a state to dictate electoral outcomes and to favor or disfavor a class of candidates by enabling extreme partisan gerrymandering. I join the court's decision that the Elections Clause does not prohibit mid-decade redistricting and note that there may be legitimate state interests advanced by the effort. Whether the present exercise is a "legitimate" state interest may ultimately be resolved by the Supreme Court in *Vieth v. Jubelirer*, and it seems to me that the Elections Clause would be equally offended by a state's abuse of its authority regardless of whether such abuse occurred in the beginning, the middle, or the end, of a decade following the release of the census data. It is not the timing of the endeavor that creates problems, it is the fact of it.

As noted by the court in *Balderas*, partisan gerrymandering reflects a "fundamental distrust of voters." As

in other contexts, extreme partisan gerrymandering leads to a system in which the representatives choose their constituents, rather than vice-versa. I join the court's judgment on the partisan gerrymandering issue given the high bar set in the equal protection context, but I do not join the court's discussion of the issue under Section III.B. That discussion implies that extreme partisan gerrymandering is okay as long as one party can reverse the tide when it takes over the statewide offices. Dr. Alford's report and testimony provides a detailed analysis of the effects of the extreme partisan gerrymander enacted in this case and the dangers of ignoring these issues. As Dr. Alford explains, these dangers include the encouragement of race-based redistricting. At present, we lack the legal precedent to sustain this challenge under either the Equal Protection Clause or the Elections Clause. The present case fails under the standards announced in *Davis v. Bandemer* and its progeny – even though those standards may or may not ultimately control the disposition of this case, given its timing and that of the arguments in *Vieth v. Jubelirer*.

I join much of the balance of the opinion. I agree that the plaintiffs have not prevailed on their equal protection claims and I agree that no violation of the Voting Rights Act has been shown with respect to Districts 18 and 30. On the remaining § 2 issues, I dissent from the court's opinion related to the issues surrounding District 23 and I concur in the court's judgment insofar as it rejects the claims surrounding District 24 and the claims surrounding Districts 1, 2, 4, 9, 10, 11 & 17. I will first examine the claims related to District 23 and then visit the issue of the influence districts.

II.

A.

The state action in this case unlawfully dilutes the strength of the Latino voters residing in former District 23. To that end, the majority errs when it holds that the State may permissibly "trade off" the rights of minority voters in former District 23 for those in new District 25, a district created to assist the state with its pre-clearance efforts. I would enjoin the operation of Plan 1374C, permit the Legislature to remedy the violations, and, given the amount of the state that would likely be affected by the changes, order that the elections be conducted under Plan 1151C.

B.

For a statute whose purpose "is to prevent discrimination in the exercise of the electoral franchise and to foster our transformation to a society that is no longer fixated on race," *Georgia v. Ashcroft*, 123 S.Ct. 2498, 2517 (2003), the Voting Rights Act receives a curious interpretation in this case. The State's heavy reliance on the flexibility given to it by *Ashcroft* might carry the day with me if Plan 1374C bore any resemblance to the redistricting plan at issue there. It does not.

To begin, the state senate plan at issue in *Ashcroft* was overwhelmingly supported by the minority legislators. Just the opposite is true in this case. Georgia's plan sought to *maximize* the statewide influence of black voters in the State of Georgia. The plan unpacked districts in which blacks constituted a super-majority and (1) maintained the number of majority-minority districts and, at the same time, (2) *increased* the number of "influence districts" in

which blacks would be expected to exert a significant – if not decisive – force in the electoral process. Georgia did so by placing black voters into districts that were likely to lean Democratic in the election returns. Because black voters in Georgia usually supported Democratic candidates, the creation of these influence districts made it likely that blacks could exert more influence in the election process and, correspondingly, increased the likelihood that the elected candidate would be responsive to the black communities' needs. The distinct but related concepts of substantive versus descriptive representation were at issue.

Georgia argued that, although the plan made the super-majority districts somewhat less "safe," its plan as a whole increased the political clout of blacks statewide and therefore did not result in a retrogression in African-American voters' effective exercise of the electoral franchise. *Ashcroft* held that "[i]n order to maximize the electoral success of a minority group, a State may choose to create a certain number of 'safe' districts, in which it is highly likely that minority voters will be able to elect the candidate of their choice. Alternatively, a State may choose to create a greater number of districts in which it is likely – although perhaps not quite as likely as under the benchmark plan – that minority voters will be able to elect candidates of their choice." *Ashcroft*, 123 S.Ct. at 2511. The Court explained that the extent to which a plan created coalition and influence districts were important considerations in the preclearance inquiry. Ultimately, the Court held that the three-judge court, by circumscribing its focus on the unpacked districts, had engaged in too narrow a review of whether the redistricting plan would lead to retrogression at the statewide level. The majority

reads *Ashcroft* to give the state flexibility to comply with its obligations under the Voting Rights Act. This is true, to a point. *Ashcroft* was a § 5 case and its language certainly permits the states a certain amount of latitude in determining how to maximize minority voter influence. But I do not read *Ashcroft* – a decision designed to foster minority participation in the political process – to permit the state to dismantle an existing opportunity district for political purposes so long as the loss is made up somewhere else. Nor do I read *Ashcroft* to make it harder to prove claims under § 2. There was no § 2 question decided in *Ashcroft*. Indeed, one of the grounds Georgia asserted in support of pre-clearance was the plan's compliance with § 2 of the Voting Rights Act. It is hard for me to believe that the Supreme Court intended to make it harder to prove a § 2 claim by endorsing a statewide approach that the Court believed could have the effect of maximizing minority influence.

Ashcroft recognizes the value of safe districts, coalition districts, and influence districts as means to increase minority voting opportunities and political influence. Make no mistake about it: Despite the State's protestations to the contrary, the changes to District 23 under Plan 1374C were not intended to increase minority voter participation either by strengthening the district or "unpacking" the minority voters into adjoining districts to maximize the overall political strength of Hispanics. These changes were designed to crush these minority voters' participation in the political process.

C.

Under Plan 1000C, in effect after the 1990 census, as well as under its successor, Plan 1151C, District 23 was a protected Latino opportunity district. The district had a Latino citizen voting age population in excess of 50% and was designed to offer Latino voters the opportunity to elect candidates of choice. Under Plan 1000C, the district boasted a Spanish Surname Voter Registration of 53.3%. And under Plan 1151C, that figure was increased to 55.3%. The *Balderas* court implicitly recognized that District 23 under Plan 1151C was a protected minority opportunity district when it maintained only six Latino majority citizen voting age districts. A review of the statistical package for Plan 1000C reveals that District 23 was one of those six districts. All six (and only those six) had a Spanish Surname Voter Registration in excess of 50%.

As it was configured under Plan 1151C, District 23 offered Latino voters the *opportunity* to elect their candidate of choice. In the present case, Dr. Gaddie, the State's expert, testified that District 23 under Plan 1151C performed for Latino voters in 2002 by electing the Latino candidate of choice in 13 out of 15 statewide elections. He also testified that a district which elects the Latino-preferred candidate of choice in such numbers offers Latinos the opportunity to elect their candidate of choice. Dr. Engstrom, the GI Forum plaintiffs' expert, reached a similar conclusion: He analyzed racially contested statewide elections from 1994 to 2002 and concluded that District 23 under Plan 1151C elected the preferred Latino candidate in 5 out of 8 races and offers Latino voters the opportunity to elect candidates of choice. Dr. Lichtman,

called by the Jackson plaintiffs, arrived at the same conclusion.

When it enacted Plan 1374C, the State altered the racial composition of District 23 not to *increase* the likelihood that the Latino community therein would elect a candidate of its choice, but to ensure it would have no practical influence on the congressional election. All of the experts agree that Plan 1374C alters District 23 to the point where it has no hope of functioning as an effective Latino opportunity district. There is no dispute that the State altered District 23 to help re-elect Congressman Henry Bonilla because it predicted that if Latinos continued to constitute a majority of the citizen voting age population in District 23, Congressman Bonilla would ultimately lose. The evidence is that he is not the Latino candidate of choice. The 2002 congressional election foreshadowed the need for this change: Congressman Bonilla received only 8% of the Hispanic vote. Spanish surname voter registration has correspondingly risen during the same time period and, until the Legislature passed Plan 1374C, had grown to approximately 55% for the district.

The State's solution to this political problem was brutal, yet simple: destroy the opportunity district. The state did so by cracking a cohesive Hispanic community out of Webb County and taking in Anglos from the Texas Hill Country to build a district in which the Hispanic community will not be able to influence the outcome of the election. The majority's characterization of new District 23 as a Latino "influence district" is therefore in error. An influence district is a district in which the minority population carries enough political weight potentially to be the swing vote in the election and command the attention of

the representative. A competitive district is the touchstone. Not so with new District 23. The Hispanic citizenship figures have been reduced by so great a margin that the Hispanics in District 23, although having the ability to control the Democratic primary, will lose the general election every time. The undisputed regression analyses confirm this. Contrary to the majority's characterization, the district's very design ensures a lack of competitiveness and a corresponding lack of responsiveness.

There are, however, a total of 359,000 Latinos who continue to reside in new District 23. They object to the State's dismantling of their opportunity district under § 2. The question presented is whether a state can, consistent with § 2, intentionally dilute a minority group's voting rights in an existing opportunity district to obtain a partisan advantage while, at the same time, offset the effects by creating a new district in another part of the state. The majority's answer is that *Ashcroft* and *Johnson v. De Grandy*, 512 U.S. 997 (1994), permit this sort of line-drawing. I disagree.

D.

Contrary to the majority, I do not read *Ashcroft* or *De Grandy* to encourage the sort of voting rights swap meet put into play by Plan 1374C. The majority effectively reads *Ashcroft's § 5* holding and *De Grandy* to countenance violations of *§ 2* in one part of the state, so long as those violations are "offset" by the creation of new minority opportunity districts elsewhere in the state. The State conceded that this was its position in response to questions from the bench during closing arguments. By its terms, of course, *Ashcroft* says nothing about a state plan

which unlawfully dilutes the minority strength in one part of the state and seeks to "offset" that dilution by the creation of a new minority opportunity district in a different part of the state – one of Georgia's contentions was the plan's compliance with § 2 required pre-clearance under § 5.

That *Ashcroft* did not endorse the approach suggested by the State is not surprising. The Court had already answered this question once in *De Grandy* and again in its *Shaw* cases. In *De Grandy*, the state proposed a *per se* rule that proportionality was a safe harbor, insulating any reapportionment plan which provided proportional representation from a Section 2 challenge. In rejecting that proposal, the Court stated that the state's argument rested on an "unexplored premise of highly suspect validity: that in a given case, the rights of some minority voters under § 2 may be traded off against the rights of other members of the same minority class." 512 U.S. at 1019.

Later, in *Shaw v. Hunt*, 517 U.S. 899, 917 (1996) (*Shaw II*), the Court made its views even more explicit:

> If a § 2 violation is proved for a particular area, it flows from the fact that individuals in this area "have less opportunity than other members of the electorate to participate in the political process and to elect representatives of their choice." 42 U.S.C. § 1973(b). The vote-dilution injuries suffered by these persons are not remedied by creating a safe majority-black district somewhere else in the State. For example, if a geographically compact, cohesive minority population lives in south-central to southeastern North Carolina, as the Justice Department's objection letter suggested, District 12 that spans the Piedmont Crescent would not address that § 2 violation.

> The black voters of the south-central to south-eastern region would still be suffering precisely the same injury that they suffered before District 12 was drawn. District 12 would not address the professed interest of relieving the vote dilution, much less be narrowly tailored to accomplish the goal.
>
> Arguing, as appellees do and the District Court did, that the State may draw the district anywhere derives from a misconception of the vote-dilution claim. To accept that the district may be placed anywhere implies that the claim, and hence the coordinate right to an undiluted vote (to cast a ballot equal among voters), belongs to the minority as a group and not to its individual members. It does not.

Although I recognize that "States retain broad discretion in drawing districts to comply with the mandate of § 2," *Shaw II*, 517 U.S. at 917 n.9 (citing *Voinovich v. Quilter*, 507 U.S. 146, 156-57 (1993); and *Growe v. Emison*, 507 U.S. 25, 32-37 (1993)), I do not read the Court's cases to mean that the "effects" test of § 2, if satisfied, may be defended against by pointing to a political agenda in the affected portion of the jurisdiction and compensation, over the long haul, to other members of the injured group residing elsewhere in the jurisdiction. *De Grandy* rejected the state's proposed safe harbor rule precisely because it encouraged what happened in this case. The court said: " . . . we reject the safe harbor rule because of a tendency the State would itself certainly condemn, *a tendency to promote and perpetuate efforts to devise majority minority districts even in circumstances where they may not be necessary to achieve equal political and electoral opportunity.*" *De Grandy*, 512 U.S. at 1019-20 (emphasis added).

New District 25 falls squarely within the scope of this statement.

In this case, the State's redistricting effort mirrors precisely what *De Grandy* cautioned against. The fundamental flaw in the majority's approach is that it fails to appreciate that the Latino districts created in Plan 1374C are not in "the same area" as the *Gingles* districts have been located historically. In the past, the Latino groups have enjoyed participation in the six *Gingles* districts located in Plan 1000C and in Plan 1151C. Although there are still six Latino opportunity districts in Plan 1374C, those new districts take in quite different geography and population. The State took in, geographically, 10 additional counties and portions of 4 others which span an area of at least 8,500 square miles. The State also took in more than 651,000 additional persons. To accomplish its goals, the state was forced to create new District 25 which reaches from the border in excess of three hundred miles north to include Hispanic population in Travis County.

In its effort to validate Plan 1374C, the majority first tells us that District 25 was created "[t]o avoid retrogression under Section 5." Quite correctly, the majority recognizes that the changes to District 23 resulted in the dilution of the Latino vote therein. But then, when confronted with the language of *Shaw* and *De Grandy* which prohibits exactly this sort of trade-off, the majority explains that the state enjoys the flexibility under *De Grandy* to draw *Gingles* districts in a different way, so long as it creates a total of six (but only six) districts in which Latinos may elect a candidate of choice. But *Gingles* addresses liability under § 2. No one suggests the State

needed to create new District 25 to guard against a potential vote dilution challenge by a resourceful if not aspiring coalition of Latinos living in Travis County and those living in the *colonias* over 300 miles away near the Texas-Mexico border. At yet another place in its opinion, the majority implicitly repudiates this very species of § 2 liability when it holds to be non-compact the GI Forum's demonstration districts – even though all have better compactness scores than new District 15 in Plan 1374C.

The majority blurs the distinction between the State's flexibility to comply with its *procedural* obligations under § 5 and its flexibility to comply with its *remedial* obligations under § 2. The majority misses this distinction because it fails to appreciate the fact that the Latino opportunity districts in Plan 1374C take in different populations and geography than before.[1]

The majority's initial reaction to new District 25 was of course correct: the State created new District 25 to "offset" the loss of old District 23 for § 5 preclearance purposes. But the underlying forces driving the need for new District 25 are inconsistent with *Ashcroft*'s rationale. At issue in *Ashcroft* was Georgia's decision to unpack black opportunity districts to *increase* the statewide political might of the minority voters. Central to *Ashcroft's* willingness to provide states with flexibility was the Court's recognition that the plan was intended (or at least contended to be intended) to *increase* minority voting strength

[1] To be sure, under any configuration, the geography spanned by the districts in South and West Texas is vast. But some of the districts include large areas to capture population; new District 25 is noncompact because of its need, under § 5, to capture *Hispanic* population.

statewide. Unlike the efforts in *Ashcroft*, the dilution of Latino voting strength in District 23 was not designed to *maximize* Latino voting strength statewide, and, as noted, the majority's characterization of District 23 as continuing on as some sort of an Hispanic *influence* district is error. Under the majority's theory of influence districts, we are left to conclude that Congressman Bonilla will be *more* responsive to the Latino community now that they constitute over 10% *less* of his constituency.

This turns *Ashcroft* on its head. District 23 is designed so that the Hispanic population therein *will not* influence the outcome of the elections and *will not* tend to make the elected representative more responsive to the community's needs. The only thing the Hispanic community in District 23 will influence is the total population of the district to meet "one person, one vote" requirements. The state action was designed to increase Henry Bonilla's chance of electoral success at the expense of District 23's dissatisfied Hispanic voters. To suggest that those minority voters cannot prevail on a dilution claim under § 2 elevates the State's political agenda over the individual rights of Latino voters in former District 23. For these reasons, I would reject the State's efforts to trade the rights of Latinos in old District 23 for those in new District 25.

E.

As stated, it is my opinion that the State violated § 2 when it dismantled old District 23 and replaced it with new District 25. If the majority is correct that the State could draw new District 25 to comply with its *Gingles* obligations, then the majority is confronted at once with the GI Forum plaintiffs' dilution claim. These plaintiffs

claim that Plan 1374C dilutes the statewide strength of Hispanic voters because it fails to create a seventh Latino majority district. The majority, however, rejects the GI Forum plaintiffs' claims for several reasons. First, the majority opines that the proposed districts will not be effective. Second, the majority holds that the districts are not compact. Third, the majority determines that *De Grandy* proportionality tends to show that Plan 1374C will not have the effect of unlawfully diluting the Latino vote. Finally, the majority suggests that *Balderas* rejected the identical claim. None of these reasons is persuasive.

1.

In this case, if the State is permitted or required to draw *Gingles* remedial districts into the new areas of the state and in the manner in which it did, the GI Forum plaintiffs assert that the *Gingles* preconditions suggest that seven majority Latino districts should be created. I agree. The evidence is undisputed that, under Plan 1385C, sponsored by the GI Forum plaintiffs, Latino voters constitute the majority of citizen voting age population in seven congressional districts in South and Central Texas. *See Valdespino v. Alamo Heights Independent School Dist.*, 168 F.3d 848 (5th Cir. 1999) (interpreting *Gingles* to require consideration of citizen voting age population or "CVAP"); *Campos v. City of Houston*, 113 F.3d 544, 548 (5th Cir. 1997) (same). These districts are District 15 (63.3% CVAP), District 16 (68.0% CVAP), District 20 (58.0% CVAP), District 23 (57.2% CVAP), District 25 (58.4% CVAP), District 27 (59.9% CVAP), and District 28 (50.3% CVAP).

The majority resists the GI Forum plaintiffs' demonstration plan because it believes the plan does not provide seven "effective" Latino districts. I disagree. The majority places great emphasis on the fact that the Hispanic CVAP of District 28 in Plan 1385C is only 50.3%. Be that as it may, under the evidence submitted by the GI Forum plaintiffs, the district elected the Latino candidate in 8 out of 8 elections since 1994, and the vote for the Latino candidate in the most recent elections, 2002, exceeded 55% of the total vote in each of the four elections. *See, e.g.* GI Forum plaintiffs' Exh. 131; (Tr. 12/16/03 a.m. at 29-30). On balance, District 28 is almost identical in performance to District 28 in the State's plan 1374C despite the fact that, in District 1374C, District 28 has an Hispanic CVAP of 56.2%. By contrast, the weakest district in the GI Forum plaintiffs' demonstration map is District 23, which elected the Latino candidate of choice in 5 out of 8 elections at margins nearly identical to those which led the *Balderas* court to conclude that District 23 was a protected minority opportunity district. Each of the remaining Latino districts in Plan 1385C elects the Latino candidates to office in 8 out of 8 elections. Viewed in the light of these election returns as opposed to simply looking at the CVAP content or any other single statistic, all of these districts perform, in terms of winning elections, at least as well as their counterparts in Plan 1374C.

The majority also relies on the testimony of experts called by other parties, including Dr. Jerry Polinard, an expert witness called by the Valdez-Cox plaintiffs. The majority reads Dr. Polinard's testimony to suggest that in all cases a higher Hispanic CVAP number is necessary to find an effective Hispanic opportunity district. The majority is wrong. In the first place, as set forth above, Dr.

Engstrom's analysis of the election results tell a different story. Moreover, Dr. Polinard was in fact testifying about the effects of the districts as drawn in Plan 1374C, not Plan 1385C. What Dr. Polinard said with respect to numbers is:

> I have no magic number. That's going to vary – vary by District. I will state the obvious, that if the Spanish surname voter registration percentage goes up, the opportunity goes up.
>
> I think you become comfortable with opportunity districts once you break into those 60 percent ranges.

(Tr. 12/16/03 p.m. at 50-51).

The majority also cites the testimony of the State's expert with respect to new District 15 to reject as effective District 28 in the demonstration plan. In terms of actual election results, however, new District 15 appears to perform *worse* than the GI Forum plaintiffs' proposed District 28, despite the fact that new District 15 has a higher Hispanic CVAP than proposed District 28.

The truth of the matter is that the effectiveness of a minority opportunity district will vary by the district. A expert might find, for example, a need for a greater Hispanic CVAP in a district ranging from Travis County to the border and covering three or four media markets than would be needed in a district that is somewhat more compact. Under the evidence, all of the districts in Plan 1385C have the numbers to make them effective Latino opportunity districts.

This might be a closer call if the demographic evidence were otherwise. A showing that Latino population

growth and voter registration was on the decline might counsel a court to conclude that gains over the short run might be offset by anticipated losses in the end. That is not our record. The evidence establishes that the Latino voter registration as well as overall population growth is *rising*. Over the course of the decade, the only conclusion to be drawn from this evidence is that Latino voting strength in these districts will become stronger, not weaker. The GI Forum plaintiffs have established that their proposed districts would be effective.

2.

The majority also rejects the GI Forum plaintiffs' contention that their districts are "compact." But under the objective compactness scores, several of the GI Forum plaintiffs' demonstration districts are, on balance, more compact than those in Plan 1374C. Although a few are worse, none of the districts scores worse than District 15 in Plan 1374C. Under the demonstration plan, 5 of the proposed districts have better "perimeter to area" scores than their counterparts in Plan 1374C. None of the districts in Plan 1385C have a perimeter to area score as high as District 15 in Plan 1374C. Under the smallest circle measure, three of the demonstration districts score better, one scores the same, and none is, again, as high as District 15 in Plan 1374C.

The majority disregards these scores, saying the comparison "understates the unusual shapes of the proposed demonstration districts." But it is the majority who overstates the significance of the "unusual" shapes of the districts. Focusing in on the "look" of the map as opposed to the objective scores and population centers, the majority

says that District 25 virtually "bisects" District 23 in the demonstration plan. Viewed in the context of a redistricting plan, however, the two districts make perfect sense. District 23 strives to include the border communities of interest along the Rio Grande and, at the same time, retains over 99% of the City of Laredo – a major border population center – in District 23. The portions of District 25 which allegedly "bisect" District 23 are actually the boundaries of Dimmitt County, the total population of which is 10,248. The population of Laredo, 99% retained in District 23, is 176,576. The GI Forum plaintiffs' demonstration plan is, on balance, more compact than the pertinent portions of Plan 1374C.

3.

The majority's principal answer to the GI Forum plaintiffs is that Plan 1374C provides Latinos the opportunity to elect congressional candidates in substantial proportion to their share of the relevant population as a whole under *Johnson v. De Grandy*. I disagree.

a.

In *De Grandy*, the Court noted:

> If the three *Gingles* factors may not be isolated as sufficient, standing alone, to prove dilution in every multimember districting challenge, *a fortiori* they must not be when the challenge goes to a series of single-member districts, where dilution may be more difficult to grasp. Plaintiffs challenging single-member districts may claim, not total submergence, but partial submergence; not the chance for some electoral success in place of none, but the chance for more success in place of

> some. When the question thus comes down to the reasonableness of drawing a series of district lines in one combination of places rather than another, judgments about inequality may become closer calls.

512 U.S. at 1012-13.

Under *De Grandy*, proportionality is one factor to be considered in assessing the totality of circumstances to determine whether unlawful vote dilution has occurred under § 2. *Id.* at 1022. "Proportionality" in this sense involves a comparison between (1) the percentage share of legislative districts in which the population of the protected class has a majority and (2) the protected class's percentage of the relevant population. Proportionality is one factor to be considered, and it does not create a safe harbor precluding § 2 liability when present, nor does it impose *per se* § 2 liability when absent.

b.

Proportionality does not compel the rejection of the GI Forum plaintiffs' claims in this case. Because of the procedural posture in *De Grandy*, the Court reserved the question whether proportionality should be measured on a statewide basis or by focusing on a smaller area of the jurisdiction at issue. *De Grandy*, 512 U.S. at 1022 ("[w]e have no occasion to decide which frame of reference should have been used if the parties had not apparently agreed in the District Court on the appropriate geographical scope for analyzing the alleged § 2 violation and devising its remedy."). Other courts have struggled with the question,

but many have assessed proportionality by focusing on the nature of the specific Voting Rights Act claims at issue.[3]

Under the facts of the present case, *De Grandy* proportionality should be measured by comparing the number of effective Latino congressional districts to the Latino percentage of the relevant statewide population. It is true that the GI Forum plaintiffs propose their Latino districts in the South and West Texas areas; however, it is equally the case that the GI Forum plaintiffs attack the operation of Plan 1374C because of its impact and its overall effect on the Latino voters in the state as a whole. They did not limit their challenge to the effect of Plan 1374C to the areas in South and Central Texas. An integral part of the claim is Plan 1374C's failure to maintain districts *in other*

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[3] *Old Person v. Brown* did not reach the question because proportionality was lacking under either a statewide or a more narrow geographic scope. 312 F.3d 1036, 1044-46 (9th Cir. 2002) ("Our holding that proportionality analysis could not here be limited to the districts of the plaintiffs' residence does not require us to choose between the state or the four counties as frame of reference. In either case, there is a lack of proportionality"). And, the court in *Rural West Tennessee African-American Affairs Council v. Sundquist*, adopted plaintiffs' proposed geographic scope when vote dilution claim focused on particular area of state. 209 F.3d 835, 844 (6th Cir. 2000). *African American Voting Rights Legal Defense Fund v. Villa* measured proportionality of a citywide apportionment plan using the entire city, noting "[w]e also believe that the district court's focus upon the entire city of St. Louis rather than upon the five central corridor wards was consistent with *Johnson*. . . . We agree that *Johnson* stands for the proposition that the proper geographic scope for the comparison is the scope that is pleaded in the complaint and subjected to proof." 54 F.3d 1345 (8th Cir. 1995). Finally, in *Campuzano v. Illinois State Board of Elections*, the court stated "[f]or a plan to provide minority voters equal participation in the political process, it must generally provide a number of 'effective' majority-minority districts that are substantially proportionate to the minority's share of the state's population." 200 F.Supp.2d 905, 909 (N.D. Ill. 2002).

parts of the state in which minority communities might play an influential if not outcome determinative role in the general elections to increase the likelihood that the elected candidate will respond favorably to the minority communities' needs.

The State apparently agreed with this approach until the evidence was in and it became apparent there was a problem under § 2 with 1374C. The State's pretrial submissions addressed proportionality on a statewide basis. In particular, the State's trial brief addressed *De Grandy* proportionality and represented, misleadingly, that proportionality was met under Plan 1374C, because Hispanics "would have a *majority of the population* in 25% of the districts." Revised State Defendants' Trial Brief, filed December 3, 2003, at 39 (emphasis added).[3] It was not until after the close of the evidence that the State, or anyone else, contended that proportionality should not be assessed statewide.

There is no risk that assessing proportionality on a statewide basis will lead to an over-representation of Latinos in Congress. For instance, there is no evidence tending to prove that Latinos elsewhere in the state (*e.g.*, the panhandle, Dallas/Fort Worth, or East Texas) constitute a reasonably compact effective voting majority such that they could in the future assert a Section 2 violation in those parts of the state and require the creation of yet additional *Gingles* districts. Such evidence might require

[3] This statement is misleading precisely because *De Grandy* proportionality examines the ratio of CVAP majority districts to the share of the relevant population.

the court to assess proportionality on a smaller scale. *Rural West*, 209 F.3d at 844 ("The State complains that by allowing the plaintiffs to define the frame of reference for their § 2 claim, we will enable future litigants to carve up successively smaller areas of the State until they are able to maximize the number of majority-minority legislative districts – a result not countenanced by the Voting Rights Act [but] as the district court pointed out, however, the *Gingles* preconditions operate to prevent just the sort of limitlessly small 'reverse gerrymander' whose specter the State raises here."). In this case, however, the claim is that Plan 1374C dilutes the statewide voting strength of Latinos. That is the proper geographic scope by which to measure *De Grandy* proportionality.

c.

So measured, Latinos constitute 32% of the total population and 29% of the voting age population in the State of Texas. *De Grandy* proportionality thus suggests that Latinos should comprise an effective voting majority, depending on whether one uses voting age or total population figures, in possibly nine or ten such districts. Under either measure, Plan 1374C fails to provide proportional representation to Latinos. Latinos enjoy the ability to elect representatives of their choice in only six districts: Districts 15, 16, 20, 25, 27 and 28. As a result, Plan 1374C fails to provide proportional representation.

The majority concludes that proportionality should be assessed on the basis of the minority group's percentage of the *citizen* voting age population. The majority overlooks that this question arises in the context of the apportionment of seats to the United States Congress. The seats are

apportioned according to total population. From 1990-2000, the Latino growth in Texas accounted for more than 60% of the state's total population. The state thus enjoys the benefit of the total Latino population through an increase in its Anglo congressional delegation, but at the same time seeks to restrict the Latino's opportunity to elect to the fewest number of districts. Latinos are thus counted one way for apportionment purposes, but another when it comes to equal opportunity to participate in the political process. Stated another way, the state seeks the maximum use of the Latino population to gain power but seeks to minimize the sharing of power with the Latinos by using a more restrictive measure.

d.

Even assuming the correctness of the majority's approach, however, 6 districts out of 7 remains at the low end of rough proportionality. For reasons that are apparent from this record, the majority errs when it rejects the § 2 claims by relying on rough proportionality. I would ascribe far less weight to the proportionality issue given the circumstances under which the present case comes to us. We must remember that the State is having to defend this claim because it made the conscious choice to dismantle a minority opportunity district to thwart the growing Latino dissatisfaction with an incumbent Congressman. Just when it became apparent that District 23 was becoming more effective for the class it was intended to protect, the State intentionally altered it. The State thus placed itself in this position and the related position of having to create a new Latino opportunity district to meet a retrogression concern. Although the majority concludes this action is permitted by *De Grandy*, that case rejected a safe

harbor rule precisely because such a rule would encourage states to do what Texas did: create an "offsetting" district where none was necessary and substitute one group's voting rights for another.

The weight ascribed to proportionality by the majority allows the State to mask its efforts to thwart the policies underlying the Voting Rights Act. To illustrate, suppose that new District 15 in Plan 1374C fails to perform and does not elect a candidate of choice for Latinos. Suppose further that over the course of the next few years, the Latino community mobilizes and puts pressure on the incumbent. To use *De Grandy* to permit the State at that stage to dismantle District 15 and create a new district somewhere else has a tendency to perpetuate the legacy of discrimination, not to thwart it. Our record, and the State's action directed toward old District 23, is no different.

4.

Finally, the majority suggests that the *Balderas* court rejected this identical claim. The *Balderas* court did not. It is ironic that the State finds comfort in a remedial order that the Legislature rejected as controlling. Although I agree that the State has the authority to enact a redistricting plan, that new plan must stand or fall on its own merit, and not on any language of the *Balderas* remedial order – an order which must be read in context of Plan 1151C as a whole and which did not purport to address the merits of Plan 1374C. *Balderas* drew a remedial plan without the benefit of either the controlling citizen voting age population data or the most recent election returns. Those data are now available. Under those figures, seven

districts may be drawn in which Latino voters will have the opportunity to elect their candidates of choice to Congress.

Balderas was primarily motivated by the desire to meet the Supreme Court's holding that a federal court should draw a remedial plan bearing in mind the requirements of the Voting Rights Act. The remedial order was thus forced to straddle the requirements of § 2 and § 5. At that time, prior to *Ashcroft*, a compelling argument could be made that a reduction in the overall Latino voting strength in any of the particular districts would have worked a retrogression prohibited by § 5. One of the forces driving the *Balderas* court's rejection of a seventh Latino district in the Central and South Texas regions was that very concern. But the Attorney General has concluded, at least as to Plan 1374C, that an increase to the relevant geographic and population locations to accommodate six Latino districts, coupled with a corresponding reduction in the strength of District 15, will not lead to a retrogression of the minority group's effective exercise of the electoral franchise. It is incumbent upon us, therefore, to assess whether, by embracing that increased geographic area and drawing new districts, the State has drawn its districts in a way that will dilute the strength of the Latino vote therein.

The state is trying to have its cake and eat it too. The *Balderas* court found no vote dilution based on the totality of the circumstances then before it. The *Balderas* court expressly noted that its remedial plan increased the Latino voting strength in District 24 and created a minority opportunity district in District 25 and, in doing so, hardly left "a bleak terrain" for minority voting opportunities. Similarly, under Plan 1151C, Latino voters enjoyed

substantial influence over the outcome of the elections in, at a minimum, Districts 10, 11 and 17 which influence, in turn, increased the likelihood that the elected candidates from those districts would be responsive to the needs of the minority communities. The presence in 1151C of districts in which the candidates are responsive to the needs of the minority community is a relevant consideration under the *Zimmer* factors. Under the totality of the circumstances, the failure to create additional opportunities did not lead to a dilution in statewide Latino voting strength. Section 2 is concerned with effects, and the State is unable to point to the presence of these minority influence districts to counterbalance its failure to create a seventh Latino majority-minority district. The State cannot rely on the *Balderas* order to overcome this particular Section 2 challenge any more than the plaintiffs can rely on it to defeat the Legislature's ability to redistrict mid-decade. *Balderas* therefore stands as no opposition to the GI Forum plaintiffs' Section 2 claim.

III.

My opinion that the State violated § 2 when it dismantled old District 23 and replaced it with new District 25 renders it unnecessary to assess whether the "bacon strip" districts violate the principles set forth in *Shaw v. Reno* and its progeny.[4] Restructuring of the South and Central Texas districts is necessary to remedy that § 2 violation. It is doubtful that the court could, consistent

[4] I agree that District 29 in Houston is not subject to such a challenge.

with *Upham v. Seamon*, simply remedy the areas adjoining District 23, without treading on the state's policy as reflected overall in Plan 1374C. It is possible that any new configuration would cure any *Shaw* issues. For present purposes, it is enough for me to embrace the wisdom of Dr. Alford's opinion that any *Shaw* issues present in South and Central Texas under Plan 1374C resulted from the state's own action in altering District 23 for political purposes. The ripple effect of changes to this area of the map, however, would likely be felt across a large portion of the state. *E.g., Abrams v. Johnson*, 521 U.S. 74, 86 (1997). Given the primary schedule, and the evidence in the record about the difficulties of conducting the elections even under the plan as enacted by the State, I would grant the Legislature the opportunity to cure these defects and order the elections to be held under Plan 1151C, a plan that is beyond dispute a legal one.

IV.

This is not an easy case. My colleagues' concerns with interfering with legislative and political prerogatives are not without force, and I agree that politics motivated many of the decisions involved in the case. As difficult as the case is, however, I am unable to agree with the majority that § 2 was not violated when the state enacted Plan 1374C. I therefore dissent from that portion of the court's opinion.

V.

As I stated at the outset, I reluctantly concur with the court's judgment insofar as it addresses the claims related to the dismantling of District 24. It is not so much my

agreement with the majority's assessment of the facts that causes me to do so, but rather it is instead the lack of clear guidance from the Supreme Court or the circuits regarding the extent to which *Ashcroft's* recognition of the value of coalitional and influence districts carries over into the § 2 context. At the present time, controlling law compels the conclusion reached by the majority.

The question whether § 2 creates influence dilution liability is a close one-made so by language in *Ashcroft* recognizing the importance and the value of such districts. My philosophical trouble with the controlling law's sacrosanct view of the 50% rule flows from the fact that the Voting Rights Act endeavors to put minority voters on an equal footing in all aspects of the political process. *See generally* Stanley Pierre-Louis, *The Politics of Influence: Recognizing Influence Dilution Claims Under Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act,* 62 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1215, 1224 (1995) ("Indeed, Section 2 refers to open participation for minority voters in the 'political processes leading to nomination or election' as well as the opportunity 'to elect representatives of choice.'") Just as minority voters are not immune from the obligation to "pull, haul, and trade to find common political ground," neither should a redistricting plan have the effect of operating unequally on a minority group's ability to engage in these very activities.

Participation in the political process is hard work. It is harder for minority groups who have suffered the legacy of a history of official discrimination. We heard compelling testimony from Deralyn Davis, the Chairman Emeritus of the Texas Coalition of Black Democrats, about just how hard it is for minority voters in the state of Texas. She described the grassroots efforts of her and others to build coalitions, mobilize, and increase the African American

influence in the state's political machine. The efforts did not focus on one location in the state, but extended statewide. The testimony of others was consistent.

Under Plan 1000C, in use until the 2000 census, the black citizen voting age population of District 24 was 20.1%. Under Plan 1151C, the court drawn plan, District 24 has a black voting age population of 21.4%. The electorate in the Democratic primary over the last four election cycles has been roughly 64% African American. Both Dr. Lichtman and the State's expert, Dr. Gaddie, agreed that current District 24 performs for African Americans because those voters control the primary election. The key to the performance of District 24 is the makeup of the balance of the district. It is a political reality that blacks and Latinos in Texas vote largely Democratic in the general elections. They do so because, at least in Texas, the Democratic candidates are generally more responsive to the concerns of these minority communities. Under Texas's election scheme, in a Democratic leaning district, the key to a minority group's ability to elect a candidate of its choice on an ongoing basis is found in the group's practical ability to "pull, haul, and trade to find common political ground" in the Democratic primary. The ability to nominate in such districts is tantamount to the ability to elect.

The Supreme Court recently reminded us that "the power to influence the political process is not limited to winning elections." *Ashcroft*, 123 S.Ct. at 2512. *Ashcroft* noted that "various studies have suggested that the most effective way to maximize minority voting strength may be to create more influence or coalition districts." *Id.* at 2512-13 (citing David Lublin, *Racial Redistricting and African-American Representation: A*

Critique of "Do Majority-Minority Districts Maximize Substantive Black Representation in Congress?," 93 Am. Pol. Sci. Rev. 183, 185 (1999); Charles Cameron, David Epstein & Sharyn O'Halloran, *Do Majority-Minority Districts Maximize Substantive Black Representation in Congress?*, 90 Am. Pol. Sci. Rev. 794, 808 (1996); C. Swain, *Black Faces, Black Interests* 193-234 (1995); and Bernard Grofman, Lisa Handley, & David Lublin, *Drawing Effective Minority Districts: A Conceptual Framework and Some Empirical Evidence*, 79 N.C.L. Rev. 1383 (2001)). If the most effective way to *maximize* minority voting strength is to create more influence or coalition districts, then the most effective way to *minimize* minority voting strength may be to dismantle those districts in which a minority group has proven successful in its efforts to "pull, haul, and trade to find common political ground."[8]

Ashcroft leaves the state with flexibility to choose the method of creating fewer black majority-minority districts in favor of a greater number of influence or coalition districts. Alternatively, a state enjoys the flexibility to strengthen its existing majority-minority districts to ensure those districts will continue to elect candidates of choice of the minority community. In the Dallas/Fort Worth area, Texas chose neither route. Texas identified District 24, in which the minority community played a

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[8] Recent decisions interpreting *Ashcroft* have held that influence dilution claims are cognizable. The first, *Metts v. Murphy*, *supra*, is cited by the majority. The second is *McNeil v. Legislative Apportionment Commission*, 828 A.2d 840, 853 (N.J. 2003) (holding a provision of New Jersey's state constitution preempted under Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act and noting "we believe that *Georgia v. Ashcroft* supports our conclusion that [influence dilution] claims are permitted").

decisive role in the nomination and election processes and, because that group was not a literal majority and elected an Anglo Democrat, rearranged a cohesive community of those voters not into new District 12 (where they might have an impact on the general election), but into new District 26. This arrangement has the practical effect of eliminating the minority voters' political influence. But it has a much larger effect: by treating the minority group in this manner, the state action, I fear, will have the effect of destroying the minority group's hope. It is not accidental that, unlike the plan in *Ashcroft*, the present plan had overwhelming opposition from the minority legislators. The law's insistence on a 50% majority shields this move, but at the same time it ignores the political and social reality that there is more to participation in the electoral process than winning elections.

It is no answer that the disparate destruction of such coalitions might be tough to identify and even harder to remedy. Our charge is not to decide just the easy cases: it is to apply and, when necessary, enforce the protections of the Voting Rights Act. The question, difficult as it may be to answer, should be whether the treatment of such minority coalitions disproportionately affects those voters' ability to participate in the political process. The remedy need not require the protection inviolate of an old district, but it might require the creation of a more competitive one.

The treatment of the minority coalitions in old District 24 was inconsistent with the purposes of the Voting Rights Act. The evidence demonstrates that District 24 under Plan 1151C and Plan 1000C functioned as a district that fostered our progression to a society that is no longer fixated on race. Under this record, the black voters in old

District 24 repeatedly nominated and helped to elect an Anglo congressman with an impeccable record of responsiveness to the minority community. To this end, I view the fact that Congressman Frost has not had a primary opponent to reflect favorably on his record. I would credit the testimony of Mayor Ron Kirk and Senator Royce West. Their testimony concerning how District 24 functions for the African American community is persuasive. Although the State, for § 5 purposes, created a new black opportunity district in the Houston area, this is of little consolation to the minority voters in old District 24, particularly the African American community in Tarrant County. The political influence of that minority community has been diluted, understanding, as did the court in *Ashcroft*, that power at the polls and participation in the political process is not always measured by mathematical majorities. Given the current state of the law, however, I join the court's judgment denying relief on the plaintiffs' claim that the State violated § 2 by the dismantling of District 24. For the same reasons, I necessarily join the court's judgment denying relief with respect to the plaintiffs' claims that the changes to Districts 1, 2, 4, 9, 10, 11 and 17 resulted in cognizable influence dilution claims.

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
MARSHALL DIVISION

WALTER SESSION, ET AL.	§	CIVIL ACTION NO.
Vs.	§	2:03-CV-354
RICK PERRY, ET AL.	§	Consolidated

JUDGMENT

(Filed Jan. 15, 2004)

For the reasons expressed in the court's opinion dated January 6, 2004, it is ORDERED ADJUDGED AND DECREED that the plaintiffs take nothing by way of this suit. The court renders judgment in favor of the defendants on all claims asserted against them in these consolidated redistricting cases.

So **ORDERED** and **SIGNED** this 15th day of January, 2004.

/s/ Patrick E. Higginbotham
PATRICK E. HIGGINBOTHAM
UNITED STATES CIRCUIT JUDGE

/s/ Lee H. Rosenthal
LEE H. ROSENTHAL
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

/s/ T. John Ward
T. JOHN WARD
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

42 U.S.C. § 1973. Denial or abridgement of right to vote on account of race or color through voting qualifications or prerequisites; establishment of violation

(a) No voting qualification or prerequisite to voting or standard, practice, or procedure shall be imposed or applied by any State or political subdivision in a manner which results in a denial or abridgement of the right of any citizen of the United States to vote on account of race or color, or in contravention of the guarantees set forth in section 1973b(f)(2) of this title, as provided in subsection (b) of this section.

(b) A violation of subsection (a) of this section is established if, based on the totality of circumstances, it is shown that the political processes leading to nomination or election in the State or political subdivision are not equally open to participation by members of a class of citizens protected by subsection (a) of this section in that its members have less opportunity than other members of the electorate to participate in the political process and to elect representatives of their choice. The extent to which members of a protected class have been elected to office in the State or political subdivision is one circumstance which may be considered: *Provided,* That nothing in this section establishes a right to have members of a protected class elected in numbers equal to their proportion in the population.

WALTER SESSIONS, ET AL V. RICK PERRY, ET AL

WITNESS: KEITH GADDIE NOVEMBER 22, 2003

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CONDENSED TRANSCRIPT AND CONCORDANCE
PREPARED BY:

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* * *

[10] **that was held in Austin where I did get reaction where Speaker Craddick and Representative King were present. That was my only contact directly with legislators in reacting to maps. I offered testimony in front of the Senate Committee regarding the process and what I was doing.**

Q. But you didn't, in that testimony, cover one particular map?

A. No.

Q. Can you tell me roughly how many times did you communicate with Andy Taylor on the subject of your reactions to particular maps?

A. Oh, my goodness. At least dozens of times. Typically what would – There were so many maps communicated that there were periods when we were at almost daily communication, several dozen contacts, at least.

Q. And what issues in particular were you asked to look at in giving reactions to these maps?

A. Our particular concern was the ability to have proposed minority districts to perform on behalf of minority voters.

Q. Were there occasions when you were shown a map that you – in which you said to Mr. Taylor that the proposed minority districts would not perform?

[11] **A. Yes.**

Q. Can you give me an example of one such occasion?

A. Well, there are so many to choose from. The – The – An example would be the District 23, which has been advanced in Map 1374. This is a district where Hispanic voters will control the Democratic party primary. But the Hispanic – The candidate of choice of Hispanic voters will not win the general election in my analysis.

Q. And you say that "the District 23 in 1347," did you comment on a similar district in a prior proposed map?

A. There were – As I said, there were numerous maps, possibly as many – I can't remember the number. But there were several maps. But there were often maps that featured the introduction of the new district into the Rio Grande Valley. And those maps would often feature a District 23 that could not perform. So Map 1374 was not the first instance that I had seen a District 23 that didn't perform. But it is an example of that district.

Q. Did you also comment on various versions of District 24?

A. Yes.

* * *

[129] **District 23 performed. I haven't verified the number in my report.**

New District 25 goes barber pole across the board, all 15 races, 6 of 6 in the multi-ethnic general elections in the previous decade. So the prospects are greater in the general election.

Q. Let's not talk about 25 for now. Let's just talk about Congressional District 23. Is it your expert opinion that a district has to yield the election of the Hispanic candidate of choice 100 percent of the time in order to offer the opportunity to elect?

A. No.

Q. Would you say a district that yields the election of 13 out of 15 Hispanic candidates of choice offers the opportunity to elect?

A. Yes.

Q. So you would agree with me that in Plan 1151, Congressional District 23 offers the opportunity to elect the Latino candidate of choice?

A. Based upon the most recent election, yes.

Q. And if, based upon the most recent election, Congressional District 23 offers the opportunity to elect a Latino candidate of choice,

* * *

[134] and out of District 15 to create 25; is that right?

A. If you're not going to take Webb County whole, you have to pull from somewhere, yes.

Q. In this case, from District 15?

A. From any direction on the map one could pull, yes.

Q. But if you need to pull Latinos because you want to make 25 a very Latino, you have to get out of The Valley county, don't you?

A. Ripple down through The Valley, yes.

Q. Is Webb County so populace that it must be split by a congressional boundary?

A. No.

Q. Would it then be accurate to say that the Latino population of current Congressional District 23 is fractured in order to ensure the re-election of Congressman Bonilla?

MR. TAYLOR: Objection; form.

THE WITNESS: District 23 was redesigned to ensure the re-election of Congress [sic] Bonilla, yes.

Q. (By Ms. Perales) Okay. Let's try my question now. Would it then be accurate to say that the Latino population of current Congressional District 23 is fractured in order to reassure the [135] re-election of Congressman Bonilla?

MR. TAYLOR: Objection; form.

THE WITNESS: You're asking me to presume intent. I can't say that. But do the two happen together, is one a consequent of the other, yes.

Q. (By Ms. Perales) And I certainly don't want you to venture out into the intent, because I know you're not the map maker. So I don't use "fracture" in any kind of legal

sense. I only mean it in the common understanding that we have to divide.

A. Yeah. Webb County is split as one of the steps that's taken in the creation of the new district, yes.

Q. Okay. Do Latinos control the Republican primary in Congressional District 23 in Plan 1374?

A. No.

Q. If Webb County were removed entirely from Congressional 23, is it your opinion that Congressman Bonilla would achieve nomination in that district?

A. I don't know. It depends on what you would put in to replace it. The – I can't speak to the primary electorate behavior, the potential challengers that Bonilla would place.

* * *

[138] I just don't know. There are Hispanic populations in Midland and Odessa, for example. But you could go east. You could go north.

Q. (By Ms. Perales) Dr. Gaddie, in your opinion, does there seem to be a conscious desire to maintain Congressional District 23 as Hispanic VAP majority in 1374C?

MR. TAYLOR: Objection; form.

THE WITNESS: Every version of District 23 I've seen has maintained it as a majority VAP district.

Q. (By Ms. Perales) And based on what you've seen, do you believe that there's a conscious desire to maintain Congressional District 23 with a Hispanic VAP majority?

MR. TAYLOR: Objection; form.

THE WITNESS: Well, again, as I've said, every version of District 23 I've seen has had that feature. I've not seen anything, other than District 23, with a VAP Hispanic majority.

Q. (By Ms. Perales) Okay. In Plan 1374C, do you conclude that Congressional District 15 offers Latino voters the opportunity to elect their candidate of choice?

* * *

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
MARSHALL DIVISION

WALTER SESSION, ET AL * Civil Docket No.
* 2:03-CV-354
VS. * Austin, Texas
* December 18, 2003
RICK PERRY, ET AL * 8:30 A.M.

TRANSCRIPT OF BENCH TRIAL
BEFORE THE HONORABLE
PATRICK E. HIGGINBOTHAM
U.S. CIRCUIT JUDGE
AND
THE HONORABLE T. JOHN WARD
AND
THE HONORABLE LEE H. ROSENTHAL
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGES

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(Proceedings recorded by mechanical stenography, transcript produced on CAT system.)

* * *

[Testimony of Bob Davis]

[43] some participation in components of it. I don't know how things worked at the Congressional delegation and maps that they were producing and what-not. That was never explained to me and never became apparent.

Q. Didn't Mr. Oldham show you the exact configuration of 25 that we see here today?

A. I don't think so. I don't think that he ever showed me that exact configuration of District 25 that you see there today.

Q. Okay. During your work in mapping, you understood it to be a fact that Mr. Bonilla's not the preferred candidate of Latino voters in Congressional 23. That's right?

A. I understood that Mr. Bonilla did not get a majority of the Hispanic vote. I don't know over how many election cycles that's true. I think particularly it was explained, or at least I understood it may be for sure in 2002. I don't know before.

Q. Can we agree that if a candidate doesn't receive the majority of Latino votes in the election that he can't be the preferred candidate of Latinos, right?

A. I think that's definitional. If I'm wrong in that then correct me. But I think that's the way you define the candidate of choice if you receive the majority of the vote.

* * *

[85] cross/examinations that the split, the actual line of demarkation between Districts 28 and 23 was the highway. And then another witness made the point, though, that it's not entirely the highway. There's a portion there, that blue portion, that goes into Webb that doesn't follow the highway line. Do you see that?

A. Yes, sir, I see that.

Q. Can you explain why that is the way that it is?

A. Well, I don't know that I was actually involved in drawing this particular portion of the map. But I think that this area in here ended up being where you balance the population in District 28. The northern end of District 28 was fairly well configured in the Bexar County and in Comal and Guadalupe and Hays County, I believe, and so I think the balancing for population purposes in District 28 actually occurred in Webb County.

Q. Let's explain that answer a little bit more just in general.

Explain to us, when you have to have equal population size for all of the 32 Districts, how a demographer like yourself goes about zeroing out the population. How do you do that?

A. Well, first, of course, you identify what population you're zeroing to. I think in this instance it was 651,219 or 519, anyway, for 20 of the Districts,

* * *

[115] that why not just leave 23 the way it is and lets move Henry up into the Hill Country. Why didn't you do that?

A. Well, I mean, that would have given away a seat that a Republican currently holds rather than enhancing the seat. Which was one of the principal objectives in this redistricting process, was to enhance District 23 and Congressman Bonilla's stature. And, of course, you know, I have some personal feelings with respect to that, is that I believe that Congressman Bonilla's participation in the election in these principally Hispanic counties in South Texas has a beneficial impact long term. I think if you look at the election returns they certainly would indicate that he runs better than other Republicans do in that area.

Q. What about District 24, tell us how that came to be.

A. All right. District – Representative Marchant, who had worked very diligently for the Republicans on the House side of redistricting as they worked on their own Texas House of Representatives Plan, had expressed an interest in running for Congress. He lives in Coppell. He was a former mayor of Carrollton, which is in both Dallas and Denton counties. And the House had a commitment, if they could, to create a District from which he might seek election to Congress. He had thought at one time – last

* * *

[165] A. Always seems hard for me, yes, sir.

Q. Now, would you agree with this statement, that if a person knows the consequences of their act and they still engage in the act that that is some evidence of their intent?

A. As a general statement, yes.

MR. OVERSTREET: Okay. No further questions.

EXAMINATION

BY MS. PERALES:

Q. Good afternoon, Representative. Nina Perales. We've met before, haven't we?

A. Yes, we have.

Q. Representative King, you intended Congressional – Representative King, you intended Congressional District 23 in Plan 1374C to be a performing Hispanic opportunity District, did you not?

A. Well, we tried the [sic] keep it above 50 percent Hispanic VAP, and we tried to make it a District that [sic] some more Republicans in it so that Henry Bonilla could have an easier time with re-election because we didn't want to lose him.

Q. One second please. I'm looking at your deposition.

Would it be fair to characterize your

* * *

PLAN OVERLAP ANALYSIS
CONGRESSIONAL DISTRICTS
PLAN 01374C Compared with PLAN 01151C

PLAN 01374C DISTRICT	PLAN 01151C		2000 CENSUS TOTAL POPULATION TOTAL	%A	%B	%H	%B+H	%O	2002 GENERAL ELECTION * VOTER REG TOTAL	%SPAN	TURNOUT TOTAL	TO/VR	STATEWIDES** %DEM	%REP
1			651,619	70.6	18.8	9.3	27.9	1.5	352,083	2.9	165,895	47.1%	37.0	63.0
	1	40.1%	261,048	72.6	19.1	7.2	26.1	1.3	142,008	1.9	64,450	45.4%	41.2	58.8
	2	16.0%	104,486	72.0	15.2	11.7	26.7	1.3	56,145	4.9	26,637	47.4%	45.6	54.4
	4	43.9%	286,085	68.3	19.7	10.4	30.0	1.7	153,930	3.0	74,808	48.6%	30.3	69.7
2			651,620	64.2	19.3	12.6	31.9	3.8	354,062	6.7	149,669	42.3%	39.4	60.6
	2	7.8%	50,535	67.4	17.5	13.8	31.1	1.5	25,385	4.7	9,068	35.7%	45.6	54.4
	8	38.0%	247,598	76.0	7.0	12.4	19.2	4.8	144,744	7.6	63,599	43.9%	22.7	77.3
	9	47.7%	310,583	55.0	30.1	11.5	41.4	3.6	162,624	5.7	69,161	42.5%	53.6	46.4
	18	0.0%	2	50.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	50.0	1	0.0	0	0.0%	0.0	0.0
	25	5.5%	35,742	38.6	18.2	21.4	39.4	2.0	17,130	10.1	5,971	34.9%	49.6	50.4
	29	1.1%	7,160	63.0	14.3	16.7	30.9	6.1	4,178	11.1	1,870	44.8%	32.1	67.9
3			651,619	63.3	9.9	16.9	26.6	10.1	314,404	6.3	146,493	46.6%	30.0	70.0
	3	80.8%	526,219	67.6	7.5	14.8	22.2	10.2	264,386	6.1	123,929	46.9%	28.4	71.6
	5	4.6%	30,221	39.0	20.5	34.9	55.0	6.1	10,041	14.7	4,215	42.0%	48.4	51.6
	26	4.1%	26,943	87.9	3.0	5.8	8.7	3.4	19,742	3.5	10,048	50.9%	18.0	82.0
	32	10.5%	68,236	31.4	25.9	29.4	54.9	13.8	20,235	7.5	8,301	41.0%	57.4	42.6
4			651,619	79.2	10.8	7.9	18.6	2.2	353,139	2.7	162,694	46.1%	37.0	63.0
	1	54.3%	353,819	75.0	15.8	7.7	23.3	1.7	182,629	2.1	82,746	45.3%	43.8	56.2
	3	10.6%	69,355	85.3	3.1	8.6	11.6	3.1	41,806	4.5	19,174	45.9%	22.3	77.7
	4	33.9%	220,832	84.1	5.5	7.9	13.2	2.6	123,544	2.9	58,270	47.2%	32.9	67.1
	26	1.2%	7,613	79.9	1.9	16.5	18.3	1.8	5,160	6.6	2,504	48.5%	20.5	79.5
5			651,619	71.5	12.9	12.9	25.6	2.9	326,234	5.3	154,784	47.4%	35.8	64.2
	1	5.6%	36,752	86.7	6.3	5.7	12.0	1.3	19,059	1.5	11,335	59.5%	31.9	68.1
	2	7.2%	46,659	69.3	16.3	13.2	29.4	1.2	25,044	3.6	10,331	41.3%	38.0	62.0
	3	4.5%	29,586	60.7	10.7	24.9	35.5	3.8	13,532	7.0	6,011	44.4%	29.0	71.0
	4	16.6%	108,340	80.3	8.2	9.8	17.9	1.8	58,096	3.4	28,981	49.9%	35.7	64.3
	5	62.5%	407,184	70.0	13.4	13.4	26.6	3.4	200,053	6.4	92,348	46.2%	36.6	63.4
	30	0.1%	574	27.9	55.6	13.4	69.0	3.1	213	7.5	72	33.8%	73.8	26.2
	32	3.5%	22,524	51.0	32.6	13.3	45.5	3.5	10,237	3.9	5,706	55.7%	34.2	65.8
6			651,619	65.8	13.5	15.9	29.2	5.0	326,450	7.1	159,892	49.0%	35.9	64.1
	2	4.4%	28,454	67.5	24.8	7.0	31.6	0.8	16,355	1.8	7,382	45.1%	44.0	56.0
	5	6.9%	45,176	72.7	17.3	9.1	26.3	1.0	26,549	2.9	13,105	49.4%	39.8	60.2
	6	66.4%	432,567	70.3	11.7	13.6	25.1	4.6	232,739	7.4	115,541	49.6%	33.8	66.2
	12	0.1%	748	94.5	0.4	3.3	3.7	1.7	530	1.5	361	68.1%	46.9	53.1
	24	21.6%	140,556	49.5	15.8	27.0	42.4	8.1	48,756	9.8	22,915	47.0%	40.9	59.1
	26	0.6%	4,118	58.3	16.6	14.2	30.1	11.7	1,521	10.8	588	38.7%	50.2	49.8
7			651,620	67.5	6.1	18.0	23.8	8.7	358,524	8.4	181,764	50.7%	29.8	70.2
	7	51.8%	337,762	63.8	6.7	20.9	27.3	8.9	173,218	8.7	87,901	50.7%	25.0	75.0
	8	10.7%	69,587	64.7	7.5	17.7	25.0	10.3	36,999	10.6	16,133	43.6%	25.3	74.7
	18	7.6%	49,487	66.3	4.9	23.2	27.8	5.9	28,164	10.0	14,931	53.0%	51.8	48.2
	25	18.8%	122,401	77.8	3.8	10.4	14.1	8.2	78,112	5.6	44,722	57.3%	36.3	63.7
	31	11.1%	72,383	70.7	6.7	14.1	20.6	8.7	42,031	9.1	18,077	43.0%	23.7	76.3
8			651,620	80.1	9.0	9.0	17.9	2.0	363,296	4.0	152,519	42.0%	33.4	66.6
	2	61.1%	397,933	79.6	12.1	6.6	18.6	1.7	217,227	2.7	86,136	39.7%	43.6	56.4
	8	38.9%	253,687	80.7	4.1	12.8	16.8	2.5	146,069	6.0	66,383	45.4%	20.6	79.4

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PLAN OVERLAP ANALYSIS
CONGRESSIONAL DISTRICTS
PLAN 01374C Compared with PLAN 01151C

PLAN 01374C DISTRICT	PLAN 01151C		2000 CENSUS TOTAL POPULATION TOTAL	%A	%B	%H	%B+H	%O	2002 GENERAL ELECTION * VOTER REG TOTAL	%SPAN	TURNOUT TOTAL	TO/VR	STATEWIDES** %DEM	%REP
9			651,619	17.4	38.3	32.8	70.4	12.1	252,487	13.7	99,288	39.3%	69.8	30.2
	7	34.0%	221,252	24.0	22.7	33.0	55.0	21.0	75,218	16.4	27,127	36.1%	52.6	47.4
	18	12.0%	78,345	6.2	74.6	15.9	90.0	3.9	50,353	6.4	19,715	39.2%	92.7	7.3
	22	7.5%	49,060	25.1	37.6	22.6	59.8	15.1	24,417	14.8	10,282	42.1%	66.4	33.6
	25	46.5%	302,962	14.3	40.5	38.7	78.4	7.3	102,499	14.9	42,164	41.1%	70.7	29.3
10			651,620	66.5	9.7	18.7	28.2	5.3	348,883	9.1	173,337	49.7%	36.5	63.5
	7	11.4%	74,291	67.4	7.0	18.3	24.9	7.7	39,909	11.7	16,441	41.2%	25.7	74.3
	8	12.3%	79,957	80.6	4.3	10.9	15.1	4.3	48,898	6.2	22,076	45.1%	17.8	82.2
	10	40.3%	262,602	58.7	10.3	23.9	33.8	7.5	125,500	11.9	68,052	54.2%	51.3	48.7
	14	0.3%	1,841	81.6	2.9	14.1	16.9	1.5	1,107	9.6	550	49.7%	46.3	53.7
	21	2.8%	18,399	84.8	2.0	6.5	8.4	6.8	11,432	4.1	7,221	63.2%	35.7	64.3
	31	32.9%	214,530	68.7	12.7	16.6	29.1	2.2	122,037	7.1	58,997	48.3%	29.5	70.5
11			651,620	64.6	4.4	29.6	33.8	1.6	345,936	19.3	166,094	48.0%	30.2	69.8
	11	4.5%	29,099	79.4	2.9	16.1	18.8	1.8	15,394	8.4	8,192	53.2%	32.9	67.1
	17	39.1%	254,932	66.2	4.6	28.0	32.3	1.5	133,350	19.2	61,820	46.4%	33.6	66.4
	19	42.5%	277,027	56.3	5.6	36.7	42.0	1.7	139,213	25.2	64,258	46.2%	28.5	71.5
	21	12.7%	82,571	83.7	0.9	14.2	15.0	1.4	53,681	6.7	29,695	55.3%	26.5	73.5
	23	1.2%	7,991	53.4	2.3	43.5	45.6	1.1	4,298	28.7	2,069	48.1%	27.8	72.2
12			651,619	66.5	6.1	23.7	29.6	3.9	311,607	11.3	151,368	48.6%	37.0	63.0
	6	6.2%	40,630	59.2	20.8	15.0	35.5	5.3	21,391	9.9	11,715	54.8%	45.0	55.0
	12	79.8%	520,175	68.5	5.3	22.5	27.6	3.9	252,105	10.8	122,065	48.4%	35.5	64.5
	17	7.4%	48,536	86.1	1.4	10.8	12.1	1.8	25,567	4.5	11,870	46.4%	32.7	67.3
	24	6.4%	42,021	27.2	6.5	62.1	68.3	4.5	12,432	38.1	5,671	45.6%	62.5	37.5
	26	0.0%	257	86.4	1.2	11.3	12.5	1.2	112	9.8	47	42.0%	27.5	72.5
13			651,620	73.7	6.2	17.6	23.6	2.7	340,264	9.4	156,981	46.1%	31.1	68.9
	4	1.5%	9,787	93.9	0.3	4.5	4.8	1.3	5,873	2.0	3,182	54.2%	20.7	79.3
	13	88.3%	575,623	73.0	6.4	18.1	24.2	2.8	299,337	9.7	137,054	45.8%	30.0	70.0
	17	10.2%	66,210	77.1	5.9	15.6	21.3	1.6	35,054	8.2	16,745	47.8%	42.1	57.9
14			651,619	62.1	10.3	24.9	35.0	2.8	358,222	14.0	154,965	43.3%	39.0	61.0
	9	34.1%	222,508	64.9	13.2	18.6	31.5	3.5	131,020	11.6	56,103	42.8%	43.4	56.6
	14	43.7%	285,016	56.6	9.4	32.2	41.3	2.1	149,952	16.8	65,100	43.4%	41.1	58.9
	22	22.1%	144,095	68.8	7.8	20.4	28.0	3.2	77,250	12.6	33,762	43.7%	27.6	72.4
15			651,619	27.2	3.1	69.0	71.8	1.0	299,798	56.7	117,431	39.2%	55.7	44.3
	14	18.4%	119,786	68.7	10.0	20.4	30.1	1.2	68,336	12.1	34,511	50.5%	38.0	62.0
	15	60.0%	390,733	15.2	1.7	82.5	83.9	0.9	167,633	72.2	57,888	34.5%	65.8	34.2
	27	13.4%	87,317	23.9	0.9	74.3	74.9	1.2	36,046	64.1	13,784	38.2%	50.7	49.3
	28	7.2%	46,982	19.8	0.7	78.9	79.3	0.8	24,274	70.6	9,281	38.2%	69.9	30.1
	31	1.0%	6,801	73.7	5.6	18.8	24.1	2.1	3,509	10.2	1,967	56.1%	39.8	60.2
16			651,619	17.4	3.6	77.7	80.7	1.9	300,774	67.5	101,701	33.8%	64.4	35.6
	16	100.0%	651,619	17.4	3.6	77.7	80.7	1.9	300,774	67.5	101,701	33.8%	64.4	35.6
17			651,620	71.4	10.8	15.4	26.0	2.7	320,971	7.6	154,702	48.2%	36.0	64.0
	2	3.6%	23,552	62.7	20.2	16.1	36.1	1.1	11,515	7.3	5,406	46.9%	41.1	58.9
	5	5.5%	35,986	62.9	21.9	14.3	35.9	1.1	19,757	5.9	9,589	48.5%	50.9	49.1
	6	24.4%	159,132	82.0	3.8	12.4	16.0	2.0	79,473	5.8	35,896	45.2%	32.3	67.7
	11	35.2%	229,096	66.0	14.7	17.6	32.0	2.0	114,474	9.0	57,783	50.5%	40.0	60.0
	17	7.4%	47,909	89.7	0.5	8.1	8.5	1.8	30,519	3.8	15,777	51.7%	27.7	72.3
	31	23.9%	155,945	66.0	11.3	17.8	28.9	5.1	65,233	9.8	30,251	46.4%	31.5	68.5

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PLAN OVERLAP ANALYSIS
CONGRESSIONAL DISTRICTS
PLAN 01374C Compared with PLAN 01151C

PLAN 01374C DISTRICT	PLAN 01151C		2000 CENSUS — TOTAL POPULATION — TOTAL	%A	%B	%H	%B+H	%O	2002 GENERAL ELECTION * — VOTER REG — TOTAL	%SPAN	TURNOUT — TOTAL	TO/VR	STATEWIDES** %DEM	%REP
18			651,619	19.7	41.0	35.6	76.1	4.2	302,740	16.0	112,721	37.2%	74.0	26.0
	7	2.8%	18,315	23.1	6.8	64.0	70.3	6.5	4,271	27.0	1,597	37.4%	38.6	61.4
	8	0.1%	675	38.4	37.5	13.5	51.0	10.7	192	6.9	40	20.8%	68.3	31.7
	18	78.8%	513,222	19.3	42.3	35.5	77.3	3.4	254,043	15.7	96,550	38.0%	75.0	25.0
	29	18.3%	119,407	21.1	40.5	32.1	72.0	6.9	44,234	16.5	14,534	32.9%	71.3	28.7
19			651,619	63.6	5.9	29.0	34.6	1.9	328,876	19.9	154,804	47.1%	31.0	69.0
	13	11.7%	75,996	47.2	4.0	48.0	51.8	1.0	37,288	30.1	17,170	46.0%	35.5	64.5
	17	30.9%	201,031	77.0	5.4	15.8	20.9	2.2	105,852	9.9	52,301	49.4%	30.9	69.1
	19	57.5%	374,592	59.7	6.5	32.2	38.4	1.9	185,736	23.5	85,333	45.9%	30.2	69.8
20			651,619	23.4	7.5	67.1	74.1	2.6	307,805	39.9	101,674	33.0%	62.3	37.7
	20	85.2%	555,100	23.1	6.0	69.0	74.5	2.5	258,221	62.4	84,668	32.8%	62.8	37.2
	21	0.2%	1,373	63.2	1.7	33.9	35.3	1.5	945	32.0	552	58.4%	43.2	56.8
	23	1.6%	10,320	48.8	7.5	39.9	47.1	4.1	6,039	36.2	2,557	42.3%	41.5	58.5
	28	13.0%	84,826	21.9	17.4	38.6	75.2	2.9	42,600	49.1	13,897	32.6%	64.1	35.9
21			651,619	73.1	4.3	18.1	22.2	4.7	402,229	12.9	214,220	53.3%	36.2	63.8
	10	20.8%	135,429	68.3	4.2	20.4	24.4	7.3	74,274	14.1	41,035	55.2%	58.1	41.9
	14	0.8%	5,168	73.7	1.7	22.7	24.2	2.0	3,675	15.4	1,991	54.2%	34.7	65.3
	20	3.2%	20,891	45.2	17.7	33.3	50.0	4.8	7,532	28.0	2,721	36.1%	39.5	60.5
	21	65.8%	428,951	77.5	2.9	15.8	18.5	4.0	281,532	11.5	153,533	54.5%	30.8	69.2
	23	0.4%	2,522	75.9	4.8	15.6	20.2	3.9	2,246	14.2	1,194	53.2%	25.5	74.5
	28	9.0%	58,658	62.1	10.5	23.9	34.0	3.9	32,970	18.5	13,746	41.7%	32.9	67.1
22			651,619	60.6	9.8	20.3	29.9	9.5	357,122	12.9	156,708	43.9%	34.1	65.9
	9	17.5%	114,120	65.5	15.2	13.7	28.7	5.8	64,619	8.9	25,966	40.2%	41.5	58.5
	22	70.4%	458,464	61.1	8.6	19.2	27.6	11.3	258,905	12.7	118,046	45.6%	31.6	68.4
	25	12.1%	79,035	50.7	8.9	36.1	44.6	4.7	33,598	22.2	12,696	37.8%	42.0	58.0
23			651,620	41.0	2.0	55.1	56.9	2.2	362,153	44.0	167,648	46.3%	43.2	56.8
	20	3.0%	19,350	52.0	4.9	39.7	44.2	3.8	9,783	27.9	4,734	48.4%	37.3	62.7
	21	15.5%	101,260	76.2	1.9	20.1	21.8	2.0	61,783	10.9	31,754	51.4%	20.8	79.2
	23	81.5%	531,010	33.8	1.9	62.4	64.0	2.2	290,587	51.5	131,160	45.1%	49.0	51.0
24			651,620	63.9	10.3	17.9	28.0	8.1	305,770	8.8	147,959	48.4%	32.4	67.6
	6	1.6%	10,420	53.5	22.4	13.6	35.9	10.7	5,554	10.8	2,890	52.0%	49.8	50.2
	12	1.5%	9,772	74.4	8.5	11.7	20.1	5.6	4,616	5.7	2,284	49.5%	31.3	68.7
	24	26.5%	172,623	49.1	19.3	26.9	45.8	5.2	80,578	14.5	36,221	45.0%	46.0	54.0
	26	43.1%	280,732	76.1	5.8	10.1	15.7	8.2	140,630	5.4	70,991	50.5%	25.9	74.1
	30	7.3%	47,749	52.3	15.2	21.3	36.1	11.5	17,046	9.6	7,143	41.9%	38.9	61.1
	32	20.0%	130,324	61.6	5.3	22.6	27.7	10.7	57,346	8.8	28,430	49.6%	27.8	72.2
25			651,619	21.9	8.0	68.6	76.2	1.9	277,414	55.6	103,842	37.4%	69.8	30.2
	10	38.9%	253,588	30.4	17.5	49.3	66.0	3.6	99,605	31.2	42,441	42.6%	76.1	23.9
	14	10.2%	66,268	48.0	9.4	41.8	50.8	1.3	34,668	31.4	15,381	44.4%	45.3	54.7
	15	26.6%	173,569	14.5	0.6	84.0	84.4	1.0	81,851	72.0	26,538	32.4%	64.5	35.5
	28	24.3%	158,194	5.6	0.3	93.9	94.1	0.4	61,290	87.1	19,482	31.8%	82.3	17.7
26			651,619	66.1	16.1	14.3	30.2	3.7	339,722	5.8	161,139	47.4%	37.6	62.4
	4	4.1%	26,576	81.4	4.4	12.0	16.3	2.3	13,909	4.0	6,569	47.2%	28.9	71.1
	6	1.4%	8,871	41.1	35.3	21.6	56.5	2.4	3,839	12.7	1,652	43.0%	61.3	38.7
	12	18.6%	120,924	83.7	3.1	9.3	12.3	4.0	67,191	5.0	33,336	49.6%	26.8	73.2
	24	25.1%	163,238	26.4	48.5	22.6	70.6	3.0	71,988	8.0	33,866	47.0%	76.0	24.0
	26	50.9%	331,956	78.7	5.3	12.0	17.2	4.1	182,759	5.3	85,697	46.9%	26.5	73.5
	30	0.0%	0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0	0.0	0	0.0%	0.0	0.0
	32	0.0%	54	90.7	1.9	7.4	9.3	0.0	36	8.0	19	52.8%	17.4	82.6

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PLAN OVERLAP ANALYSIS
CONGRESSIONAL DISTRICTS
PLAN 01374C Compared with PLAN 01151C

PLAN 01374C DISTRICT	PLAN 01151C		2000 CENSUS TOTAL POPULATION TOTAL	%A	%B	%H	%B+H	%O	2002 GENERAL ELECTION * VOTER REG TOTAL	VOTER REG %SPAN	TURNOUT TOTAL	TURNOUT TO/VR	STATEWIDES** %DEM	STATEWIDES** %REP
27			651,619	27.6	2.9	68.1	70.7	1.7	309,050	58.0	121,177	39.2%	55.6	44.4
	15	13.4%	87,317	46.6	3.4	48.0	51.1	2.3	48,285	40.1	18,356	38.0%	45.6	54.4
	27	86.6%	564,302	24.7	2.8	71.2	73.7	1.6	260,765	61.3	102,821	39.4%	57.5	42.5
28			651,620	27.9	6.6	64.5	70.7	1.3	324,351	54.3	118,117	36.4%	58.9	41.1
	14	26.6%	173,541	56.7	5.0	36.5	41.2	2.1	96,157	27.8	40,561	42.2%	37.5	62.5
	20	8.6%	56,278	12.5	4.1	82.9	86.5	0.9	24,132	75.6	6,277	26.0%	71.8	28.2
	21	2.9%	19,065	42.2	2.1	54.4	56.2	1.6	10,341	44.7	3,580	34.6%	45.5	54.5
	23	15.3%	99,776	3.5	0.4	96.1	96.1	0.3	39,504	90.9	17,388	44.0%	86.5	13.5
	28	46.5%	302,960	21.4	10.4	67.4	77.3	1.3	154,217	58.7	50,311	32.6%	66.5	33.5
29			651,619	21.9	10.4	66.1	76.0	2.1	221,543	45.9	71,639	32.3%	64.2	35.8
	8	0.0%	115	42.6	47.0	10.4	57.4	0.0	51	4.6	10	19.6%	54.3	45.7
	9	0.7%	4,408	39.1	32.8	23.5	56.1	4.8	2,089	14.6	616	29.5%	56.1	43.9
	18	1.6%	10,564	15.0	22.4	62.2	83.8	1.3	4,164	42.0	1,404	33.7%	76.4	23.6
	25	17.1%	111,479	35.2	11.7	51.3	62.5	2.3	40,463	30.8	13,856	34.2%	50.2	49.8
	29	80.6%	525,053	19.1	9.6	69.7	78.9	2.0	174,776	49.8	55,753	31.9%	67.5	32.5
30			651,620	21.9	42.3	34.2	76.1	2.1	275,776	12.5	119,674	43.4%	77.3	22.7
	5	12.5%	81,535	41.9	23.0	32.1	54.7	3.4	29,261	13.9	12,018	41.1%	54.9	45.1
	30	73.7%	480,255	16.9	52.3	30.0	81.8	1.3	219,890	10.9	95,757	43.5%	81.8	18.2
	32	13.8%	89,830	30.0	6.7	58.6	65.0	5.1	26,625	24.1	11,899	44.7%	62.4	37.6
31			651,619	66.1	14.2	16.3	29.9	4.0	323,217	9.9	151,790	47.0%	34.9	65.1
	5	3.6%	23,232	58.1	25.2	15.9	40.8	1.1	11,848	8.7	5,662	47.8%	48.0	52.0
	11	60.4%	393,425	62.0	18.8	15.8	33.9	4.2	180,545	9.9	81,577	45.2%	35.6	64.4
	17	5.1%	33,001	82.6	1.0	15.0	15.9	1.4	15,665	4.8	8,196	52.3%	30.4	69.6
	31	31.0%	201,961	72.2	6.0	17.4	23.2	4.5	115,159	10.6	56,355	48.9%	33.4	66.6
32			651,620	50.1	8.3	36.2	44.3	5.7	268,513	13.3	140,163	52.2%	35.7	64.3
	3	4.1%	26,460	77.5	4.7	8.2	12.7	9.8	15,721	4.8	8,359	53.2%	26.9	73.1
	5	4.3%	28,286	37.2	21.0	39.4	60.0	2.7	9,452	8.9	4,764	50.4%	42.1	57.9
	24	20.4%	133,181	16.0	7.6	75.3	82.5	1.5	37,799	48.3	15,456	40.9%	70.6	29.4
	30	18.9%	123,042	44.1	9.3	39.7	48.6	7.2	41,280	14.6	17,352	42.0%	37.2	62.8
	32	52.3%	340,651	64.5	7.5	21.6	28.9	6.6	164,261	6.0	94,232	57.4%	30.3	69.7

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** "Statewides" is a weighted average of the results of all general election statewide contested contests.

8/3 – SENATE MAP COMPARISON

DIST	INCUMBENT	ETHNICITY	LG '98 SEN	OUTLOOK	LG '98 8-3	OUTLOOK	COMMENTS
1	SANDLIN	ANGLO	53.3	Lean R	52.0	Lean R	8-3 needs to increase R%
2	LAMPSON/GREEN	ANGLO	54.9	Lean R	53.1	Lean R	8-3 cuts Lampson base/CD 2 is open in 8-3
3	JOHNSON, SAM	ANGLO	68.7	Safe R	70.0	Safe R	
4	HALL	ANGLO	51.3	Likely D	50.3	Likely D*	8-3 needs to increase R%
5	HENSARLING	ANGLO	55.3	Safe R	55.6	Safe R	8-3 doesn't pair w/Turner
6	BARTON/FROST	ANGLO	58.9	Safe R	57.1	Safe R	
7	CULBERSON/BELL	ANGLO	65.9	Safe R	62.9	Safe R	
8	BRADY	ANGLO	56.1	Safe R	66.5	Safe R	
9	LAMPSON/OPEN	AFRICAN AMERICAN	54.3	Lean R	23.0	Safe D	8-3 creates new African American seat
10	DOGGETT	ANGLO	35.9	Safe D	50.5	Toss-up**	8-3 creates a competitive CD 10
11	EDWARDS/TURNER	ANGLO	51.1	Toss-up	51.0	Lean R	8-3 has new territory and pairs w/Turner
12	GRANGER	ANGLO	58.8	Safe R	56.4	Safe R	
13	THORNBERRY	ANGLO	59.7	Safe R	59.2	Safe R	
14	PAUL	ANGLO	44.1	Likely R	43.9	Likely R	
15	HINOJOSA	HISPANIC	38.8	Safe D	39.8	Safe D	
16	REYES	HISPANIC	35.2	Safe D	35.2	Safe D	
17	STENHOLM	ANGLO	56.3	Likely R	58.3	Likely R	
18	JACKSON-LEE	AFRICAN AMERICAN	21.7	Safe D	25.2	Safe D	
19	NEUGEBAUER	ANGLO	59.8	Safe R	57.6	Safe R	
20	GONZALEZ	HISPANIC	35.1	Safe D	32.4	Safe D	
21	SMITH	ANGLO	59.0	Safe R	54.1	Safe R	Sen 21 changes with West Texas solution
22	DeLAY	ANGLO	58.8	Safe R	62.6	Safe R	
23	BONILLA	HISPANIC	44.6	Likely R	51.2	Safe R	8-3 makes Bonilla safe; allows GOP
							Hispanic to win after Bonilla departs
24	OPEN	ANGLO	42.0	Safe D	63.7	Safe R	8-3 eliminates Frost
25	BELL/OPEN	HISPANIC	43.3	Safe D	30.8	Safe D	8-3 creates new Hispanic seat
26	BURGESS	ANGLO	66.8	Safe R	55.9	Safe R	
27	ORTIZ	HISPANIC	40.3	Safe D	39.9	Safe D	
28	RODRIGUEZ	HISPANIC	35.6	Safe D	40.6	Safe D	
29	GREEN/OPEN	HISPANIC	37.3	Safe D	34.9	Safe D	
30	JOHNSON, E.B.	AFRICAN AMERICAN	24.4	Safe D	24.4	Safe D	
31	CARTER	ANGLO	52.6	Likely R	54.7	Safe R	Sen 31 cut too thin
32	SESSIONS	ANGLO	64.7	Safe R	61.1	Safe R	

* Likely D with Hall running; Lean R as open seat

** Toss-up to Lean R with Doggett

Table 20

Ecological Regression Estimates
Hispanic and Non-Hispanic Voting in General Elections in Current and Prior Congressional District 23
1996-2002

Year of Congressional Elections, District 23	% Hispanic Voters Voting for Bonilla	% Hispanic Voters Voting for Democratic Candidates	% Non-Hispanic Voters Voting for Bonilla	% Non-Hispanic Voters Voting for Democratic Candidates
1996	30%	70%	83%	17%
1998	26%	74%	85%	15%
2000	20%	80%	83%	17%
2002	8%	92%	88%	12%
Mean	**21%**	**79%**	**85%**	**15%**

Source: Jackson Exhibit 1, Expert Report of Dr. Alan Lichtman, page 51.

RED-M200
Data: 2000 Census
PLAN 01374C 10/09/03 2:40:32

POPULATION AND GENERAL ELECTION HISTORY
CONGRESSIONAL DISTRICTS - PLAN 01374C

Texas Legislative Council
10/09/03 2:50 AM

PLAN 01374C		2000 CENSUS												GENERAL ELECTION HISTORY*						
		TOTAL POPULATION							% POPULATION					-YEAR-	—VOTER REG—		—TURNOUT—		STATEWIDES**	
DIST		DEVIATION		TOTAL	ANGLO	BLACK	HISP	B+H	OTHER	%A	%B	%H	%B+H	%O		TOTAL	%SPAN	TOTAL	TO/VR	%DEM	%REP
1	Total	0	(0.00%)	651,619	460,058	122,247	60,681	181,959	9,602	70.6	18.8	9.3	27.9	1.5	2002	352,083	2.9	165,895	47.1%	37.0	63.0
	VAP			480,945	354,233	84,260	35,928	119,663	7,049	73.7	17.5	7.5	24.9	1.5	2000	354,401	2.5	231,498	65.3%	35.1	64.9
2	Total	+1	(+0.00%)	651,620	418,629	127,200	82,408	208,182	24,809	64.2	19.5	12.6	31.9	3.8	2002	354,062	6.7	149,692	42.3%	39.4	60.6
	VAP			472,686	315,935	87,010	53,313	139,532	17,219	66.8	18.4	11.3	29.5	3.6	2000	351,581	5.9	229,240	65.2%	38.4	61.6
3	Total	0	(0.00%)	651,619	412,785	64,346	110,211	173,207	65,627	63.3	9.9	16.9	26.6	10.1	2002	314,404	6.3	146,510	46.6%	30.0	70.0
	VAP			465,131	305,661	42,541	71,164	113,041	46,429	65.7	9.1	15.3	24.3	10.0	2000	302,568	5.9	207,208	68.5%	28.9	71.1
4	Total	0	(0.00%)	651,619	516,333	70,115	51,765	121,099	14,187	79.2	10.8	7.9	18.6	2.2	2002	353,139	2.7	162,704	46.1%	37.0	63.0
	VAP			477,253	387,951	47,700	31,977	79,265	10,037	81.3	10.0	6.7	16.6	2.1	2000	343,879	2.3	223,836	65.1%	35.8	64.2
5	Total	0	(0.00%)	651,619	465,957	84,119	83,860	166,914	18,748	71.5	12.9	12.9	25.6	2.9	2002	326,234	5.3	154,794	47.4%	35.8	64.2
	VAP			478,152	356,015	56,448	52,880	108,846	13,291	74.5	11.8	11.1	22.8	2.8	2000	329,871	4.9	212,552	64.4%	35.1	64.9
6	Total	0	(0.00%)	651,619	428,747	88,229	103,619	190,214	32,658	65.8	13.5	15.9	29.2	5.0	2002	326,828	7.1	160,092	49.0%	35.9	64.1
	VAP			467,861	322,659	57,728	64,825	121,801	23,401	69.0	12.3	13.9	26.0	5.0	2000	320,166	6.3	216,710	67.7%	34.4	65.6
7	Total	+1	(+0.00%)	651,620	439,749	39,767	117,161	155,396	56,475	67.5	6.1	18.0	23.8	8.7	2002	358,524	8.4	181,798	50.7%	29.8	70.2
	VAP			497,757	349,306	27,561	79,733	106,406	42,045	70.2	5.5	16.0	21.4	8.4	2000	356,358	7.5	263,460	73.9%	29.8	70.2
8	Total	+1	(+0.00%)	651,620	521,694	58,560	58,920	116,800	13,126	80.1	9.0	9.0	17.9	2.0	2002	363,296	4.0	152,531	42.0%	33.4	66.6
	VAP			476,358	388,299	41,224	37,913	78,753	9,306	81.5	8.7	8.0	16.5	2.0	2000	359,285	3.5	228,507	63.6%	33.0	67.0
9	Total	0	(0.00%)	651,619	113,545	249,843	213,796	459,059	79,015	17.4	38.3	32.8	70.4	12.1	2002	252,487	13.7	99,301	39.3%	69.8	30.2
	VAP			458,539	94,785	167,148	139,052	303,557	60,197	20.7	36.5	30.3	66.2	13.1	2000	243,038	12.5	151,476	62.3%	67.2	32.8
10	Total	+1	(+0.00%)	651,620	433,024	63,307	122,168	183,779	34,817	66.5	9.7	18.7	28.2	5.3	2002	348,883	9.1	173,364	49.7%	36.5	63.5
	VAP			472,313	325,535	42,744	79,365	121,290	25,488	68.9	9.0	16.8	25.7	5.4	2000	344,099	8.6	243,452	70.8%	34.0	66.0
11	Total	+1	(+0.00%)	651,620	420,966	28,985	192,867	220,398	10,256	64.6	4.4	29.6	33.8	1.6	2002	345,936	19.3	166,099	48.0%	30.2	69.8
	VAP			473,547	327,523	19,374	119,700	138,519	7,505	69.2	4.1	25.3	29.3	1.6	2000	348,852	18.2	223,606	64.1%	28.3	71.7

* In most contests, election results do not include results from third party, independent, or write-in candidates. Complete official results are maintained by the office of the secretary of state.
** "Statewides" is a weighted average of the results of all general election statewide contested contests.

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PLAN 01374C DIST		2000 CENSUS: TOTAL POPULATION: DEVIATION		TOTAL	ANGLO	BLACK	HISP	B+H	OTHER	% POPULATION: %A	%B	%H	%B+H	%O	GENERAL ELECTION HISTORY*: YEAR	VOTER REG: TOTAL	VOTER REG: %SPAN	TURNOUT: TOTAL	TURNOUT: TO/VR	STATEWIDES**: %DEM	STATEWIDES**: %REP
12	Total	0	(0.00%)	651,619	433,549	39,424	154,404	192,646	25,424	66.5	6.1	23.7	29.6	3.9	2002	311,607	11.3	151,407	48.6%	37.0	63.0
	VAP			471,881	331,262	26,806	96,272	122,521	18,098	70.2	5.7	20.4	26.0	3.8	2000	306,281	10.5	206,943	67.6%	36.4	63.6
13	Total	+1	(+0.00%)	651,620	480,277	40,534	114,725	153,926	17,417	73.7	6.2	17.6	23.6	2.7	2002	340,264	9.4	156,983	46.1%	31.1	68.9
	VAP			479,426	369,113	28,262	70,019	97,777	12,536	77.0	5.9	14.6	20.4	2.6	2000	346,668	8.6	220,054	63.5%	29.0	71.0
14	Total	0	(0.00%)	651,619	404,933	67,327	162,551	228,175	18,511	62.1	10.3	24.9	35.0	2.8	2002	358,222	14.0	155,022	43.3%	39.0	61.0
	VAP			468,241	306,391	46,132	103,432	148,914	12,936	65.4	9.9	22.1	31.8	2.8	2000	357,024	13.2	257,680	72.2%	37.5	62.5
15	Total	0	(0.00%)	651,619	176,941	19,908	449,893	468,099	6,579	27.2	3.1	69.0	71.8	1.0	2002	299,798	56.7	117,458	39.2%	55.7	44.3
	VAP			443,520	141,411	14,587	283,645	297,388	4,721	31.9	3.3	64.0	67.1	1.1	2000	295,358	55.6	157,494	53.3%	50.2	49.8
16	Total	0	(0.00%)	651,619	113,278	23,298	506,142	526,127	12,214	17.4	3.6	77.7	80.7	1.9	2002	300,774	67.5	101,721	33.8%	64.4	35.6
	VAP			445,599	89,726	15,119	333,226	346,871	8,995	20.1	3.4	74.8	77.8	2.0	2000	296,346	64.8	145,047	48.9%	57.2	42.8
17	Total	+1	(+0.00%)	651,620	464,932	70,107	100,537	169,334	17,354	71.4	10.8	15.4	26.0	2.7	2002	320,971	7.6	154,705	48.2%	36.0	64.0
	VAP			486,164	362,692	46,765	63,852	110,003	13,469	74.6	9.6	13.1	22.6	2.8	2000	317,838	7.1	212,816	67.0%	35.5	64.5
18	Total	0	(0.00%)	651,619	128,686	267,046	232,074	495,780	27,153	19.7	41.0	35.6	76.1	4.2	2002	302,740	16.0	112,742	37.2%	74.0	26.0
	VAP			462,992	108,342	186,773	149,285	334,192	20,458	23.4	40.3	32.2	72.2	4.4	2000	295,663	14.7	172,458	58.3%	71.6	28.4
19	Total	0	(0.00%)	651,619	414,129	38,147	188,910	225,262	12,228	63.6	5.9	29.0	34.6	1.9	2002	328,876	19.9	154,805	47.1%	31.0	69.0
	VAP			474,970	323,979	24,740	117,900	141,949	9,042	68.2	5.2	24.8	29.9	1.9	2000	335,689	18.8	209,049	62.3%	27.9	72.1
20	Total	0	(0.00%)	651,619	152,457	49,085	437,265	482,540	16,622	23.4	7.5	67.1	74.1	2.6	2002	307,805	59.9	101,693	33.0%	62.3	37.7
	VAP			464,286	125,103	32,983	295,252	326,511	12,672	26.9	7.1	63.6	70.3	2.7	2000	321,432	58.1	162,095	50.4%	57.1	42.9
21	Total	0	(0.00%)	651,619	476,357	28,169	118,110	144,715	30,547	73.1	4.3	18.1	22.2	4.7	2002	402,229	12.9	214,279	53.3%	36.2	63.8
	VAP			493,684	372,035	18,888	80,091	98,259	23,390	75.4	3.8	16.2	19.9	4.7	2000	405,769	12.0	294,200	72.5%	33.1	66.9
22	Total	0	(0.00%)	651,619	395,061	64,039	132,002	194,525	62,033	60.6	9.8	20.3	29.9	9.5	2002	357,122	12.9	156,780	43.9%	34.1	65.9
	VAP			462,070	292,010	42,928	84,673	126,888	43,172	63.2	9.3	18.3	27.5	9.3	2000	344,311	12.1	242,945	70.6%	32.8	67.2


* In most contests, election results do not include results from third party, independent, or write-in candidates. Complete official results are maintained by the office of the secretary of state.
** "Statewides" is a weighted average of the results of all general election statewide contested contests.

RED-M200
Data: 2000 Census
PLAN 01374C 10/09/03 2:40:32

POPULATION AND GENERAL ELECTION HISTORY
CONGRESSIONAL DISTRICTS - PLAN 01374C

PLAN 01374C DIST		2000 CENSUS: TOTAL POPULATION: DEVIATION		TOTAL	ANGLO	BLACK	HISP	B+H	OTHER	% POPULATION: %A	%B	%H	%B+H	%O	GENERAL ELECTION HISTORY*: -YEAR-	—VOTER REG— TOTAL	%SPAN	—TURNOUT— TOTAL	TO/VR	STATEWIDES** %DEM	%REP
23	Total	+1	(+0.00%)	651,620	266,847	12,833	359,244	370,452	14,321	41.0	2.0	55.1	56.9	2.2	2002	362,153	44.0	167,679	46.3%	43.2	56.8
	VAP			458,443	206,678	8,780	233,469	241,456	10,309	45.1	1.9	50.9	52.7	2.2	2000	351,481	42.4	214,027	60.9%	36.5	63.5
24	Total	+1	(+0.00%)	651,620	416,412	66,990	116,815	182,232	52,976	63.9	10.3	17.9	28.0	8.1	2002	305,770	8.8	148,013	48.4%	32.4	67.6
	VAP			472,908	317,435	43,774	74,785	117,841	37,632	67.1	9.3	15.8	24.9	8.0	2000	309,942	7.9	215,820	69.6%	30.9	69.1
25	Total	0	(0.00%)	651,619	142,883	52,092	447,059	496,382	12,354	21.9	8.0	68.6	76.2	1.9	2002	277,414	55.6	103,856	37.4%	69.8	30.2
	VAP			454,116	121,040	36,414	287,855	322,807	10,269	26.7	8.0	63.4	71.1	2.3	2000	286,326	53.4	149,160	52.1%	62.2	37.8
26	Total	0	(0.00%)	651,619	430,849	105,017	93,182	196,617	24,153	66.1	16.1	14.3	30.2	3.7	2002	339,722	5.8	161,292	47.5%	37.6	62.4
	VAP			464,512	320,269	69,907	57,945	127,089	17,154	68.9	15.0	12.5	27.4	3.7	2000	323,437	5.3	221,719	68.6%	37.6	62.4
27	Total	0	(0.00%)	651,619	180,101	19,043	443,798	460,715	10,803	27.6	2.9	68.1	70.7	1.7	2002	309,050	58.0	121,217	39.2%	55.6	44.4
	VAP			449,886	141,633	12,425	288,926	300,391	7,862	31.5	2.8	64.2	66.8	1.7	2000	309,373	56.8	168,330	54.4%	50.3	49.7
28	Total	+1	(+0.00%)	651,620	181,835	43,291	420,361	461,015	8,770	27.9	6.6	64.5	70.7	1.3	2002	324,351	54.3	118,138	36.4%	58.9	41.1
	VAP			447,110	142,980	30,197	268,775	297,736	6,394	32.0	6.8	60.1	66.6	1.4	2000	319,689	53.4	156,039	48.8%	51.4	48.6
29	Total	0	(0.00%)	651,619	143,005	67,553	430,615	495,239	13,375	21.9	10.4	66.1	76.0	2.1	2002	221,543	45.9	71,661	32.3%	64.2	35.8
	VAP			433,912	114,627	42,873	268,024	309,360	9,925	26.4	9.9	61.8	71.3	2.3	2000	220,220	42.5	112,675	51.2%	57.6	42.4
30	Total	+1	(+0.00%)	651,620	142,390	275,837	222,638	495,570	13,660	21.9	42.3	34.2	76.1	2.1	2002	275,776	12.5	119,705	43.4%	77.3	22.7
	VAP			458,789	121,020	188,326	140,856	327,605	10,164	26.4	41.0	30.7	71.4	2.2	2000	278,151	11.5	157,758	56.7%	73.4	26.6
31	Total	0	(0.00%)	651,619	430,504	92,377	105,894	194,874	26,241	66.1	14.2	16.3	29.9	4.0	2002	323,217	9.9	151,790	47.0%	34.9	65.1
	VAP			465,103	322,079	60,150	66,008	124,545	18,479	69.2	12.9	14.2	26.8	4.0	2000	311,938	9.3	205,609	65.9%	32.7	67.3
32	Total	+1	(+0.00%)	651,620	326,400	54,222	235,991	288,400	36,820	50.1	8.3	36.2	44.3	5.7	2002	268,513	13.3	140,186	52.2%	35.7	64.3
	VAP			486,907	268,439	38,071	152,841	189,874	28,594	55.1	7.8	31.4	39.0	5.9	2000	280,327	11.8	191,660	68.4%	34.5	65.5

* In most contests, election results do not include results from third party, independent, or write-in candidates. Complete official results are maintained by the office of the secretary of state.
** "Statewides" is a weighted average of the results of all general election statewide contested contests.



TEXAS
U.S. Congressional Districts
HB3 - Conference Committee Report 10-9-03
PLAN 01374C

LEGEND

plan 01374C — shaded
Counties

Scale 1 : 4975022
MAP:5000C REQUEST:19318

1 inch = 78.52 miles


TEXAS LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL

RED-M200
Data: 2000 Census
PLAN 01385C 12/04/03 17:31:13

POPULATION AND GENERAL ELECTION HISTORY
CONGRESSIONAL DISTRICTS - PLAN 01385C

PLAN 01385C		2000 CENSUS												GENERAL ELECTION HISTORY*						
		TOTAL POPULATION							% POPULATION					-YEAR-	-VOTER REG-		-TURNOUT-		STATEWIDES**	
DIST		DEVIATION		TOTAL	ANGLO	BLACK	HISP	B+H	OTHER	%A	%B	%H	%B+H	%O		TOTAL	%SPAN	TOTAL	TO/VR	%DEM	%REP
15	Total	+1	(+0.00%)	651,620	154,450	12,654	479,814	490,945	6,225	23.7	1.9	73.6	75.3	1.0	2002	295,327	61.2	109,275	37.0%	59.1	40.9
	VAP			440,173	124,782	9,534	302,210	310,988	4,403	28.3	2.2	68.7	70.7	1.0	2000	289,855	59.7	146,901	50.7%	52.5	47.5
16	Total	0	(0.00%)	651,619	124,996	24,096	493,500	514,308	12,315	19.2	3.7	75.7	78.9	1.9	2002	303,833	66.2	105,673	34.8%	62.8	37.2
	VAP			447,392	98,904	15,607	325,201	339,352	9,136	22.1	3.5	72.7	75.9	2.0	2000	300,270	62.8	149,659	49.8%	55.7	44.3
20	Total	0	(0.00%)	651,619	176,596	41,090	419,738	457,271	17,752	27.1	6.3	64.4	70.2	2.7	2002	308,003	57.3	106,039	34.4%	57.5	42.5
	VAP			468,188	144,021	28,063	284,100	310,558	13,609	30.8	6.0	60.7	66.3	2.9	2000	319,630	55.4	167,218	52.3%	53.0	47.0
23	Total	0	(0.00%)	651,619	185,950	17,490	439,147	454,753	10,916	28.5	2.7	67.4	69.8	1.7	2002	326,117	54.2	143,845	44.1%	52.9	47.1
	VAP			438,694	141,596	11,715	278,602	289,386	7,712	32.3	2.7	63.5	66.0	1.8	2000	312,817	53.1	171,395	54.8%	41.6	58.4
25	Total	0	(0.00%)	651,619	185,631	15,827	443,826	458,051	7,937	28.5	2.4	68.1	70.3	1.2	2002	318,458	55.0	124,519	39.1%	53.1	46.9
	VAP			444,857	144,830	11,560	283,737	294,491	5,536	32.6	2.6	63.8	66.2	1.2	2000	320,308	54.1	169,136	52.8%	47.1	52.9
27	Total	0	(0.00%)	651,619	184,181	19,521	439,188	456,525	10,913	28.3	3.0	67.4	70.1	1.7	2002	315,976	57.6	123,458	39.1%	55.7	44.3
	VAP			450,442	144,597	12,736	286,147	297,907	7,938	32.1	2.8	63.5	66.1	1.8	2000	317,595	56.4	173,838	54.7%	50.4	49.6
28	Total	+1	(+0.00%)	651,620	192,015	69,853	379,730	445,939	13,666	29.5	10.7	58.3	68.4	2.1	2002	322,294	47.3	111,026	34.4%	56.9	43.1
	VAP			451,729	151,199	46,531	245,448	290,340	10,190	33.5	10.3	54.3	64.3	2.3	2000	323,711	46.4	165,992	51.3%	52.8	47.2

* In most contests, election results do not include results from third party, independent, or write-in candidates. Complete official results are maintained by the office of the secretary of state.
** "Statewides" is a weighted average of the results of all general election statewide contested contests.



TEXAS
U.S. Congressional Districts
GI Forum Proposal with AG Citizenship Data
PLAN 01385C

LEGEND

plan 01385C — divided
Counties

Supreme Court, U.S.
FILED
JAN 10 2006
OFFICE OF THE CLERK

NOS. 05-204, 05-254, 05-276, 05-439

IN THE

Supreme Court of the United States

LEAGUE OF UNITED LATIN AMERICAN CITIZENS, *et al.*,
Appellants,

v.

RICK PERRY, *et al.*,
Appellees.

On Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Texas

JOINT APPENDIX
Volume I of II

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05-254, JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT FILED AUGUST 24, 2005
05-276, JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT FILED AUGUST 31, 2005
05-439, JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT FILED OCTOBER 3, 2005
PROBABLE JURISDICTION NOTED DECEMBER 12, 2005

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Relevant Docket Entries

U.S. District Court
Eastern District of TEXAS (Marshall)
CIVIL DOCKET FOR CASE
Session, et al v. Perry, et al
#: 2:03-cv-00354-TJW

Date Filed	Tab	Description
10/12/2003	1	Original Complaint filed. Cause: 28:1983 Civil Rights
12/03/2003	98	Trial brief by LULAC, Webb County TX, and Cameron County Texas
12/03/2003	99	Trial brief by Charles Soechting in 2:03-cv-00354
12/03/2003	100	Trial brief by Travis, County of in 2:03-cv-00354, Austin, City of in 2:03-cv-00354
12/03/2003	107	Revised Trial brief by "State Defendants" in 2:03-cv-00354
12/03/2003	108	Trial brief by GI Forum of Texas in 2:03-cv-00354
12/03/2003	115	Trial brief by "Dem Congress Intv"and "Jackson Plaintiffs"
12/15/2003	126	Transcript of Bench Trial 12/11/03 1:00 P.M. in Austin TX before Judge Higginsbothamn T John Ward and Lee H Rosenthal filed . Court Reporter: Susan Simmons

Date Filed	Tab	Description
12/15/2003	157	Page & Line designation of Mr Jim Ellis' deposition by Walter Session in 2:03-cv-00354
12/16/2003	184	TRANSCRIPT of Bench Trial Proceedings in AUSTIN TX held on 12/15/03 at 8:30 a.m. before Judge Higginbotham Ward & Rosenthal. Court Reporter: Susan Simmons.
12/16/2003	185	TRANSCRIPT of Bench Trial Proceedings in AUSTIN TX held on 12/15/03 at 1:00 p.m. before Judge Higginbotham Ward Rosenthal. Court Reporter: Susan Simmons.
12/17/2003	186	TRANSCRIPT of Bench Trial Proceedings in AUSTIN TX held on 12/16/03 at 8:30 a.m. before Judge Higginbotham Ward & Rosenthal. Court Reporter: Susan Simmons.
12/17/2003	187	TRANSCRIPT of Bench Trial Proceedings in AUSTIN TX held on 12/16/03 at 1:00 p.m. before Judge Higginbotham Ward & Rosenthal. Court Reporter: Susan Simmons.
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Date Filed	Tab	Description
12/18/2003	188	TRANSCRIPT of Bench Trial Proceedings in AUSTIN TX held on 12/17/03 at 8:30 a.m. before Judge Higginbotham Ward & Rosenthal. Court Reporter: Susan Simmons.
12/19/2003	190	TRANSCRIPT of Bench Trial Proceedings in AUSTIN TX held on 12/18/03 at 8:30 a.m. before Judge Higginbotham Ward & Rosenthal. Court Reporter: Susan Simmons.
12/19/2003	191	TRANSCRIPT of Bench Trial Proceedings held in AUSTIN TX on 12/18/03 at 1:00 p.m. before Judge Higginbotham Ward & Rosenthal. Court Reporter: Susan Simmons
12/19/2003	192	TRANSCRIPT of Bench Trial Proceedings in AUSTIN TX held on 12/19/03 at 8:00 a.m. before Judge Higginbotham Ward & Rosenthal. Court Reporter: Susan Simmons.
12/19/2003	193	TRANSCRIPT of Bench Trial held on 12/19/03 in Austin before Judge Ward; Judge Rosenthal; Circuit Judge Higginbotham. Court Reporter: Susan Simmons. 102 pages (not scanned - original document in Clerk's Office, Marshall TX)
12/20/2003	131	POST TRIAL Brief filed by Travis, County of in 2:03-cv-00354, Austin, City of in 2:03-cv-00354

Date Filed	Tab	Description
12/22/2003	134	POST-TRIAL SUBMISSION by Charles Soechting Chairman of the Texas Democratic Party in 2:03-cv-00354
12/22/2003	135	POST TRIAL Brief filed by "State Defendants" in 2:03-cv-00354
12/22/2003	136	FILED IN TYLER POST TRIAL Brief filed by "Dem Congress Intv" in 2:03-cv-00354, Jackson Plaintiffs in 2:03-cv-00354
12/23/2003	137	Post Trial Brief filed by TX-NAACP in 2:03-cv-00354
12/23/2003	139	Post Trial Brief filed by GI Forum of Texas in 2:03-cv-00354
12/29/2003	141	POST TRIAL Brief filed by LULAC in 2:03-cv-00354
01/06/2004	162	Memorandum Opinion before Higginbotham, Cir Judge, and Ward and Rosenthal, district judges: For the reasons set forth herein, we deny all relief requested by plaintiffs; Judgment will be entered for defendants. Ward, J., concurring in part & dissenting in part copy faxed/mailed to all attys & Judges Note: See Document #162 in Lead Case 2:03cv354 (ktd) Modified on 01/06/2004

Date Filed	Tab	Description
01/07/2004	163	Notice of appeal to Supreme Court by TX Democratic Party, Jackson Plaintiffs , Mayfield Plaintiffs , Manley Plaintiffs (Eddie Jackson, Barbara Marshall, Gertrude "Traci" Fisher, Hargie Faye Jacob-Savoy, Ealy Boyd, JB Mayfield, Roy Stanley, Phillis Cotle, Molly Woods, Brian Manley, Tommy Adkisson, Samuel T Biscoe, David James Butts, Ronald Knowlton Davis, Dorothy Dean, Wilhelmina R Delco, Gustavo Luis "Gus" Garcia, Samuel Garcia, Lester Gibson, Eunice June Mitchell Givens, Margaret J Gomez, Mack Ray Hernandez, Art Murillo, Richard Raymond, Ernesto Silva, Louis Simms, Clint Smith, Connie Sonnen, Alfred Thomas Stanley, Maria Lucina Ramirez Torres, Elisa Vasquez, Fernando Villareal, Willia Wooten, Ana Yanez-Correa, Mike Zuniga Jr, and plaintiff-intervenors, Gene Green, Chris Bell, Nick Lampson, Leser Bellow, Homer Guillory, John Bland, And Rev Wille Davis) of [162-2] order Fee paid (copies to attys & judges 1/7/04) (ktd) Modified on 01/09/2004

Date Filed	Tab	Description
01/07/2004	166	ORDER denying [164-1] motion "emergency" to stay the judgment pending appeal in 2:03-cv-00354, 6:01-cv-00158 (signed by Judge T. J. Ward Higginbotham & Rosenthal) cc: attys faxed 1/7/0. (poa) Modified on 01/07/2004
01/07/2004	168	Notice of appeal to supreme court by "Cherokee Cnty pla" of [162-2] order . Fee Status: not paid cc: attys & judges fax 1/7/04
01/08/2004	170	ORDER denying [169-1] motion to stay judgment pending appeal (signed by Judge T. J. Ward 1/8/04 cc: attys & 3-judge panel 1/8/04)
01/08/2004	171	ORDER denying [167-1] motion "emergency" to stay judgment pending appeal (signed by Judge T. J. Ward 1/8/04 cc: attys & 3-judge panel
01/09/2004	173	Notice of appeal to Supreme Court by Travis, County of and Austin, City of of [162-2] order . Fee Status: not paid (copies faxed/mailed to all attorneys and judges)

Date Filed	Tab	Description
01/15/2004	174	Judgment. For the reasons expressed in the ct's opinion dated 1/6/04, it is ORDERED that the plaintiffs take nothing by way of this suit. The ct renders judgment in favor of the defendants on all claims asserted against them in these consolidated redistricting cases (signed by Judge T. J. Ward; Patrick E Higginbotham & Lee H Rosenthal 1/15/04 cc: attys & judges fx/mld 1/15/04)
01/21/2004	181	NOTICE OF APPEAL by League of United Latin American Citizens-Statewide. Filing fee not paid.
01/27/2004	176	Notice of appeal by GI Forum of Texas, "Balderas' pla", LULAC, TX Lulac Dist 7 & 15, Eli Romero of [162-2] order . Fee Status: 300.00 Receipt #101998
02/17/2004	180	TRANSCRIPT of Bench Trial Proceedings held on 12/12/03 @ 1:00 in Austin TX before Judge Ward Higginbotham & Rosenthal. Court Reporter: Susan Simmons. (poa,) (Entered: 02/17/2004)